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Supervisor:  Natalie J. Stroud 
 
Discrete emotions in response to politics have increasingly been examined. 
However, there has been a negativity bias where scholars have been primarily focusing on 
discrete negative emotions. Despite documented evidence of their distinctiveness in 
cognitive psychology, discrete positive emotions, such as enthusiasm, hope, and pride, 
have received little to no attention from communication scholars and political scientists. 
Drawing from appraisal theories, this dissertation advances our knowledge about the 
different constructs of discrete emotions, especially positive emotions, and their effects on 
information search and political participation.  
I answered two main questions in this research: First, how different are enthusiasm, 
hope, and pride from one another in terms of their constructs of appraisal components? 
Second, to what extent do discrete positive and negative emotions result in differential 
effects on people’s information seeking and political participation? 
I employed a multi-methodological approach to analyze the cognitive constructs 
and effects of discrete emotions. First, I executed an online survey to find out which 
appraisal components predict each positive emotion. The confirmatory factor analysis 
captured three different sets of cognitive appraisal dimensions for enthusiasm, hope, and 
pride. Second, I conducted an online experiment to test the varying effects of six discrete 
  
 
 
 vii 
emotions on participants’ information seeking behavior and their intentions to participate 
in eight political activities. I investigated the differential effects for three positive emotions 
and three negative emotions. 
This research uncovers that enthusiasm, hope, and pride, prevalent positive 
emotions in the political realm, are different from one another in regard to their cognitive 
appraisal constructs. Moreover, the dynamics among emotions, information seeking, and 
participation intentions are found to vary across discrete emotions with the same valance 
in several instances.  
The dissertation sheds light on different profiles of discrete emotions as well as 
their varying effects on people’s political life. The closer look at the role of discrete 
emotions in politics increases our chance to better democracy as citizens become more 
aware of their own emotions enacted by the media, politicians, parties, and can thus make 
conscious decisions about exercising their rights as a citizenry. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
On November 7, 2012, President Obama said in his victory speech, “I have never 
been more hopeful about America. And I ask you to sustain that hope. I'm not talking about 
blind optimism, the kind of hope that just ignores the enormity of the tasks ahead or the 
roadblocks that stand in our path. I'm not talking about the wishful idealism that allows us 
to just sit on the sidelines or shirk from a fight. I have always believed that hope is that 
stubborn thing inside us that insists, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that something 
better awaits us so long as we have the courage to keep reaching, to keep working, to keep 
fighting.” In 2008, running as a first-time presidential candidate, he had used the same 
sentence, “hope is not blind optimism,” throughout the campaign. The use of the rhetoric 
of hope arguably contributed to Obama’s success in galvanizing underrepresented 
populations such as African-Americans and in increasing voter turnout, especially among 
young voters. The hopeful tone of the campaign also may explain its’ fundraising 
successes, especially from individual donors (Luo, 2008). 
While giving his inaugural address on January 13, 2013, President Obama 
addressed the enthusiastic crowd by saying “they (the oath Obama spoke) are the words of 
citizens and they represent our greatest hope.” Throughout the address, he urged 
Congressional leaders and fellow citizens to unite despite their differences to achieve a 
better future (Baker, 2013). As scholars have analyzed, President Obama was noticeable 
for his talent in using the rhetoric of positivism to mobilize the public (Civettini, 2011; 
Escobar, 2011; Gould, 2011). Escobar (2011) analyzed the Obama phenomenon, saying 
“Obama succeeded in galvanizing a collective emotional ‘us’… He elicited powerful 
emotions and turned himself into the receptacle for the mobilizing energy projected by the 
means of communication” (p. 124). As Escobar acknowledged, what follows emotional 
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speeches and remarks is the electorate’s reactions. As scholars have suggested, emotions 
evoked by political events, leaders, and issues can prompt citizens to engage in political 
life (e.g., Civettini, 2011; Engelken-Jorge, 2011).  
In this dissertation, I aim to focus on the role of emotions in political information 
seeking and participation. The subject carries increasingly important social and political 
implications. As the political landscape grows more contentious and uncivil, it leads to 
heightened emotional reactions from the general public (Gervais, 2014; Hasell & Weeks, 
2016). These reactions can be positive, in response to likeminded ideas and people, and 
negative, in response to oppositional ideas and people. Research on the effect of citizens’ 
emotional experiences in the political sphere deserves more attention as feeling and 
expressing emotion is basic human nature (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2001; Lazarus, 1991; Ost; 
2004). Looking into how ordinary citizens are affected by their emotions (either 
consciously or unconsciously) in their journey as citizens warrants further investigation.  
In the sense, how emotions in politicians’ words, media soundbites, and/or 
everyday political talk guide the political process and shape our political culture has always 
been a matter of interest for political scientists and sociologists. Academic accounts of 
political emotions, however, have been far from complete in answering questions like: 
‘What is a political emotion?’ ‘What do emotions do in the political arena?’ ‘How do 
different emotions affect politicians’ and voters’ decision-making, thus shaping our 
political surroundings?’ 
One of the reasons that emotion studies in the political realm have not been holistic 
enough is a lopsided emphasis on reason over emotion, and a bias toward cognition instead 
of emotion-cognition relations (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001). The bias toward 
rationalistic or dualistic approaches, which separate emotion from reason, made it difficult 
to study emotions systematically (Ost, 2004). In short, emotions have been treated as 
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irrational or problematic occurrences that need to be tackled or suppressed. Perceived to 
be evasive and ephemeral in terms of their causes and effects, emotions were less subject 
to a systematic academic approach (Goodwin et al., 2001). Engelken-Jorge (2011) 
maintains that the marginalization of emotions only gets worse as emotions are conceived 
of “as insufficiently tangible and not subjectable to quantification” (p. 21). 
Emotions, however, are an inescapable everyday issue for political elites as well as 
the mass public (Ost, 2004). Throughout history, political elites and leaders have 
recognized that without the mobilization of emotions, efficient governing is almost 
impossible and they have looked for ways to incorporate emotions into politics and 
governing process (Ost, 2004). In particular, Richards (2004) argues that as the 
contemporary political spheres are increasingly infused with popular culture, political 
discourse gets highly emotionalized and politicians strategically diffuse affective states 
into the public’s mind using various emotional appeals. In turn, emotionality functions as 
a sensational and efficient way to agitate the public, to mobilize or demobilize voters, and 
to maintain the momentum behind certain political narratives for which media and elites 
advocate. Recently, identifying the “emotional deficit in contemporary political 
communications” as “a lack of crafted, sustained attention to the emotional needs of the 
audience,” Richards (2004) maintains that “political communications research has begun 
to register the growing importance of the affective dimensions of politics” (p. 342-345).   
Despite the increased attention to the influence of emotions in political spheres, 
there has been little research on the distinct effects of various emotions. As a more nuanced 
approach to discrete emotions would benefit our holistic understanding of the emotion 
dynamics in the political world, in this dissertation, I aim to explicate the construct of 
discrete emotions and investigate the influence of various emotions on political cognition 
and behavior. 
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CONCEPTUALIZING EMOTIONS 
Even though emotions have made a successful comeback in academia, there have 
been challenges in defining, classifying, and measuring emotions (Engelken-Jorge, 2011). 
Without knowing the appropriate framework for integrating emotions into political 
analysis, it is difficult to understand emotions’ role in politics. Regarding the framework, 
scholars have approached emotions using different conceptualization; two major 
approaches being the dimensional and discrete emotion frameworks (e.g., Lazarus; 1991; 
Russell, 1980). Although which conceptual framework should be privileged over the other 
is not a settled question, in disciplines like political science and communication, 
researchers increasingly have taken a discrete emotion approach, which emphasizes the 
unique effects of individual emotions, over a dimensional approach, which emphasizes 
grouping emotions into categories such as positive or negative (Nabi, 2010; Scherer, 1999). 
I take a similar approach, the discrete emotion model, in this dissertation, but focus on a 
set of emotions that have received little academic attention – such as pride, hope, and 
disgust – and contrast them with emotions that have been more studied – such as anger and 
anxiety. 
COGNITIVE APPRAISALS OF POLITICAL EVENTS 
Citizens are awash in emotion-evoking messages from partisan news media and 
political elites that are designed to win over the electorate on a daily basis. Politicians and 
elites are savvy enough to use emotions to engage and mobilize the public. Emotions are 
an important component of political movements (Goodwin et al., 2001). On the one hand, 
as seen in the Obama phenomenon in 2008, positive emotions can inspire citizens to 
partake in politics by suspending disbelief in governments and political leaders, which 
Gould (2011) referred to as “desiring politics” (p. 155). On the other hand, incivility and 
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negativity in politics are powerful enough to draw negative emotional reactions from voters 
that can influence participation in various types of political activities (Mutz, 2007). 
Some (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985) argue that different emotional experiences can be attributed to the cognitive 
evaluation of the environment where people experience different stimuli. Put differently, 
emotion carries a cognitive component in it (Nussbaum, 2001). Nussbaum (2001), in her 
discussion of the intelligence of emotions, argues that “emotions carry a cognitive 
component of their own, and embody our deepest thoughts.” That is to say, emotions may 
have a connection to decision-making and other cognitive judgement processes. 
Recognizing the cognitive component of emotions, a critical question is “how emotion can 
transfer itself to actual political decision making” (Sandry, 2011, p. 137). Sandry maintains 
that emotion remains important for political communicators as “it stirs the conscience and 
can lead to enduring political activity” (p. 139).  
Following this line of reasoning, I contend that cognitive evaluations or appraisals 
of political events, issues, or candidates play a key role in affecting which discrete emotion 
people experience, which is the key argument of cognitive appraisal theories. For example, 
in the Clinton-Trump election in 2016, the Trump campaign emphasized the importance of 
immigration reform and proposed to construct a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border to keep 
undocumented immigrants from entering the country. The campaign message not only 
evoked anger from Mexicans and Mexican immigrants in the U.S., but also faced 
widespread opposition from American citizens (Suls, 2017). People reasoned that the 
suggested action was an insult and threat to Mexican people and that it would be the U.S. 
government who would eventually pay the cost of building the wall (Cordoba, 2017; 
Woody, 2017). Here, anger resulted from people’s cognitive appraisal of the situation.  
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On the positive side, during political events like presidential inaugurations, people 
perceive and experience positive emotions like hope and enthusiasm as the inaugural 
address by the president is crafted to evoke positive feelings from the electorate and make 
them envision the brighter future. In short, people do not feel emotions as a blank slate, but 
recognize and evaluate cognitive determinants, which in turn cause specific emotional 
reactions (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1996; Scherer, 1999). It is important to understand the 
situations that give rise to different emotions because discrete emotions, experienced as a 
consequence of political events or in regard to issues and candidates, may influence the 
political information or sources to which people turn and whether people decide to engage 
in political activities. 
COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTS AND EFFECTS OF DISCRETE EMOTIONS 
As the attention to discrete emotions and their distinct causes and effects has 
increased, political scientists started to turn to discrete negative emotions like anger, fear, 
and anxiety (e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Weber, 2013). To this point, the emotion literature in 
political communication and political psychology has focused disproportionately on 
negative emotions like anger and fear. Due to more subtle differences in their causes and 
effects, research on positive emotions (e.g., enthusiasm, hope, pride, or contentment) has 
been quite limited both in quantity and quality. The lack of attention to the role of discrete 
positive emotions is surprising. Despite the experience of positive emotions in politics, 
systematic examinations of their effects on the citizenry are often overlooked as a deciding 
factor in inducing citizens’ political activities. Instead, citizens’ negative experiences and 
sentiments toward issues and candidates have received more attention, perhaps in part 
because conflicts and cacophony get more coverage by media and opinion leaders 
(Groeling, 2010). As we experience elections and governmental events, however, positive 
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and negative emotions often co-exist or co-occur. According to Civettini (2011), despite 
the increased distrust of government and heightened cynicism towards politics, citizens 
tend to hold positive, future-oriented perceptions that make them believe that the future 
would get better. 
Even though positive emotional effects on behavior (i.e., learning, civic 
engagement) have been documented (Fredrickson, 2001; Marcus et al., 2000), the 
differential effects of discrete positive emotions on information seeking and political 
behaviors have received little attention. Instead, scholars have treated a set of different 
positive emotions as a single, positive emotion (e.g., Brader, 2006b; Valentino, Brader, 
Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011). As Verhulst and Lizotte (2011) 
acknowledge, the dimensional framework has dominated political research on positive 
political emotions. Although other scholars have stretched their efforts to go beyond the 
dimensional model when studying discrete negative emotions and their influences on 
information processing and judgments (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000; MacKuen, Wolak, 
Keele, & Marcus, 2010), there is a void in understanding the differential effects of discrete 
emotions, especially discrete positive ones.  
The primary focus of the dissertation is the classification of discrete positive 
emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and pride) and their differential effects on political 
information seeking and participation. However, this dissertation also engages three 
discrete negative emotions, including a less explored discrete negative emotion (i.e., 
disgust) and commonly explored negative emotions (i.e., anger and anxiety), to benchmark 
the effects of positive emotions on information search and participatory behaviors.  
To do so, first I set up a study to find out and specify distinctive appraisal processes 
for discrete emotions. I specifically look into the experiences of three positive emotions 
(i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and pride) in a political context by administering an online survey 
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where I ask participants about their appraisal processes and experiences of positive 
emotions during the 2016 presidential campaign. Next, to investigate the effects of discrete 
emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, pride, anger, anxiety, and disgust), I administer an online 
experiment, using a non-probability sample, in which the effect of each discrete emotion 
is isolated and differentiated from that of other emotions. Both studies investigate people’s 
emotional experiences during the 2016 presidential election.    
Thus far, we know almost nothing about how discrete positive emotions work in 
real-life politics. Previous studies have assumed that all emotions with positive valence 
tend to encourage citizens’ engagement in politics as they signal no perceived threat in the 
environment, thus facilitating the continuation of current behaviors (Brader, 2005; 
Fredrickson, 2001; Isen, 1999; Marcus et al., 2000). However, when looking closer at the 
dimension of positive valence, incongruent findings regarding the impact of positive 
emotions on participation can be identified across studies that tend to collapse different 
positive emotions into a single positive emotion scale (e.g., see Brader, 2005, 2006b; 
Weber, 2013). Thus, the role of discrete emotions in political learning and participation 
needs to be differentiated and is worthy of further academic investigation. This is precisely 
what I intend to do in the project.  
PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION  
There are two main questions that guide this research project. First, how distinct 
are discrete positive emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and pride) in terms of their cognitive 
constructs? Second, to what extent do discrete emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, pride, 
anger, anxiety, and disgust) affect political information seeking and intentions to 
participate? The following six chapters aim to answer the questions. 
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Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical underpinnings of the discrete emotion approach 
and compares it to the dimensional approach. This chapter recognizes a deficit in research 
on discrete positive emotions and discusses the importance of studying the distinct effects 
of positive emotions in the political world. Then I present appraisal theories as a theoretical 
backdrop for examining different appraisal determinants of discrete positive emotions. 
Three positive emotions of interest – enthusiasm, hope, and pride – are reviewed. I draw 
from previous literature allowing me to identify possible cognitive constructs of each 
emotion that will later guide the study. I do not aim to study appraisal determinants of 
discrete negative emotions here because the current literature in political psychology has 
already studied and established the differences among discrete negative emotions, such as 
anger, fear, and anxiety (Nabi, 2002; Valentino, Banks, Hutchings, & Davis, 2009a; 
Weber, 2013).  
Chapter 3 presents what we know about the effect of discrete emotions with both 
positive and negative valence on political information seeking and participation behaviors 
by reviewing literature on both positive and negative emotions. Relevant theories are 
discussed to build the theoretical framework of the investigation (i.e., affective intelligence, 
expectancy violation theories, and emotional rescue model). The chapter focuses on 
predicting the dynamics amongst six discrete emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, pride, 
anger, anxiety, and disgust) and information seeking/political engagement.  
Chapter 4 details the multi-methodological approach of the dissertation. First, I 
conducted an online survey to find out how different the three positive emotions are from 
one another and whether there are different sets of appraisal determinants for the three 
emotions. Second, I fielded an online experiment to examine the differential effects of six 
discrete emotions on citizens’ political information seeking behaviors and intentions to 
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engage in political activities. I used a different prompt to induce each emotion and designed 
a mock Internet news site to track the amount and direction of people’s information search. 
Chapter 5 reveals the results of the online survey to confirm the different appraisal 
constructs of three positive emotions. Grounded on the proposed sets of cognitive items, 
each appraisal determinant is measured and tested for validity. Then, by conducting 
confirmatory factor analyses, I address the problem of co-occurrence of three emotions in 
the study and propose the best fitting appraisal constructs for enthusiasm, hope, and pride. 
The findings show that three positive emotions have different sets of appraisal dimensions 
that best predict each emotion. 
Chapter 6 presents the findings of an experiment explicating the differential effects 
of six discrete emotions on information search and participation intention. In terms of 
information search, I focus on how much information (more or less) and the type of 
information (pro-attitudinal, counter-attitudinal, or non-political) people seek under a 
specific emotional state. The results show that a few discrete emotions pose a differential 
impact on information seeking pattern and/or political activities. The dynamics between 
emotion, information search, and participation is further discussed in light of previous 
literature. 
Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation by placing the overall results in the context of 
the emotion studies in politics. I emphasize the importance of discrete emotional approach 
to the electorate and political system by illustrating how discrete emotions shape 
individuals’ political behaviors. Moreover, I discuss possible avenues for future research.  
This dissertation aims to push the boundary of understanding the role of emotions 
in politics by asking how citizens experience different emotions grounded in cognitive 
appraisal processes (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1999). Studying a wide range of discrete 
emotions and how they affect the political life of citizens and shape our political reality 
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should be a staple in getting in-depth knowledge of contemporary political communication. 
As acknowledged in the introduction, the rational and cognitive role that emotions play in 
politics have been overlooked. This dissertation hopes to fill the gap.  
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Chapter 2: Discrete Emotions 
The topic of emotions has attracted researchers from communication, psychology, 
neurology, sociology, physiology, and philosophy. This has made emotions research rich 
in its depth and breadth; however, it also has made the subject evasive. Part of the challenge 
in defining emotions comes from their inherent complexity. Emotions vary not only on 
dimensions such as intensity, duration, and valence, but also on the functions served by the 
experience of emotion and on whether emotion is directed toward one’s self or others 
(Metts & Planalp, 2011). 
Discussing what constitutes emotion, cognitive psychologists identify how 
emotions are generated, experienced, and evaluated. Ortony et al. (1990) analyze several 
components of emotions: somatic, cognitive, and motivational components. First, the 
somatic component is bodily changes due to the automatic evaluation of inputs, such as 
sweating or flushing. Second, the cognitive component refers to the evaluative dimensions 
that influence emotional experiences. In other words, an object, situation, or other type of 
stimulus requires people to process and evaluate its relationship with, or impact on, their 
wellbeing. Depending on how people evaluate the stimuli, people experience different 
emotions. For instance, people may experience fear in response to a threat deemed 
unfamiliar and relevant to their well-being (e.g., spotting a snake in one’s bed). However, 
they may not feel any emotion as they consider a threat familiar but irrelevant to their well-
being (e.g., Americans’ hearing news about earthquakes in Japan). Lastly, there is a 
motivational component of emotions, which is inclinations or urges to act or not. The 
motivational force makes people inclined to behave in a way that helps to relieve or 
maintain the emotions they experience. If people experience fear, the fear will motivate 
them to get rid of the source of the threat (e.g., move away from a snake).  
  
 
 
 13 
Also using a cognitive approach to emotions, Lazarus (1991) looks into the 
relationship between emotion and cognition and identifies that the experience of emotions 
is a result of cognitive evaluations of a given stimuli or environment. He says that emotions 
are one of the strongest motivational forces for people to adopt new goals or respond to a 
changing environment. Despite varying degrees of expertise and foci of studies, cognitive 
psychologists generally agree that emotions carry a cognitive component (Lazarus, 1991; 
Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1990). Drawing from these ideas, the overarching goal of this 
dissertation is to find the links among emotions, information processing, and political 
behavior. Even though there has been an enormous effort to explicate these relationships, 
questions regarding the psychological effects of emotions and the impact of emotions on 
behavior remain and are worth continued examination, particularly with respect to positive 
emotions, as I will detail shortly.  
DIMENSIONAL VS. DISCRETE EMOTION MODEL  
One of the unsettled questions in cognitive science and psychology has been how 
to define emotions and classify different emotions. The issue of how to approach and 
conceptualize emotions is crucial to clarify because conceptual definitions influence 
methodological decisions. Clarity in both conceptual and methodological domains yields 
greater opportunity for systematic research on emotions within and across multiple 
disciplines. To address this issue, I first review two opposing perspectives on theorizing 
emotions, the dimensional approach and the discrete emotion approach. There seems to be 
no definitive consensus that discrete emotion models should be preferred to or outperform 
dimensional models (Engelken-Jorge, Ibarra Güell, & Moreno del Río, 2011). As explained 
in the following section, however, this dissertation aligns more closely with a discrete 
emotion approach.   
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Dimensional Models 
Dimensional models of emotions can be traced back to philosophical theorists such 
as Hobbes and Spinoza. Philosophers used to categorize emotions based on their valence, 
distinguishing positive emotions from negative ones (Barrett & Russell, 1998; Russell & 
Carroll, 1999). Dimensional models (e.g., circumplex model by Russell, 1980) 
conceptualize and categorize different emotions on limited sets of continuums and usually 
take the valence of emotions into account. Going beyond the valence-only model, 
dimensional models also may consider other dimensions such as action tendency 
(approach-avoidance), arousal (high-low), and control. On the dimension of action 
tendency, anger has an approach tendency resulting in action-oriented behaviors, whereas 
fear has an avoidance tendency leading people to withdraw (Nabi, 2002). The arousal 
dimension explains the intensity of emotional experiences. Some emotions like enthusiasm 
are high-arousal emotions whereas others like compassion or depression are low-arousal 
emotions. The control dimension indicates that different emotions denote varying levels of 
perceived control over emotional stimuli or environments. For example, a feeling of hope 
indicates less control whereas a feeling of pride gives people a sense of control over the 
situation (Shiota, 2003; Tong, 2007).  
Differences in the dimensions used by investigators exist. Dimensional models 
make an assumption that experiences and motivations of different emotions are not distinct 
from each other, but fall along continuums (Russell, 1980). Following the logic, if anxious 
individuals get more aroused, they can experience anger or more extreme, negative 
emotions than anxiety. Even though there is no agreement on the nature and number of 
dimensions that are needed in dimensional models, the approaches are generally concerned 
with valence, action tendency, and arousal dimensions that characterize and distinguish 
among different emotions. Also, theorists have used a few basic emotions that are central 
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to dimensional models and act as anchoring points, such as anger and sadness (Izard, 2007; 
Russell & Barrett, 1999).  
Dimensional approaches have been critiqued in several ways. First, treating 
different emotions which share the same valence, such as anger and anxiety, as 
homogenous is problematic (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Nabi, 2010), and does not 
allow scholars to predict the distinct causes and effects of each discrete emotion. For 
instance, even though both anger and anxiety have the same negative valance, they are 
found to have distinct elicitors and consequences. Anger can be experienced when facing 
a familiar threat and promotes an approach tendency, whereas anxiety can be experienced 
when facing an unfamiliar threat and promotes an avoidance tendency (Lerner & Keltner, 
2000; Nabi, 2002). Thus, we need distinct cognitive explanations other than the varying 
levels of valence or arousal to explain how emotions such as depression, frustration, fear, 
and anxiety are elicited and experienced.  
Second, scholars have continued to reveal that the commonly agreed-upon 
dimensions underlying dimensional models (e.g., valence, arousal, and action tendency) 
cannot accurately distinguish each emotion (Clore & Ortony, 2008; Izard, 2007, 2009; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987).  Scholars stipulate that 
the experience or expression of emotion is not as continuous or seamless as the dimensional 
models suggest. For instance, following the continuous dimension of arousal, anxious (less 
intense) people should grow to feel fear (more intense) if a threat gets larger. However, in 
reality people who feel anxious by perceiving a threat in an environment may grow to feel 
frustration or depression as the threat gets more realistic or as different causes are 
perceived. Thus, the arousal dimension cannot fully explain or predict whether anxious 
people grow fearful, frustrated, or depressed as the perceived threat grows.  
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Third, even though the dimensions (e.g., valence and arousal) of emotion are 
usually assumed to be orthogonal, many studies demonstrate non-orthogonality (Abelson 
et al., 1982, Marcus et al., 2000). On the two orthogonal dimensions, arousal and valence, 
for example, serenity can be considered as low arousal and moderately pleasant emotion, 
and enthusiasm can be regarded as highly pleasant and high arousal emotion. However, 
previous emotion studies often conflated the valence dimension with other dimensions like 
arousal or control (e.g., Fredrickson & Cohn, 2008). Marcus et al. (2006) argue that valence 
is correlated rather than orthogonal to the dimension of arousal, saying that “the failure to 
take the dynamic character of non-orthogonality into account is a serious problem for any 
study that focuses on just one dimension of emotion, as in the valence model” (p. 35). As 
result of the accumulated academic effort, appraisal theories (Izard, 2007, 2009; Lazarus, 
1991, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), the functional neuroscience perspective (Huddy et 
al., 2007; LeDoux, 1989), and the cognitive functional model (Nabi, 2002) – discrete 
models to which I turn shortly – increasingly have been substituted for the dimension-based 
approaches.  
Discrete Emotion Models 
Over time, psychologists have dealt with discrete political emotions, differentiating 
emotions with the same valence, such as anger, fear, sadness, guilt, and shame, to identify 
whether each emotion affects people differently. Nabi (2003, 2010), in her defense of 
emphasizing discrete emotions in communication research, argues that a clearly focused 
and defined set of discrete emotions is the most useful approach as it is precise in 
prediction. She suggests that the beauty of the discrete emotion model is that it incorporates 
the dimensional perspective in the way that valence and intensity are evaluated, but goes 
  
 
 
 17 
much further by capturing the additional elements that provide nuanced explanations for 
human behavior.  
Appraisal theories argue that particular emotions, such as joy, anxiety, sadness, 
hostility, guilt, pride, and contentment, should be considered distinct in that they are 
assumed to be unique emotional experiences that stem from different causes (e.g. Barrett, 
2006; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984). Discrete emotion models posit that each emotion 
has a distinct pathway which shows why it is felt (activation), how it is felt (somatic 
arousal), how it affects cognitive processing of stimuli and the environment, which 
appraisal might follow, and how it translates into behavior. Thus, discrete models assume 
that even though some emotions share the same valence, they work in different ways. For 
example, feeling anger promotes approach tendencies while feeling fear promotes 
avoidance tendencies despite the fact that they have the same valence.  
Discrete emotion studies suggest that the experiences of emotions can be explained 
and predicted on the basis of people’s cognitive interpretation of an emotion-inducing 
environment (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1996). This is the central tenet of appraisal 
theories, which contends that “emotions are elicited and differentiated on the basis of a 
person’s subjective evaluation or appraisal of the personal significance of a situation, 
object, or event on a number of dimensions or criteria” (Scherer, 1999, p. 637). The term 
“appraisal” was first coined by Magda Arnold (1960), who used the term to explain the 
elicitation of different emotions. Support for appraisal theories has been found in several 
studies (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2001; Scherer, 1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; 
Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993). These studies show that each emotion has a 
specific appraisal pattern, and that appraisal-emotion relationships are generally consistent 
across cultures. In other words, people use different sets of evaluative criteria, and their 
judgments of emotional events or stimuli would eventually determine which emotions 
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might occur or be experienced. The dimensions people use to evaluate the stimuli or 
environment are called appraisal components/determinants (Frijda, 1987; Manstead & 
Tetlock, 1989; Roseman, 1984, 1996; Scherer, 1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), appraisal 
profiles/variables (Frijda, 1987; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989), or cognitive 
dimensions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Appraisal components make discrete emotions 
more useful when studying the distinct effects of each emotion in communication contexts.  
There are limitations to the discrete emotions models, however. The fundamental 
premise that discrete emotions show patterns of predetermined, neurobiological, and 
expressive responses has not been consistently confirmed (Larsen, Bernston, Poehlmann, 
Ito, & Cocioppo, 2008; Metts & Planalp, 2011). This is because under a wide range of 
social interactions and various communicative contexts, one discrete emotion is likely to 
merge with complicated cognitive activities, generating more complex emotions, such as 
pride, guilt, or embarrassment. Emotion scholars say that complex emotions, unlike basic 
emotions such as anger, fear, or disgust, can be identified by and are experienced with more 
complicated cognitive activities beyond physiological reactions or somatic expressions 
(e.g., Solomon, 2008; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Pride, for example, is a complex emotion 
as it can be experienced when people who are feeling happy engage in self-evaluation of 
one’s own achievement compared to others’, which is identified as a complex and 
conscious cognitive process (Lewis, 2008; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). As complex 
emotions need advanced thinking and conscious evaluations of emotional stimuli in 
relation to the environment, it is challenging to study and find out consistent appraisal 
patterns and responses of complex emotions compared to those of basic emotions that are 
directly related to basic survival skills (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989, 2008). Even though 
discrete emotion models may not fully explain the experience of or reactions from complex 
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emotions like pride and shame, they are better at identifying multiple cognitive appraisal 
determinants as well as taking into account situational evaluations of various emotions.  
DISCRETE POSITIVE & NEGATIVE EMOTIONS 
Discrete emotional models have yielded an extensive amount of literature on 
different effects of discrete emotions in various disciplines. It is worth noting, however, 
that there is a clear negativity bias in terms of the prevalence of emotion studies (Barrett, 
2006; Tong, 2007; Verhulst & Lizotte, 2011). In other words, discrete emotions with 
negative valence have received much more attention than discrete positive emotions in 
empirical studies. In the section, I briefly discuss the models and findings regarding both 
discrete positive and negative emotions, drawing a conclusion that we need more research 
on discrete positive emotions. 
Scholars adopting discrete emotion models argue that people encounter different 
kinds of negative stimuli and respond differently under the conditions of uncertain risk 
(anxiety) and known threat (aversion) (e.g., Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus et al., 
2000). Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001), for example, demonstrate that anger and fear are 
associated with different patterns of risk assessment: fear is related to loss of control thus 
leading to pessimistic perspectives, whereas anger is attributed to blame and thus related 
to more optimistic views. Dealing with the same negative emotions, Nabi (2002) also 
proposes the cognitive functional model (CFM), a model distinguishing among discrete 
negative emotions (i.e., anger, fear).  
Recent research on positive emotions has contributed to the literature on discrete 
positive emotions. Several studies indicate that positive emotions are a heterogeneous set 
of emotions with positive valence (e.g., Frijda, 1987; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 
2007). The prediction and experience of one positive emotion follows a different cognitive 
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process from that of another positive emotion, and specific positive emotions have unique 
qualities and consequences. So far, there is much literature studying the differential 
influence of discrete negative emotions on information processing and subsequent political 
outcomes. Verhulst and Lizotte (2011) acknowledge that “the majority of the work on 
discrete emotions has focused on the disparate impact of different negative emotions” (p. 
83). Most work on discrete positive emotions, however, remains inconclusive (Barrett, 
2006). Little research has looked at the differential impacts of discrete positive emotions 
on information processing and cognitive reasoning.  
One reason why positive emotions may have been featured less frequently in past 
research is simply that they are harder to study. The pathways showing how different 
positive emotions lead to distinct thought-action responses (e.g., information processing or 
retention) are harder to identify than those of negative emotions. Appraisal theorists have 
generally found that positive emotions are less cognitively distinct than negative ones 
(Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). As negative emotions 
lead to clearer action tendencies, this translates into clear and reliable results in a lab 
setting. Further, the effect of positive emotions tends to be less distinct, making the 
observation and operationalization more challenging (Fredrickson & Cohn, 2008). In other 
words, it is easier to find the distinct and large effects of discrete negative emotions as the 
effect size is usually greater than that of discrete positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2008; 
Fredrickson & Losada, 2005).  
Another reason for the lower level of attention to discrete positive emotions is that 
positive emotions initiate a broader range of thoughts and actions, so it is more likely that 
the effect of one positive emotion will trigger another positive emotion, making it difficult 
to study the distinct effect of one positive emotion (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). For 
example, the experience of interest could lead to thoughts about new challenges, leading 
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quickly to experiences of both pride and excitement. For these reasons, researchers who 
wish to study positive emotions may suffer from procedural difficulties (e.g., building 
measures), smaller effect sizes, and less distinct outcomes. However, this should not be 
taken to mean that positive emotions are less important and it should not hinder efforts to 
study discrete positive emotions.   
Despite these challenges, discrete emotion models propose that different positive 
emotions should have distinct thought–action procedures, or appraisal components based 
on how people evaluate the environment and their physiological reactions. The fact that 
different positive emotions co-occur does not mean that they do not have distinct constructs 
or effects. To elaborate, evidence shows that positive emotions tend to co-occur with each 
other more often than negative emotions do (e.g., Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & 
Benvenuto, 2001). According to the affect transfer and associative network theories (e.g., 
Forgas, 1999), one specific emotion might trigger another positive emotion, since 
associative networks have been reinforced based on the valence of related events of 
emotional stimuli. Barrett et al. (2001), for example, found that the average inter-
correlations between positive emotions (i.e., happiness, joy, enthusiasm, and amusement) 
was .74, whereas that for the negative emotions (i.e., anger, sadness, shame, nervousness, 
and guilt) was .33 in a study where participants rated their daily experiences on a series of 
positive and negative emotions. However, high correlations among positive emotions do 
not necessarily mean that they share the same appraisal or cognitive components or have 
the same effects on cognition and behavior (Fredrickson & Cohn, 2008).  
One way to find strong and consistent differential effects across positive emotions 
is to build valid and reliable measures. Emotion scholars have had a hard time 
differentiating and classifying discrete positive emotions (see Isen, 1999 for review). 
Complex emotions like hope and pride are hard to detect as they do not trigger noticeable 
  
 
 
 22 
physiological symptoms, such as increased heart rate and sweaty palms, which can be 
related to emotional experiences. Appraisal theorists usually have looked into cognitive 
constructs of emotions to determine whether certain emotions of interest have been 
experienced. These cognitive appraisal components have been used to classify discrete 
positive emotions (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). 
Appraisal components of emotions refer to a set of specific evaluative dimensions of 
emotional experiences with which people process an object, stimulus, or environment that 
evokes various emotions in people. For instance, using the components of controllability 
and pleasantness, a person feels frustration when the situation seems highly unpleasant and 
seems uncontrollable (Frijda, 1987). Smith and Ellsworth (1985) also argue that emotional 
experiences can be differentiated by and associated with distinct patterns of cognitive 
appraisal. Specifically, using uncertainty and attention as appraisal criteria, people 
experience surprise when a situation draws more attention and the future seems to be 
uncertain (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Appraisal theorists have postulated different sets of 
criteria to explain discrete emotions. Based on different sets of cognitive appraisal 
components, emotion scholars have evaluated emotion-inducing environments and 
subsequent emotional responses (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 1984, 1996; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). Drawing from appraisal theories, this dissertation will look 
to define the circumstances that give rise to discrete positive emotions.  
One limitation is that appraisal studies have not fully explored or agreed on a unique 
set of appraisal components for each positive emotion (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2001; 
Tong, 2007). Further, the appraisal components evaluated in prior research were found to 
be inconsistent or less reliable predictors of specific positive emotions than desired. To 
date, classification accuracy rates (both for positive and negative emotions) vary from 30 
to 50 percent depending on the dimensions used and emotions analyzed in different studies. 
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For example, Smith and Ellsworth (1985) identified six appraisal components (i.e., 
pleasantness, anticipated effort, self-other responsibility, control, certainty, and attention) 
to classify 15 different emotions (i.e., happiness, sadness, fear, anger, boredom, challenge, 
interest, hope, frustration, contempt, disgust, surprise, pride, shame, and guilt), and the 
classification accuracy rate was around 42.1 percent. Frijda et al. (1989) used 13 appraisal 
variables to classify 32 emotions (both positive and negative) with a 43.2 percent accuracy 
rate. Most recently, Tong (2007) used 17 cognitive dimensions to classify 14 different 
positive emotions (including hope and pride, but not enthusiasm) with a 45.5 percent 
accuracy rate. Across the studies, not only the nature and number of appraisal components 
used but also the type and number of emotions studied have not been identical, thus it is 
challenging to identify the best set of appraisal components to classify positive emotions 
(Frijda et al., 1989; Tong, 2007). Across the studies, however, the hypothesis that subtle 
emotion distinctions reflect differences in their appraisal variables receives support.  
Moreover, it is worth noting that there are many distinct appraisal components 
about which past studies have theorized, but have not examined yet. For example, hope is 
posited to be related to perceiving a positive side of the future (Lazarus, 1991); pride could 
be related to perceived superiority of oneself over others (Tesser & Collins, 1988); humility 
could be a perceived weakness in oneself (Tangney, 2002); contentment is posited as 
perceived autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 2000); and compassion could be measured with the 
dimension of identification with others (Cassell, 2002). Typically, these appraisal 
components have been used to theoretically conceptualize each emotion, but have not been 
measured or studied to find out the empirical links between appraisal components and 
emotions.  
In sum, numerous independent lines of research not only indicate that positive 
emotions generally serve important adaptive functions, but also suggest that each positive 
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emotion is unique and different from other positive emotions (the discrete emotion model). 
Yet, previous studies have not produced strong findings about the effects of discrete 
positive emotions, especially their idiosyncratic influences. Second, recent literature 
indicates that cognitive appraisal components are central to differentiating discrete positive 
emotions and practical measures to identify whether people experience different emotions 
(e.g., Frijda, 1987; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). However, appraisal components of positive 
emotions have been neither comprehensively examined nor found to be sensitive enough 
to differentiate various positive emotions (Tong, 2007).  
It is important to note clearly that I will focus on understanding the appraisal 
dimensions of positive emotions (enthusiasm, pride, and hope), and not those of negative 
emotions (anger, anxiety, and disgust) that will feature in the next chapter. So far, scholars 
have looked at discrete negative emotions in relation to their appraisals, effects, and 
motivation (DeBell, 2016; Nabi, 2002; Redlawsk et al., 2010; Roseman & Smith, 2001) 
which highlights why and how they are different from each other. Discrete negative 
emotions like fear, anxiety, or anger have been explicated extensively in light of their 
appraisals in the political contexts by drawing from appraisal theories (see Huddy, 
Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Isbell, Ottati, & Burns, 2006; MacKuen et al., 2010; Nabi. 
2003; Valetino et al., 2011), whereas past literature on political emotion has not taken into 
account distinct appraisals of positive emotions. Thus, I do not investigate the appraisal 
profiles of discrete negative emotions as it is already established notion that negative 
emotions are discrete in terms of their appraisals in politics.  
In the dissertation, drawing from the past findings of appraisal studies of positive 
emotions, I intend to identify a set of appraisal components that can best explain specific 
positive emotions. To date, cognitive psychologists have focused on either identifying a 
specific set of appraisal dimensions which explain various emotions or studying the 
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discriminant power of them without applying the findings to particular contexts. In this 
study, however, the appraisal components of discrete positive emotions will be examined 
in terms of their applicability to a particular context, which is politics. This is the key way 
in which this dissertation expands beyond prior literature, which has tended not to focus 
on a particular context. But particular contexts – like politics – may improve the ability to 
discriminate among the emotions and reveal clearer appraisal dimensions. Experiencing 
various positive emotions in political contexts, such as elections, campaigns, and rallies, is 
expected to be quite different from feeling positive in everyday life since engaging in 
politics is a unique social experience that may involve different appraisals of the political 
environment or social change and its relations with oneself. 
Filling the Gap by Identifying Appraisals of Discrete Positive Emotions 
In this section, appraisal theories on emotion are reviewed on the basis of their 
exploration of positive emotions. The evaluative processing of emotion-inducing stimuli 
results in different emotions and the dimensions of emotional experiences (e.g., anticipated 
effort/obstacle, controllability, agency, novelty) can vary across different emotions 
(Scherer, 1999). One of the main proponents of appraisal theories, Lazarus (1991), argues 
that the qualities of emotions (e.g., valence, intensity) are determined a priori by the 
antecedent event evoking emotion. People process and evaluate a given situation either 
consciously or unconsciously. The emotion-accompanying evaluative processes and the 
interactive cognition-emotion dynamics lead to different adaptive strategies such as relying 
on heuristics or motivated reasoning (Lazarus, 1991). 
The link between emotions and cognitions has been demonstrated in prior work. 
Frijda (1987, 1989) reveals a strong relationship between emotions and cognitive structures 
by demonstrating that words referring to the same emotional state are intuitively felt to 
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have similar meaning and to closely correspond with appraisal components (i.e., the 
clusters of different emotional states obtained from a mood adjective checklist composed 
of 231 words that were considered applicable to emotions). Shame, guilt, and regret, for 
example, were predicted by self-agency dimension, and a set of positive emotions (e.g., 
enthusiasm, romantic love, and happiness) corresponded with a high arousal state. The 
strong correlations found in the study show the similarities between emotional states and 
their appraisal components.    
Roseman (1984, 1996) identifies appraisal determinants of discrete emotions in 
experiments that test how different appraisals of a situation determine one's emotional 
responses. Based on five different appraisal components (motivational state, situational 
state, certainty, legitimacy, and agency/control), a range of different emotions were found 
to be linked. Roseman (1984) argues that feelings of pleasantness/unpleasantness are a 
function of two appraisals: appraisals of what one wants (i.e., motivational state) in relation 
to what one has (i.e., situational state). In a sense, emotions resulting from attaining a goal 
are different from those resulting from securing what one already has. Likewise, the 
unpleasant feeling of a noxious event is different from the feeling of loss. Using the 
dimension of legitimacy, Roseman identifies different emotions, such as anger, guilt, 
shame, and pride, based on whether the (good or bad) outcome is deserved or undeserved. 
In short, each appraisal component had a significant effect on emotions, and certain 
combinations of appraisals were predictive of different emotional experiences (Roseman, 
1984, 1996).  
Tong (2007) proposes new appraisal components based on research on positive 
emotions. Based on his dimensions, the positive emotions appear to be just as distinct from 
one another as the negative emotions. He adopts some of the dimensions from Smith and 
Ellsworth’s (1985) analysis of appraisal components and identifies some dimensions (e.g., 
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effort, pleasantness, moral violation, and mastery) that have greater discriminatory power 
than other appraisal variables. Throughout the extensive analysis, Tong (2007) concludes 
that seventeen cognitive dimensions are effective at classifying fourteen different positive 
emotions (e.g., amusement, challenge, compassion, hope, humility, pride, and interest).  
This dissertation reviews appraisal theories because appraisal components are 
usually the tools that emotion scholars use to differentiate positive emotions (e.g., Lazarus, 
1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). They provide a way in which discrete 
positive emotions with different causes and consequences can be well differentiated. The 
takeaway from appraisal studies is that some appraisal components do a better job 
differentiating discrete emotions than others. The use of accurate and highly predictive 
cognitive appraisal components increases the validity of differentiating and identifying 
discrete positive emotions of interest. Considering the goal of the dissertation, which is to 
find the differential effects of discrete positive emotions on information processing and 
political participation, a first objective of this study is to identify a set of appraisal 
components to differentiate among three positive emotions in the context of politics: 
enthusiasm, hope, and pride.   
Discussion of Enthusiasm, Hope, and Pride 
In the section, I discuss the three positive emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and 
pride) that my dissertation aims to study. The reason why I chose these three emotions is 
that they have not been systematically studied as discrete emotions in the political domain, 
yet they have potentially important effects on information processing and political 
participation. Enthusiasm is shown to be a highly action-oriented emotion, thus carries 
many implications in the political realm (Frijda et al., 1989; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; 
Marcus et al., 2000). Of the three positive emotions, enthusiasm has been studied most 
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frequently (Brader, 2005, 2006b; Marcus et al., 1993, 2000, 2006). Pride and hope, studied 
less often, are noticeable political emotions in terms of their connection to agency and 
certain arousal states (Engelken-Jorge et al., 2011; Frijda et al., 1989). Recently, some 
attention was paid to studying the effect of hope in politics because President Barack 
Obama often used the term (e.g., Escobar, 2011; Civettini, 2011). Hope is one of the most 
referenced emotions in the political rhetoric to galvanize the electorate (Gould, 2011), but 
studies show that hopeful people usually perceive the agency in the circumstances, not 
within themselves (Frijda et al., 1989; Tong, 2007). Pride, on the other hand, is found to 
be more self-oriented in terms of agency than hope (Frijda et al, 1989; Tangney, 1999). 
People who experience pride toward a political candidate, issue, or event tend to be more 
certain about the future than hopeful people (i.e., past studies show that pride is more 
strongly related to the certainty component than hope), and this may result in meaningful 
differences in political activities (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). Lastly, Frijda et 
al. (1989) suggest that both hope and pride show the sign of hyperactivism, such as feeling 
excited or exuberant. These three emotions have been referenced frequently in the 
psychology discipline in terms of their cognitive implications for behavior (Tong, 2007; 
Tracy & Robins, 2004), however, they have received far less attention in political studies. 
In order to fill the gap, I take an appraisal-based approach to differentiate hope, 
pride, and enthusiasm in the political domain. Even though enthusiasm has been included 
in some studies, political scholars have not differentiated enthusiasm from other discrete 
positive emotions like pride or hope (e.g., Marcus et al., 2000). Studying the effect of 
enthusiasm, political scholars have taken a dimensional approach by treating enthusiasm 
as the opposite dimension of different negative emotions, such as anger and anxiety. The 
reason why discrete positive emotions, especially pride and hope, have been featured 
disproportionately in political studies despite their importance in cognitive and social 
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psychology is intuitive: Pride and hope are complex emotions (Mascolo & Fischer, 1995) 
and the constructs have not been fully explored, thus making them hard to operationalize 
in political contexts.  
The few studies that have been done addressing these emotions have adopted 
qualitative approaches to discuss the importance they carry in politics (with exception of 
enthusiasm). For example, Snyder’s (1994, 2000) work on hope discusses its implications 
for politics, however, there have been no further studies of which I am aware that extend 
the discussion on hope in politics. Thus, the objective of this section is to develop 
conceptualizations of the three emotions based on cognitive psychology literature looking 
at the positive emotions. This provides the groundwork for meaningfully differentiating 
among the three emotional responses. 
Enthusiasm  
According to the semantic analysis by Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989), 
enthusiasm can be defined as a “strong desire to do things” (p. 113). They conceptualize 
enthusiasm as an emotional desire that functions to motivate behaviors to achieve goals. 
Weber (2013) shows that happiness, hope, and optimism load on an enthusiasm dimension 
and explains that these positive emotions can be derived from conceiving or achieving 
future goals. Shiota (2003), compiling a taxonomy of positive emotion words, 
differentiates enthusiasm from other positive emotions, such as contentment, hope, and 
pride. Shiota uses the term enthusiasm to refer to the emotion felt when the environment 
signals an imminent increase in resources. Thus, people experience enthusiasm when 
perceiving a goal to be achievable or noticing possible improvement in available resources 
like money, food, or shelter, which are indications of an enhanced possibility of goal 
achievement.  
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In general, positive emotions like joy, contentment, and happiness activate 
approach tendencies which facilitate a continuation of action since there is no perceived 
threat or risk involved in the environment (Fredrickson & Cohn, 2008). Johnson-Laird and 
Oatley (1989) also consider enthusiasm an approach emotion, signaling the body that the 
continuation of a current behavior is safe and appropriate (Cacioppo, Gardner, & 
Berntsonconti, 1999; Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Fredrickson, 2001). As an emotional 
state, enthusiasm is a moderate- to high-arousal emotion, where people become motivated 
to expend effort and continue current behaviors (i.e., approach tendency) in order to pursue 
and acquire potential rewards (Fredrickson, 1998). Also, enthusiastic people are more 
prone to respond to positive events and behave proactively when they perceive increased 
opportunities for resource acquisition than non-enthusiastic people (Shiota, 2003). In sum, 
enthusiasm can be constructed as a cognitive process that invites the recognition of 
resource acquisition, experience of heightened pleasantness, and display of strong 
desirability (e.g., action tendency) to achieve a goal (Frijda et al., 1989; Shiota, 2003). 
Measures and findings  
There are some controversies around whether enthusiasm is a discrete emotion or 
not, and this disagreement is partially attributable to different measures of enthusiasm (e.g., 
Barrett, 1989). Even though enthusiasm has been conceptually differentiated from pride 
and hope in cognitive psychology, others treat enthusiasm as representing all emotions with 
positive valence. Barrett (1989), for example, examining different positive emotions, 
combined measures of enthusiasm (enthusiastic, excited, lively, and energetic) with 
measures of happiness (happy, delighted, joyful, and cheerful) to assess positively-
valenced emotional states. Moreover, many political science scholars have combined 
discrete positive emotions (e.g., pride, joy, hope, enthusiasm) together to create one 
positive emotion scale and this makes it hard to predict the distinct cause and effect of 
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different positive emotions (Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001; Brader, 
Groenendyk, & Valentino, 2010; Groenendyk & Banks, 2014; Just et al., 2015; MacKuen 
et al., 2010; Marcus et al., 2000; Weber, 2013).  
Enthusiasm has been measured in different ways. Although enthusiasm is one of 
the most studied positive emotions in the political science literature, the measures past 
research has adopted were mostly grounded in a dimensional approach (e.g., Marcus et al., 
2000; Valentino et al., 2011). For instance, studies only use a single item (e.g., how often 
do you feel enthusiastic toward a candidate? Has a candidate ever made you feel 
enthusiastic?) or combine a battery of positive emotion questions asking about the 
frequency of feeling hopeful/proud/enthusiastic to create an enthusiasm measure (Marcus 
et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2009b).  
Regarding the manipulation of enthusiasm, Weber (2013) examines the exposure 
to enthusiasm-inducing ads in experiments and asks questions regarding participants’ 
emotional state (i.e., happiness, hope, optimism) to ensure that the manipulation induces 
enthusiasm. Valentino and colleagues (2008, 2011), on the other hand, use open-ended 
prompts asking participants to recall enthusiasm-inducing events, and based on a semantic 
analysis, they measure how enthusiastic the participants felt. Hereby, I argue that the 
previous measurement in political research has a very limited ability to find out the 
distinctive cognitive components of different positive emotions (i.e., under which 
circumstances people experience enthusiasm, hope, or pride) and this makes it harder for 
researchers to study discrete positive emotions and their differential effects in politics.  
In contrast, cognitive psychologists have differentiated enthusiasm from others 
positive emotions by examining its appraisal components (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Shiota, 
2003) and the dissertation follows the discrete emotion approach to study the different 
constructs of enthusiasm, hope, and pride. As the main goal of the chapter is to differentiate 
  
 
 
 32 
discrete positive emotions based on their appraisal components, I use a set of cognitive 
appraisal items (e.g., Were you in control of what was happening? Did you want to avoid 
the situation? And Did you understand what was going on?) to ensure that certain appraisal 
components are predictive of the intended emotion like enthusiasm.  
To date, however, the literature has rarely examined appraisal components of 
enthusiasm as a distinct emotional state, and this limits the accuracy of current predictors 
of enthusiasm. Frijda et al.’s (1989) study is one exception and they found that enthusiasm 
was positively related to and predicted by the following appraisal components: valence 
(pleasantness), clarity of situation, personal relevance (importance), agency (both self and 
other), and action tendency (approach). In other words, enthusiasm is a highly pleasant, 
action-oriented, and personally-relevant emotion, and people who experience enthusiasm 
tend to be certain about what is going on in a situation and perceive that they and/or others 
are in control of what happens in the environment.  
Given the scarcity of studies examining the appraisal components of enthusiasm 
(for an exception, see Frijda et al., 1989), this dissertation will be exploratory rather than 
confirmatory in its analysis of the appraisal components predicting enthusiasm. The 
appraisal components examined in the dissertation include not only those that have been 
identified previously (i.e., valence, agency, clarity, action tendency), but also new ideas 
like the recognition of resource acquisition drawn from the existing literature (e.g., Shiota, 
2003). 
Pride 
Another frequently identified positive emotion is pride. Most of the literature on 
pride is from developmental psychology, but the emotion has been highly neglected in 
other disciplines (Tangney, 1999). Based on their semantic analysis of different emotions, 
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Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989) define pride as “happiness with self as a result of a high 
opinion of self in relation to others” (p. 120). Lazarus (1991) notes that pride occurs when 
a valued achievement is accredited to oneself or to significant others. Mascolo and Fischer 
(1995) explain that pride can be experienced when one “appraises the self as having 
responsibility for accomplishing a socially valued outcome or being a socially valued 
person” (p. 65). In this sense, feeling pride can lead to approach tendencies as it encourages 
future behavior by making people think highly of themselves as well as by calling attention 
to possible future accomplishments (Frijda et al., 1989; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995; Tong, 
2007).  
It is worth noting that pride is quite different from happiness or joy. The pleasant 
impression of pride is caused by the idea that one has achieved or accomplished something 
significant, and the impression in turn causes another idea, which Hume described as an 
idea of the self (Lewis, 2008; Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007). Pride, in other words, 
cannot be experienced with the feeling or sensation alone, but is identified with cognitive 
processes such as self-reflection (Solomon, 2008; Tangney, 1999). Basic emotions, such 
as happiness, sadness, anger, and disgust, can arise as a result of unconscious appraisals, 
and they can be experienced for no specific reason (Izard, 2009; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 
1996). Complex emotions like pride, however, depend on conscious appraisals that relate 
to our own perception of the relationships between self and others (Johnson-Laird & 
Oatley, 1989, 2008). Complex emotions usually hinge on cognitive abilities and develop 
later in life after learning and understanding the concept of self. Thus, what is called self-
conscious evaluative emotions cannot occur until elaborate cognitive processes have 
occurred (Stipek, Recchia, & McClintic, 1992). As most emotion theorists suggest, a 
recognized self or awareness of self is a prerequisite for emotions, such as embarrassment, 
shame, guilt, and pride (Lewis, 1992, 2008; Stipek et al., 1992; Tracy, Robins, & Lagattuta, 
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2005). In short, pride is usually derived from positive self-evaluation or self-esteem with 
respect to one’s valuable achievement.  
Lastly, pride is an example of intergroup emotions which can be defined as 
“emotions that arise when people identify with a social group and respond emotionally to 
events or objects that impinge on the group” (Smith & Mackie, 2008, p. 428). Smith and 
Mackie propose intergroup emotions theory, explaining that certain emotions arise in 
intergroup situations where people build a psychological connection to a particular group. 
In an intergroup environment, social comparison, competition, and conflict between 
different groups can become so salient that it will lead ingroup members to experience 
social emotions such as pride and shame. For instance, strong partisans may experience 
collective pride or shame based on the result of elections or polls about preferred candidates 
(Smith & Mackie, 2008).  
Pride serves social functions as the emotion evolves in a social context and should 
be beneficial for a person’s social survival or adaptation (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). Pride 
can be an individual response to a positive evaluation of a specific action, thought, or 
phenomenon. Here, the object that makes people feel proud is specific and related to a 
particular behavior. Thus, when feeling pride, people focus on their actions that make them 
proud and the specific focus allows for future action. In sum, pride can be constructed as a 
cognitive process connected to achieving something valuable, evaluating self-other 
relations (on the achievement), and feeling mastery from positive self-regard. 
Measures and findings  
Most of the literature looking into pride uses self-reported measures to identify 
pride and related experiences as cognitive psychologists acknowledge that pride, being 
cognitively complex and consciously felt, usually has no physiological symptoms 
(Tangney, 1999). Experiencing pride signifies that one is doing well; a person who feels 
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proud of one’s achievement perceives that he out-performs others on a task or in terms of 
attributes (Lewis, 1993; Tesser & Collins, 1988). Further, people experience pride not just 
about individual achievements, but also about the achievements of their significant others, 
such as family and partners. 
Most scholars have relied on the cognitive appraisal components of pride when 
deciding whether it is experienced. Tong (2007) demonstrates that pride is positively 
related to the following appraisal components: pleasantness (valence), feeling of mastery 
resulting from achieving something desirable and important, clarity of the situation, and 
social appropriateness (Tong, 2007). Speaking of the social appropriateness component, 
pride functioning as a social emotion can shed light on the fact that people experience pride 
when evaluating that it is socially appropriate to feel what they feel in intergroup contexts 
(i.e., achieving something others have not achieved). Frijda and colleagues (1989) also 
reveal that pride is positively predicted by pleasantness, clarity, importance, and self-
agency appraisal components, and leads to a feeling of exuberance. Like enthusiasm, pride 
is a highly pleasant and personally important (relevant) emotion. Unlike enthusiasm, pride 
is more cognitively oriented, accompanied with feelings of achievement and increased self-
esteem. Also, people who experience pride tend to be certain about what is going on in a 
situation, and perceive that they have control over what happens in the environment. 
Because of the complexity of the experience of pride, however, the study of pride so far 
received little attention (Lewis, 2008). To my knowledge, there is no literature looking into 
pride as a discrete emotion and studying its effect in political contexts. However, we can 
hypothesize numerous political situations where people experience pride, such as when 
they identify with a leading party in an election. This dissertation thus examines pride as it 
relates to political information seeking and behavior.  
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Hope 
Reading (2004) defines hope as a “pleasurable subjective state that arises when 
individuals expect that a desired future goal is realistically achievable, and that expectation 
energizes them to initiate activities they believe will help them attain it” (p. 5). Putting 
emphasis on a cognitive aspect, Snyder (1989) defines hope as “goal-directed thinking, in 
which people appraise their capacity to produce workable routes to goals, along with their 
potential to initiate and sustain movement via a pathway” (p.143). Snyder (1994) continues 
that hope is the combination of “mental willpower and waypower for goals” (p. 11). 
According to the literature, people who have high waypower can seek alternative ways to 
achieve a goal if the projected pathway is blocked (Snyder, 1994). Drahos (2004) 
conceptualizes hope as “a forward looking emotion” and “an important psychological 
resource for dealing with an uncertain and depressing fate” (p. 21). 
From the aforementioned definitions and literature on hope, I derive three central 
components to construct the concept of hope: goal, pathway, and agency. Goal is 
something perceived to be desirable and achievable to exert effort to obtain it. The presence 
of a goal is a prerequisite to experiencing hope. Pathways are possible routes to achieve a 
goal, including goal-directed thinking and activities (Snyder, 2000). Agency gives 
individuals a sense of efficacy and optimism, providing a psychological basis for 
individuals to feel hopeful, as Reading (2004) specifies that hope energizes people to 
voluntarily initiate activities to attain desired goals. In other words, being hopeful is a 
common affective state of thinking in relation to one’s goal and goal-oriented behaviors 
(Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Shiota, 2003; Snyder, 2000). In sum, hope can be 
constructed as a cognitive process that invites a series of actions: setting a concrete goal, 
finding pathways to achieve the goal, and tapping one’s willpower (agency) to move 
forward or to overcome potential barriers (Snyder, 2000).  
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Hope is different from enthusiasm such in hope may stem from negatively 
perceived circumstances as well as from positive circumstances depending on individuals’ 
ability to imagine a positive future outcome, whereas enthusiasm is usually felt under 
positively perceived circumstances (Shiota, 2003). Hope is similar to pride in that both 
emotions are more closely intertwined with cognition than other emotions like enthusiasm. 
Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989) categorize hope and pride as complex emotions, which 
require more developed cognitive processing and evaluations of the environment. 
Likewise, Just et al. (2007) describe hope as one of “the most cognitively integrated 
emotions” (p. 234). However, hope is distinct from pride in that hope can be experienced 
when individuals perceive that the future is unclear and anticipated effort is projected to 
help with attaining goals whereas pride is positively related to the clarity of the situation 
and does not pose a clear indication of the level of effort (Tong, 2007).   
Measures and findings  
There have been few scales designed to measure hope. Snyder explores the 
significance of hope in his books, The Psychology of Hope (1994) and Handbook of Hope 
(2000), and develops a measure for the construct; however, the measure is more tailored to 
measure people’s tendency to feel hopeful as a trait, not as an emotional state. Instead of 
adopting the trait-like hope scale, this dissertation measures hope as an emotional state 
relying on cognitive appraisal determinants of hope. Appraisal theorists have used different 
sets of appraisal components to measure and differentiate hope from other positive 
emotions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). The analysis of appraisal components 
concludes that hope is positively related to the dimension of anticipated effort and 
negatively associated with the dimension of clarity of the situation, which means that when 
feeling hopeful, people expect to expend effort to attain their goals and feel uncertain about 
the situation and what will happen in the future (Frijda et al., 1989; Just et al., 2007). In a 
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sense, hope is less pleasant than other positive emotions like pride and enthusiasm on the 
valence dimension because it may signal a possible obstacle for attaining goals, sometimes 
resulting in a lack of motivation and a feeling of helplessness (Baumeister, Fabor, & 
Wallace, 1999; Frijda et al., 1989). Also, in terms of agency, hopeful people are found to 
perceive that circumstances or forces beyond their control are controlling the situation 
(Tong, 2007), which is quite different from the expectations by Snyder (2000) or Reading 
(2004). 
Looking specifically at the effects of hope in the political domain, little research 
has been conducted. One of the reasons why political hope has been studied only at the 
surface level is that scholars do not have an agreed-upon way to study hope systematically. 
As outlined briefly, the conceptualization of hope is quite vague. There is some critical and 
qualitative literature looking into the use of hope in the political domain. Civettini (2011), 
for instance, discusses Obama’s rhetoric of hope and how Obama used hope as a rhetorical 
tool. He remarks that the way Obama cultivated a rhetoric of hope made it easier for the 
American people to see pathways to achieve goals and to believe the goals are attainable. 
The Obama phenomenon particularly punctuates the ever-increasing attention to a politics 
of hope by showing its effective, and potentially abusive (as it could be misleading), power 
over voters (Engelken-Jorge et al., 2011). 
Very few quantitative studies on the role of hope in political judgement and other 
political contexts are available. Just et al. (2007) reveal that hope and enthusiasm are 
distinct emotions. They find that only hope increased during the 1996 election campaign 
for Clinton using a national representative sample, whereas enthusiasm decreased. Also, 
hope was found to be the most important emotion in determining vote choice and candidate 
preferences at the end of political campaigns. Importantly, the findings shed light on the 
reason why two different emotions, enthusiasm and hope, are not easily distinguishable, 
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especially at the end of campaigns as Just and colleagues argue that toward the end of the 
campaigns, hope and enthusiasm become mixed “because by that time the future is now” 
(Just et al., 2007, p. 252). In other words, people who felt hopeful at the beginning of 
election campaigns may grow increasingly enthusiastic about their own party or candidate 
over time, but it does not necessarily mean that hopeful individuals always experience 
enthusiasm at the same time. Feeling hope can be replaced with feeling enthusiasm, and 
the two emotions may not always co-occur.  
SUMMARY 
Based on the review of the literature on discrete positive emotions, a tentative 
conclusion can be drawn: There are no agreed-upon or well-defined constructs of the three 
positive emotions: enthusiasm, hope, and pride. Yet by drawing from psychology, political 
science, and communication, this dissertation has offered distinct conceptual 
understandings of each of these three emotions. Enthusiasm can be considered as a basic 
emotion whereas hope and pride are more cognitively complex. Enthusiasm is 
conceptualized as a strong emotional desire that occurs when one’s goal is likely to be 
attainable. Hope and pride require more complex cognitive processing of a given situation, 
object, and environment than enthusiasm does. Hope and pride are distinct in terms of their 
appraisal components like pleasantness, certainty (clarity), and agency. Hope is perceived 
as a less pleasant and less certain emotion than pride is, and hopeful people tend to see 
agency in the circumstances whereas proud people think that they are in control of what is 
happening. 
Mainly the differences among the three emotions derive from how individuals 
perceive and evaluate a given situation (Shiota, 2003; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 
2007), and this leads to the first fundamental question asked in the dissertation: How 
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different or similar are enthusiasm, hope, and pride? By creating an accurate and more 
agreed-upon taxonomy, it will be possible to study these emotions and their political 
consequences. This leads to the next question of the dissertation which will be discussed 
in the following chapter: Do they have differential effects on political information 
processing and behavior? Given the importance of emotional life in politics, the demand 
for building distinct constructs for these positive emotions seems quite urgent.  
Drawing from appraisal studies, a different set of appraisal components can be 
tentatively identified for each emotion even though the composition of the set is not 
definitive and open to further examination: Enthusiasm can be predicted by pleasantness 
(high), agency (self & others), certainty, resource acquisition, and action tendency (Frijda 
et al., 1989; Shiota, 2003). Hope can be specified with the pleasantness (low), agency 
(circumstance), certainty, change, action tendency, and anticipated effort dimensions 
(Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Snyder, 2000; Tong, 2007). Lastly, pride may require evaluative 
dimensions like pleasantness (high), agency (self), certainty, mastery, social 
appropriateness, and positive self-regard (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tangney & Fischer, 
1995; Tong, 2007). 
Without knowing the constructs associated with each positive emotion, any test of 
emotional effects on information processing and participation stands on shaky ground. 
Thus, I first examine the differences and similarities among enthusiasm, hope, and pride, 
building on appraisal theories. It should be noted that there are good reasons to expect that 
the three emotions are correlated with one another and tend to trigger each other (Barrett 
et al., 2001; Fredrickson, 2008). According to affect transfer theory, one discrete positive 
emotion may trigger the feeling of another positive emotion tapping associative networks 
in human brain (Forgas, 1999). Yet each is hypothesized to have a distinct set of appraisal 
components. Thus, I posit the first research question and hypothesis:  
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RQ1: Which appraisal components best predict enthusiasm, hope, and pride? 
H1: Each emotion – enthusiasm, hope, and pride – will display a different set of 
appraisal components. 
Drawing from appraisal theories and emotion studies in psychology, this 
dissertation will build measures to explicate the relationships between these three positive 
emotions and political outcomes to be discussed next. To address the hypothesis and 
research question proposed in this chapter, I design and execute an online survey and the 
methodology will be discussed in Chapter 4. In the next chapter, Chapter 3, I will review 
the literature on the relationships between discrete emotions, information search, and 
participatory activities in politics.  
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Chapter 3: Effects of Emotions on Information Processing and 
Participation 
It has been shown repeatedly that there is an inseparable link between cognition 
and emotion (e.g., Frijda, 1987; Isen, 1999; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; 
Zajonc, 1984). Even though literature investigating the link does not always align in terms 
of the details of the relationship, such as the direction, cause, primacy, and outcomes, most 
agree with the notion of the interdependence between cognition and emotion. This basic 
premise is the fundamental framework within which this dissertation investigates the 
effects of emotions. Although a number of studies, models, and theories explicating the 
relationship between emotion and cognition are available, how discrete emotions influence 
information processing and political behavior remains largely unknown. Especially, the 
competing findings on the effects of positive emotions on information processing and 
participation only make the need to investigate these effects more urgent (e.g., Fredrickson, 
2001, 2005; Isen et al., 1984; Mackie & Worth, 1989). 
This chapter addresses the void in the literature on the effects of discrete emotions 
on information processing and participatory activities. Despite the lack of a perfectly fitting 
theoretical framework, a few theories and models shed light on how discrete emotions 
might affect individuals’ information processing and behavior. Beyond investigating the 
effects of discrete positive emotions, I also include three discrete negative emotions in 
order to advance the literature. Current literature has looked into the effects of discrete 
negative emotions (e.g., anger, fear) in the political context, however, did not present 
consistent picture of their effects (Brader, 2005; Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 2013). 
Thus, including the negative ones into the study contributes the literature by showcasing 
their effects.  
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In this chapter, I discuss the most relevant theories and models, which highlight the 
dynamics between discrete emotions and cognitive processes. To organize the theories and 
models, I will discuss: (1) the automaticity of affect, drawing from the dual-process model, 
which explains how emotions may prime people to process information in a particular way, 
and (2) specific theories that elaborate affective information processing in political 
contexts, including affective intelligence theory and expectancy violation theory. Next, for 
the purpose of differentiating the effects within discrete positive and discrete negative 
emotions, I will first discuss the effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on information 
search and participation, then move on to discuss those of two discrete negative emotions, 
anger and anxiety. Finally, the chapter will introduce a novel negative emotion into the 
study, which is disgust, and discuss its potentially unique effect compared to anger and 
anxiety. The chapter will end with the implications of the theories and models and the 
discussion of how positive as well as negative emotions can influence information 
processing and political participation. 
PATHWAYS OF AFFECTIVE INFORMATION PROCESSING  
In general, people have tendencies to maintain their good mood or emotions (Isen 
& Patrick, 1983). Specifically, enthusiastic, proud, or hopeful people do not want to be 
disturbed by unforeseen negative stimuli. This is the basic expectation when we think of 
information processing under positive emotional states. In this section, I explain the 
mechanisms behind affect-driven information processing. Affect-driven information 
processing refers to the phenomenon wherein the valence of initially felt affect biases 
information processing (Lodge & Taber, 2013).  
Scholars have exerted effort to identify the pathways of affect-driven information 
processing, showing how people are primed by emotions, investigating whether 
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information processing and seeking is affect-congruent or incongruent, and examining 
which processing strategies are more vulnerable to emotion effects. For instance, people 
feeling positive emotions tend to process information to maintain their positive affect, such 
as looking for positively-valenced (affect-congruent) information or positively evaluating 
information. In a series of empirical studies, Forgas and colleagues (1984, 1994) have 
shown that people experiencing happy and sad emotions are likely to engage in affect-
congruent information processing, judgements, and recall. Happy individuals identify more 
positive behaviors whereas sad individuals tend to be more critical towards themselves and 
others (Forgas et al., 1984, 1994). In an experiment, Erison et al. (2014) found an affect 
priming effect wherein people who are unconsciously primed with positive stimuli 
construct more positive judgements of a given issue than people who are not primed. 
Research on affectively motivated information processing suggests that 
predispositions and other contextual cues (affect-congruent vs. -incongruent stimuli) are 
important in predicting how emotion affects political information processing and seeking 
(Lodge & Taber, 2005; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010). Differences in initial 
dispositions (e.g., level of prior knowledge, partisanship, and held stereotypes) may 
influence people’s information seeking behavior under certain emotional states. Isbell, 
Burns, and James (2004), for example, find that happy people are more inclined to seek 
out confirmatory information which aligns with their held stereotypes than sad people.  
Only a few theories and frameworks explain the possible dynamics of information 
processing under various discrete emotions. In the next section, three models are discussed 
to explicate how different emotions may influence information processing and seeking 
behaviors: automaticity of affect, affective intelligence theory, and expectancy violation 
theory. All of the frameworks are particularly interested in explaining possible relations 
between emotions and information processing strategies.  
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The Automaticity of Affect (Dual-process Model) 
Affect-motivated information processing can be triggered by the automaticity of 
affect. The automaticity of affect derives from hardwired, automated emotional networks 
in the brain. The automaticity, or primacy, of affect has been contested for many years 
(e.g., Zajonc, 1980, 1984). Following the dual-process model of thinking, Lodge and 
colleagues (Lodge & Taber, 2005; Lodge, Taber, & Weber, 2006) confirm that affective 
primes can automatically activate the cognitive appraisal of a given stimuli and subsequent 
processing of information (i.e., automaticity of affect). The dual-process model explains 
that people use two distinct processing systems (i.e., fast and slow thinking) when 
encountering stimuli depending on their stereotypes, past experiences, intuition, current 
mood, exposure to primes, affect heuristics (e.g., likes and dislikes), and cognitive load 
(Davidson, Scherer, & Goldsmith, 2003; Forgas, 2001; Kahneman, 2011).  
The model frequently has been adopted by political scholars to explain automated 
affective processing (e.g., Lodge, Taber, & Weber, 2006). The automaticity of affect means 
that people use fast, unconscious, intuitive, and effortless processing under certain affective 
states, such as feeling ecstatic. Importantly, an implicit, unconscious, and automated 
process can be spurred by an immediate, real-time emotional response to a stimulus that 
one cannot control or consciously influence (Scherer, 1984). Automated affective 
processing, also called fast thinking, usually generates impressions, feelings, and 
inclinations. When the reactions are endorsed by slow and effortful thinking process, also 
called slow thinking, they become attitudes, beliefs, and intentions (Kahneman, 2011).1  
                                                 
1 The dual-process model, also dubbed fast- or slow-thinking, has been discussed in terms of using either 
heuristics or a systematic approach to processing information. One similarity between the dual process 
model and my work is that affect or the use of certain emotions (such as enthusiasm or anger) usually 
promotes people to turn to heuristics due to their predetermined or hardwired affective tag attached to 
stimuli. However, it should be noted that not all the use of affective cue promotes fast thinking or reliance 
on heuristics. As mentioned, people who are feeling sad or anxious process information more effortfully by 
taking a systematic approach. In and of itself, using heuristics does not and should not always translate to 
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In general, research on the dual-process model suggests that happy people are more 
likely to engage in fast and automated information processing when they are given 
congruent information than when given incongruent information, whereas sad or depressed 
people tend to process information more objectively and extensively (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986; Kahneman, 2011). Grounded on the dual-process model, Lodge and Taber (2005, 
2013) argue that as people build their attitudes or preferences for a political object, such as 
a candidate, party, or issue, their preferences or attitudes become hardwired in their minds 
with affective responses. For instance, if an individual has developed a pro-immigration 
attitude, he will automatically evaluate a piece of information supporting anti-immigration 
policy unfavorably without going through effortful information processing, or if a person 
already likes a certain candidate, she will automatically respond favorably to the candidate-
related news without giving a second thought to it. 
Following the logic of automaticity of affect, the evaluations of political 
information can be constantly interrupted and influenced by affective heuristics attached 
to information, which automatically evoke affectively motivated processing (Lodge & 
Taber, 2005, 2013). According to Lodge and Taber (2013), the affect-primed implicit 
response merely reflects “affect stored directly with a memory object” (p. 5). Affect-driven 
implicit responses are more prevalent among strong partisans and political sophisticates 
since they have built a stronger attachment or priori to a political object (candidate, issue, 
or party), thus affect is more easily accessible when cueing information is presented (Lodge 
& Taber, 2013). Although the automaticity of affect cannot predict the exact pathways 
from emotions to information processing and beyond, it explains that people can be primed 
by emotions in ways that affect information processing.  
                                                 
affectively-motivated or affect-driven information processing, and systematic processing does not always 
exclude affect-driven information processing.   
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Affective Intelligence and Expectancy Violation Theories 
The previous section explains how affect-congruent or incongruent information 
processing might occur. In the following section, I discuss theories that adopt the above 
reasoning, but further develop ways in which discrete positive emotions could affect 
information processing. Affective intelligence theory and expectancy violation theory 
provide a partial picture of how discrete positive emotions could influence information 
processing in political contexts. 
In reconciling the relationship between affect and cognition, political scientists 
have analyzed how affect influences political responses. Drawing from neurophysiological 
data which support two distinctive pathways of emotional responses in the brain (Gray, 
1981, 1987), Marcus and colleagues propose affective intelligence theory (AIT), which 
suggests that affective states (e.g., enthusiasm, anxiety) provide people with different 
contextual cues through the activation of two distinct modes of affective information 
processing. One is the dispositional system in which people rely on habitual routes and 
preexisting experiences, and the other, called the surveillance system, evokes more 
thorough information processing in which people consciously register stimuli in a new 
environment (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus at el., 2000). Marcus and his colleagues 
draw a sharp line between two emotional dimensions, enthusiasm-depression and anxiety-
calmness, arguing that people in an anxious state (the opposite of calmness or safety) are 
likely to engage in avoidance behaviors. They perceive a stimulus or situation as 
threatening and consider alternative outcomes through the activation of the surveillance 
system. Alternatively, the state of enthusiasm (the opposite of feeling depressed) promotes 
an approach tendency and increases the propensity for people to use previous habits and 
heuristics through the activation of the dispositional system.  
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According to AIT, complacent and enthusiastic voters heavily rely on peripheral 
cues and past beliefs, such as partisanship, whereas anxious voters deliberatively process 
political information by tapping candidates’ policy stance or other qualities (Marcus & 
MacKuen, 1993; Marcus et al., 2000). Although Marcus et al. (1993, 2000) use a 
dimensional approach with anxiety and enthusiasm as two anchor points, what they 
propose through affective intelligence theory moves beyond typical valence models of 
emotion. Their theory corresponds well with the dual-process model as the model proposes 
that feeling positive emotions leads to heuristic processing, while other emotions prompt 
more thorough processing.  
There are several limitations of AIT when predicting the distinct pathways of 
information processing under the discrete positive emotions under investigation in this 
project (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and pride). First, Marcus and his colleagues (1999, 2000, 
2011) created one composite measure of enthusiasm by standardizing scores on three 
discrete emotions, hope, pride, and sympathy. Even though the authors differentiated 
enthusiasm from negative emotions, they take a dimensional approach and treat enthusiasm 
as an overarching positive emotion that promotes overall approach tendencies. Thus, the 
pathways of information processing under each positive emotion, which is the main interest 
of the dissertation, cannot be differentiated or predicted separately.  
Moreover, research testing the affective intelligence framework shows only partial 
support for the rationale of the theory. Undertaking an empirical effort to validate the 
premise of affective intelligence model, Ladd and Lenz (2008, 2011) challenge the 
assumptions of AIT by demonstrating that anxiety improves voters' decision-making 
through routes other than those proposed by AIT. They argue that it is not the emotion, 
anxiety, which leads people to rely on the surveillance system, but the evaluations of 
candidates and parties that causes people to evaluate policy preference or candidates’ 
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qualities. In their alternative model, emotions and party/candidate evaluations are 
correlated and both have an impact on information seeking behavior. In other words, they 
find not only the affect transfer effect wherein people’s emotions influence candidate 
evaluations but also evidence of the endogeneity of affect wherein candidate evaluations 
also lead to the experience of anxiety and enthusiasm (Ladd & Lenz, 2008, 2011). They 
argue that published experimental tests of AIT are very rare, and this should be interpreted 
as there is a need for the specification of affective intelligence model (Ladd & Lenz, 2011). 
Despite these limitations, several follow-up studies adopt the AIT framework and 
add depth to the predictions of AIT. MacKuen et al. (2010), for example, present a more 
detailed picture by including more contextual information. Investigating the relationships 
between discrete emotions (i.e., anger, anxiety, and enthusiasm) and the direction of 
information search, they demonstrate that enthusiasm generally limits people's information 
search when the given information is congruent with their issue or policy position. 
However, when it comes to future intent, enthusiastic people are more willing to seek out 
challenging information with a desire to learn more about the opposing side whereas angry 
people are less inclined to seek challenging information (MacKuen et al., 2010). Thus, not 
only anxiety but enthusiasm can activate surveillance system depending on the valence of 
information provided.  
Grounded in AIT, others demonstrate that the activation of the surveillance or 
dispositional system depends not on the two emotions (i.e., anxiety and enthusiasm), but 
on the experience of in-group or out-group emotions based on partisanship (Johnston, 
Lavine, & Woodson, 2015). Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson (2015) propose using 
expectancy violation theory (EVT) to look at whether anger, anxiety, and enthusiasm 
facilitate either deliberative or retractive (partisan) thinking depending on people’s 
expectations about in-group and out-group parties or candidates. In other words, how 
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people act does not depend on which emotions they experience, but on how the felt 
emotions violate their expectancy toward certain objects (e.g., candidate, party). For 
instance, if people experience enthusiasm toward the opposing candidate or feel anxiety 
toward their preferred candidate, this violates their expectations, and in turn heightens 
deliberative reasoning and suppresses partisan thinking. On the other hand, expectancy 
confirming emotions, such as experiencing anxiety toward the other party’s candidate, have 
the reverse effects. 
EVT agrees with AIT that anxiety sometimes promotes deliberation and enthusiasm 
and anger sometimes promote reflexive partisanship wherein people rely on heuristics or 
previous beliefs, but diverges from AIT in the claim that the way each discrete emotion 
promotes either deliberative or partisan reasoning is necessarily related to people’s partisan 
expectations. When positive emotions (enthusiasm) are associated with in-party objects 
and negative emotions (anxiety, anger) are associated with out-party objects, heuristic 
judgment is more likely and this can suppress people’s information seeking behaviors. For 
instance, anxiety toward the out-party candidate functioned in the way that is similar to 
enthusiasm toward the in-party candidate, leading to increased partisan voting and 
decreased issue-based voting. Thus, to more accurately predict the effects of discrete 
emotions on political learning and behavior, people’s partisanship as well as the direction 
of their information search (challenging or reassuring) should be taken into account.  
The AIT and EVT are some of the very few models that can explain and predict the 
effects of enthusiasm, anger, and anxiety. The predictions made by AIT and EVT regarding 
the effect of positive emotions on information processing dovetail well with each other. 
According to AIT (Marcus et al., 2000; MacKuen et al., 2010), people in an enthusiastic 
state are likely to rely on heuristics and held beliefs or attitudes and limit their information 
search as long as the information they process seems congruent with their priors. Moreover, 
  
 
 
 51 
according to EVT (Johnston et al., 2015), when people feel enthusiastic towards the 
opposing side (thus, become less enthusiastic and more ambivalent), people become more 
prone to be effortful information processers extending information search. Even though the 
theories do not cover discrete positive emotions, such as hope and pride, their predictions 
regarding information processing under enthusiasm can be partially adopted to meet the 
goal of the dissertation. 
EFFECTS OF POSITIVE EMOTIONS ON INFORMATION SEARCH 
Although there has been a bias toward studying negative emotions (Fredrickson & 
Cohn, 2008), research is beginning to provide a better understanding of positive emotions. 
However, there are competing explanations regarding the influence of positive emotions 
on information seeking behavior. Some argue that by triggering approach behavior and 
increasing interest, positive emotions promote creative problem solving (Isen, Daubman, 
& Nowicki, 1987; Isen, 1999), increased cognitive resources (Fredrickson, 2001), and 
exploration for the purpose of learning (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). For example, 
Fredrickson and Losada (2005) assume that positive emotions encourage people to 
consider a wide range of information and broaden their cognitive repertoires. A series of 
studies done by Isen and colleagues confirm that positive emotions encourage people to be 
integrative and open to new information, leading to better adaptive strategies like hopeful 
thinking (Isen & Daubman, 1984).  
Contrary to the positive effects, it also has been found that people who experience 
positive emotions (e.g., enthusiasm) are less likely to process information carefully. The 
explanation of the negative effect of positive emotions argues for cognitive depletion under 
positive emotional states. Mackie and Worth (1989) propose that positive affective states 
erode individuals’ cognitive capacity which results in longer time and more effort to 
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examine information. Martin and colleagues (1993) demonstrate that positive affect 
diminishes people’s motivation to process information effortfully. AIT (Marcus et al., 
2000) agrees that enthusiastic people are less accurate information processors as they 
become no longer motivated to expand their information search since there is no novel 
threat perceived in the environment. Thus, happy people are prone to rely on heuristics, 
such as previous beliefs or partisanship, when making political judgments. The reasoning 
has been confirmed in some psychological studies as well (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002). 
A third line of reasoning proposes a different story. Mood maintenance theory (Isen 
& Patrick, 1983) posits that people in positive affective states (i.e., feeling elated) want to 
maintain their good feelings. This leads people to adopt different information processing 
strategies depending on the situation. People in positive emotional states are more willing 
to take a risk when the expected loss is perceived to be small (low risk), and less willing to 
take a risk when the loss is perceived to be large than people in neutral affective states (Isen 
& Means, 1983; Isen & Patrick, 1983). Thus, depending on the level of perceived risk in a 
situation, happy people engage in different information processing strategies to maintain 
their positive emotions. 
On the basis of appraisal theories, there is reason to believe that there will be some 
variability in information processing behaviors influenced by different positive emotions 
as the causes as well as appraisal components of one emotion are different from those of 
other positive emotions (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). If Marcus and 
colleagues’ argument about positive emotional responses is supported, discrete positive 
emotions should decrease the amount of information sought in general. However, there are 
competing research findings, some demonstrating increased cognitive attention as well as 
the tendency to be open to new information (e.g., Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson & 
Branigan, 2005; Isen, 1987, 1999). For instance, using a longitudinal panel survey, Just et 
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al. (2007) found that hope can increase political interest and lead to information seeking, 
such as watching the party conventions or network TV news. Given the lack of a consistent 
theoretical or empirical rationale, it is hard to pose directional hypotheses about the effects 
of the discrete positive emotions on the amount of information seeking. Thus, I propose 
the following non-directional hypothesis:  
H2: (a) Enthusiastic, (b) proud, and (c) hopeful individuals will seek out different 
amounts of information compared to those not experiencing these emotions.  
Not only the amount of information sought but also the direction of information 
seeking under each emotion is a focus of the dissertation. In other words, without a clear 
picture of the dynamics of emotions in selective exposure, the goal of finding out distinct 
roles of discrete emotions in information seeking and participation might be half-achieved. 
Selective exposure research suggests that a partisan response to different types of 
information may occur under different emotional states (e.g., Valentino, Banks, Hutchings, 
& Davis, 2009a; Wojcieszak, Bimber, Feldman, & Stroud, 2016).  
According to mood management theory, people who are experiencing positive 
emotions are more likely to seek partisan information aligned with their partisan beliefs to 
maintain their mood (e.g., Zillmann & Bryant, 1985; Zillmann, 1988). Just and colleagues 
(2007) also suggested that feeling hope biases information search strategies, making people 
seek only congenial information to stay hopeful. Based on expectancy violation theory, 
positive emotions felt toward in-group members are expected to facilitate retractive or 
partisan thinking, leading people to seek confirming information. MacKuen et al. (2010) 
also confirmed the general tendency of enthusiastic individuals seeking out less 
information. Although Jonas, Graupmann, and Frey (2006) proposed that mood regulation 
affects information search, suggesting that people in a good mood are more willing to 
engage with attitude-dissonant information than those experiencing a bad mood, this is 
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about the future intention, not about the actual information search.. These findings shed 
light on the fact that affect-driven information seeking is biased toward prior beliefs and 
attitudes. Thus, not the emotional experience itself but the context of emotional experience 
(ingroup vs. outgroup) will decide the direction of information search. More specifically, I 
set forward the following hypothesis about the relationship between the positive emotions 
and the direction of information search. 
H3: Individuals who experience (a) enthusiasm, (b) hope, or (c) pride toward ingroup 
members will seek out more confirming information than non-confirming 
information compared to those not experiencing these emotions.  
The differential effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on information processing, 
however, have not been examined by existing literature. Thus, for exploratory purposes, I 
will examine whether discrete positive emotions affect information processing differently. 
Maybe there are differences in the effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on the amount 
and direction (confirming vs. non-confirming) of information sought. For instance, a study 
found that hope is a stronger predictor of stimulating attention to campaign-related 
information than enthusiasm (Just et al., 2007), a difference that also could be found 
between pride and other positive emotions. This may be because hopeful people are more 
uncertain about the situation than people experiencing pride or enthusiasm, thus want to 
seek out more information to relieve the anxiety from uncertainty. Also, as pride being 
predicted by positive self-regard and having control over what is happening (self-agency), 
proud people may be more selective and choose even more reinforcing information than 
enthusiastic or hopeful individuals. Therefore, I propose studying the differential effects of 
enthusiasm, hope, and pride in a systematic way with the following research question: 
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RQ2: How do enthusiasm, hope, and pride affect information seeking behaviors in 
terms of (a) the amount (more or less) and (b) direction (confirming or non-
confirming) of information sought?  
EFFECTS OF POSITIVE EMOTIONS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
As reviewed in this section, psychological literature suggests that the interactions 
between emotion and cognition can stimulate political participation. However, the 
underlying interplay between emotion and cognition in politics is not well understood. 
Only after fully understanding the interactions between emotional arousals and various 
cognitive processes can political participation be predicted. When it comes to the impact 
of discrete emotions on political participation, the findings are usually centered on negative 
emotions (mainly anger and anxiety). Further, studies have found that negative emotions 
have stronger effects than positive emotions on participation (Marcus et al., 2000; 
Valentino et al., 2008, 2011; Weber, 2013). When looking into the mechanisms through 
which different positive emotions could result in political engagement, the dynamics and 
size of the effects are far from uniform. 
Feelings of enthusiasm, especially toward a preferred party or candidate, are 
thought to mobilize individuals as enthusiasm is closely tied to the disposition system and 
facilitates an approach tendency, reinforcing party loyalties and prior preferences (Marcus 
et al., 2000). Logically, enthusiasts of a certain political cause, actor, or party may build an 
affective attachment to their party or candidate, which in turn increases mental proximity 
to and involvement in politics (Sandvoss, 2012). In one experiment, participants induced 
to feel positive emotions made faster decisions and spent less time going back over 
materials they had already considered compared to those induced to feel negative emotions 
(Isen & Means, 1983). Following the logic, enthusiasm should facilitate action because it 
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encourages reliance on heuristic processing rather than reconsideration of one’s behavioral 
strategy (LeDoux & Phelps, 2000; Marcus et al., 2000). Grounded on AIT, for instance, 
some have found that enthusiasm boosts political interest and intentions to vote or 
volunteer in campaigns more than anxiety or anger does (Brader, 2005, 2006b). The 
positive behavioral implications of positive emotions have been supported by other studies 
as well. Frijda et al. (1989) demonstrate that enthusiasm scores high on the action tendency 
dimension, meaning that people experiencing enthusiasm are likely to take actions 
regarding their goals. Regarding the action tendency of hope, Just and colleagues (2007) 
suggest that if individuals feel hopeful about a candidate, they adjust their information 
search strategy to strengthen their positive appraisal of the candidate and the increased 
congruency plays a role in motivating people to cast their ballots. Cognitive scholars also 
generally agree that positive emotions like enthusiasm have broad motivational power and 
trigger approach tendencies (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; LeDoux & Phelps, 2000; 
Shiota, 2003). 
The findings do not always support this idea, however. Cho (2013) finds that feeling 
enthusiasm toward a favored candidate does not increase the frequency of discussion, 
participation, or efficacy. Weber (2013) also concludes that enthusiasm was unrelated to 
interest in politics and that it decreased participation in politics, discussion about politics, 
and efficacy.  
Groenendyk and Banks (2014) try to reconcile the different results by proposing 
the emotional rescue model. They demonstrate that both enthusiasm and anger mediate the 
relationship between party identification and political participation. They suggest that 
strong partisans are more likely to respond to political stimuli with enthusiasm and anger 
than weak partisans or independents. The strength of party affiliation stimulates different 
levels of participation (e.g., rally, talk, and donate) via the activation of enthusiasm and 
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anger and reinforces party-oriented behaviors, such as collective partisan thinking and 
other forms of participation. In the sense, different findings on the effects of positive 
emotions on political participation may be due to the interaction effect of the strength of 
partisanship in a way that strong partisans tend to react more strongly under positive 
emotions than others. However, the effect of partisanship strength is only applicable to two 
emotions, enthusiasm and anger, which are the emotions of high arousal (Izard, 1992; 
Russell, 1980), and one of them (i.e., enthusiasm) is treated only in regard to its positive 
valence using the dimensional approach (Groenendyk & Banks, 2014). The current project 
does not consider the interaction effect of individuals’ partisanship strength, but includes 
it as one of the control variables, since it examines not only enthusiasm but also low 
arousal, complex emotions like pride and hope. 
Although some prior work has been done, our understanding of how different 
positive emotions lead to political participation seems far from complete. The accumulated 
empirical findings regarding enthusiasm are not clear-cut. Moreover, there is almost no 
empirical data showing the effects of hope and pride on political participation. This leaves 
a huge gap in the current political literature on the relationship between emotion and 
participation.  
Theories like affective intelligence (Marcus et al., 2000) suggest that enthusiastic, 
proud, and/or hopeful individuals are inclined to exhibit approach tendencies to political 
objects. It is not yet clear, however, whether enthusiasm, pride, and hope will have different 
effects on participation. Based on appraisal theories and related findings on appraisal 
components of discrete positive emotions, enthusiasm has been found to be more action-
oriented than hope or pride, and hope has been documented as a goal-oriented emotion 
which helps people to seek out the pathways to reach goals (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Shiota, 
2003; Snyder, 2000; Tong, 2007). Thus, it is possible that enthusiasm has a larger effect 
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on participation than pride or hope and that hope is more mobilizing pride. As for the 
effects of positive emotions on participation, I am interested in identifying differential 
effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on political participation. Thus, I ask a research 
question about the direct effects of three emotions on political participation, and propose 
the following hypothesis: 
H4: Individuals experiencing discrete positive emotions – (a) enthusiasm, (b) hope, 
or (c) pride - are more likely to participate in politics than those who are not. 
RQ3: Are there differences among enthusiasm, hope, and pride in how they 
influence political participation? 
Researchers connecting emotions to political participation have mentioned that 
information search, spurred by emotional experiences, may influence political participation 
(Groenendyk & Banks, 2014; Lodge & Taber, 2005; Marcus et al., 2000; MacKuen et al., 
2010; Valentino et al., 2009b, 2011). As of yet, however, they have not tested how different 
information seeking behaviors mediate the relations between positive emotions and 
participation. The amount (more or less) and direction (attitude-confirming or non-
confirming) of information seeking can influence participation. Selectivity literature, for 
instance, confirms that selective exposure to attitude-confirming information increases 
political participation whereas non-directional information seeking behaviors may reduce 
the level of participation (e.g., Stroud, 2011). 
Adding to this literature, this dissertation analyzes the indirect effects of discrete 
positive emotions on political participation mediated by information seeking. As the 
mediation process from positive emotions to information processing to participation has 
not been studied and has little theoretical grounding, I raise the following research 
question: 
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RQ4: Do different patterns of information seeking in terms of (a) amount and (b) 
direction mediate the relationship between the three positive emotions 
(enthusiasm, pride, and hope) and political participation?  
EFFECTS OF NEGATIVE EMOTIONS ON INFORMATION PROCESSING AND PARTICIPATION 
Discrete Negative Emotions: Anger, Anxiety, and Disgust  
Unlike the scarcity of past literature on discrete positive emotions in politics, a 
substantial amount of research exists about the role of discrete negative emotions in 
political information seeking and processing (e.g., Johnston et al., 2015; MacKuen at al., 
2010; Weber, 2013). As mentioned, the negativity bias in political emotion studies has 
been prevalent in the past few decades as scholars have focused on discrete negative 
emotions such as anger and anxiety, but not as much as on positive emotions. Yet there is 
still a need to examine negative emotions in politics in terms of their consequences and 
effects. The findings of the studies which looked into the relationship between discrete 
negative emotion and information seeking are abundant in quantity but are far from 
uniform in terms of what they found (e.g., Nabi, 1999; Valentino et al., 2009b). Following 
from the affective intelligence and expectancy violation theories by Marcus et al. (2000) 
and Johnston et al. (2015), I examine three discrete negative emotions, which are anger, 
anxiety, and disgust. In this section, I will review the research findings on these three 
negative emotions in terms of their effects, especially in relation to information seeking 
and participation behaviors in politics.  
Anger, Anxiety, and Information Seeking 
Anger and anxiety have different roles in politics. Along the lines of research on 
affective intelligence theory (Marcus et al., 2000) and the cognitive functional model 
(Nabi, 2002), a wide range of research has focused on the impact of negative emotions like 
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anger and anxiety, suggesting that they have distinct influences on information processing 
(Civettini & Redlawsk, 2009; Feldman & Huddy, 2005; Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 
2007). Anger and anxiety may both be brought up from appraisals of an unpleasant 
incident; however, anger differs from anxiety in that it is associated with a sense of 
certainty and familiarity about how a situation will unfold, whereas anxiety is closely 
associated with uncertainty and unfamiliarity (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). The differences 
may be attributable to variation of feelings of certainty or sense of control that individuals 
experience under different affective states and the feelings of certainty likely linger and 
carry over to influence subsequent information processing (Isbell, Ottati, & Burns, 2006; 
Storbeck & Clore, 2007). 
The dynamics between anxiety and information processing have been studied 
extensively. The novelty of information can induce a sense of threat and anxiety, and 
subsequently spur respondents to be more engaged in rational decision-making processes 
since prior habits cannot give any cues about how to deal with the information. Moreover, 
the uncertainty of new situations yields emotions like anxiety and fear under which people 
will be more careful in information processing and political learning can be by-product 
from the processes (Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; 
Marcus et al, 2000; Nabi, 2002; Nabi, 2003). In terms of the quantity of information search, 
scholars found that anxiety promotes information seeking (Brader, 2005, 2006; Redlawsk 
et al., 2007; Valentino et al. 2008). When it comes to the quality of information processing, 
even when the total time of information search remains same, anxiety might increase in-
depth search and boost learning (Hutchings, Valentino, Philpot, & White, 2006; Valentino 
et al., 2008). However, Civettini and Redlawsk (2009) found no evidence of anxiety 
enhancing information recall better than other emotions.  
  
 
 
 61 
Anger is also a frequently studied emotion in politics. Evidence shows that anger 
has somewhat different effects on information seeking behavior (e.g., Nabi, 2002; 
MacKuen et al., 2010). Anger can lead people to be unresponsive or unsusceptible to new 
or counter-attitudinal political information (Groenendyk, 2011). In terms of the quantity of 
information seeking, Valentino et al. (2008) found that anger decreases the time spent on 
information search. More specifically, Redlawsk et al. (2007) showed that inconsistency 
between an individual’s position and a preferred candidate’s position evoked anger and 
this reduced people’s motivation to search for the candidate-related information. Also, 
MacKuen et al. (2010) revealed that anger reduces the amount of new information sought 
and increases the likelihood of committing to preconceived notions and positions. Overall, 
political scholars agree with the notion that anxiety promotes deliberation through 
increased attention to new information and extended search whereas anger may cast people 
away from the kind of deliberation democracy might require (Groenendyk, 201l; Marcus 
et al., 2000; MacKuen et al., 2010; Valentino et al, 2008).   
The majority of research findings about the role of discrete negative emotions in 
political information seeking aligns well, although not perfectly, with one another, thus 
based on the review of literature, I propose the following research question and hypotheses 
after controlling for external variables such as partisanship.  
H5a: People experiencing anxiety will seek out more information in term of number 
of articles and reading time than those who are not experiencing the emotion 
(i.e., control group). 
H5b: People experiencing anger will seek out less information in terms of number 
of articles and reading time than those who are not experiencing the emotion 
(i.e., control group). 
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People may choose certain types of information based on their affective states 
(Lodge & Taber, 2005). As briefly discussed, Jonas and his colleagues find that people try 
to manage or regulate their mood by choosing attitude-supporting or disconfirming 
information (Jonas et al., 2006). They proposed that the mood regulation function of 
information selectivity might be inherent in cognitive dissonance reduction processes in 
which people try to manage their mental discomfort by selecting the information they are 
exposed to, since the affective quality of information, either consonant or dissonant, has 
the ability to influence mood (Jonas et al., 2006). Taber and Lodge (2006) also suggested 
people experiencing negative emotions are more likely to have confirmation biases and 
choose attitude-consonant information whereas people with positive affective states are 
more willing to check out the attitude-dissonant information. Studying the impact of 
conflict and agony frames of news leads, Zillmann and colleagues show that conflict and 
agony frames, which may evoke anger and/or anxiety, significantly enhanced the 
likelihood of selective exposure to pro-attitudinal articles (Zillmann, Lei, Knobloch, & 
Callison, 2004). 
Speaking of the finding on discrete negative emotions and information selectivity, 
AIT suggests that anxiety promotes exposure to counter-attitudinal information via the 
surveillance route whereas anger enhances exposure to pro-attitudinal information via the 
dispositional system (Marcus et al., 2000). Evidence backs this theoretical expectation. For 
instance, MacKuen et al. (2010) revealed that anger (i.e., aversion) decreases the likelihood 
of searching counter-attitudinal information (i.e., number of pages viewed and future 
intent) while anxiety has a substantial effect on people’s disconfirming information search 
and willingness to compromise their own views on certain topics. Weeks (2015) recently 
examined the effects of anger and anxiety on partisan or motivated information processing. 
Even though Weeks (2015) did not directly measure the amount or direction of information 
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search, he found out that anger promoted partisan way of information processing while 
anxiety helped people process information in a more balanced way.  
Despite a vast amount of research on selective exposure and the role of emotions 
in political judgment (e.g., Lodge & Taber, 2013; Wojcieszak et al., 2016), the connection 
between negative emotions and information selectivity is still not clear. It may involve a 
lot of possible variables, such as information utility, candidate evaluations, or group cues 
(e.g., Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008; Ladd & Lenz, 2011). For instance, Valentino and 
his colleagues (2009a) looked into information utility as a moderator of selective exposure 
under different emotional states and found that unless people regard incongruent 
information as useful to cope with a possible threat, anxiety increases the selective 
exposure. The finding may not actually dispel AIT by Marcus and colleagues (2000), but 
suggests that information utility may counteract of the effect of anxiety on selective 
information seeking. Based on the current literature on emotion and selective exposure, I 
present the following hypotheses and RQ:  
H6a: People experiencing anxiety will seek out more counter-attitudinal information 
than those experiencing anger or no emotion (i.e., control group). 
H6b: People experiencing anger will seek out more pro-attitudinal information than 
those experiencing anxiety or no-emotion (i.e., control group). 
While H6a and H6b hypothesize that anxiety leads to balanced information search 
and that anger leads to unbalanced information search (i.e., selective exposure), we do not 
know much about their differing effects on selective avoidance, where people seek out 
reduced amount of information that are disconfirming or counter-attitudinal. Thus, I ask 
the following research question: 
RQ5: How do anger and anxiety differ from each other in affecting people’s 
information seeking behavior in terms of direction (i.e., selective avoidance)? 
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Anger, Anxiety, and Political Participation 
With few exceptions, scholars have found that negative emotions have a greater 
impact on people’s participatory behaviors than positive emotions (e.g., Marcus et al., 
2000; Valentino et al., 2009b, 2011; Weber, 2013). However, when it comes to comparing 
the levels of action tendency across discrete negative emotions like anger and anxiety, the 
current literature presents a mixed picture. According to the cognitive functional model 
(Nabi, 2002), anger promotes action by triggering the approach tendency whereas fear or 
anxiety activates the avoidance tendency. However, AIT suggests that both anxiety and 
anger can spur political participation by tapping into different neurophysiological routes. 
Anxiety can be mobilizing through the activation of surveillance system as people perceive 
unfamiliar threats and seek out alternative ways to achieve their goal, while anger can 
facilitate action by activating heuristics and dispositional traits (Marcus et al., 1993, 2000). 
Supporting the rationale of AIT, Brader (2005, 2006b), in his experimental analysis, 
found the mobilizing effect of anxiety, but to a much lesser degree than Marcus and 
colleagues (2000) suggested. Even though anxiety-evoking ads had a positive impact on 
intended participation, it was not as much as enthusiasm-evoking ads did. In the study, 
people who were exposed to the anxiety-eliciting ads showed a willingness to work for the 
campaign and a belief in the importance of voting. 
Emotion scholars generally agree that anger has a more consistent and powerful 
impact on a range of participatory behaviors than anxiety does (e.g., Valentino et al., 2011; 
Weber, 2013). For example, Valentino et al. (2011) used multiple methods to distinguish 
between the effects of anger and anxiety on political participation. Using cross-sectional 
data, they found anger significantly and consistently triggers participation whereas anxiety 
affects participatory behaviors inconsistently. Specifically, anxiety carried positive effects 
on less costly forms of participation, such as talking to others, displaying a bumper sticker, 
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or wearing a campaign button, but sometimes showed demobilizing effects on other costly 
forms of participatory behaviors, such as donating money, attending rallies/protests, or 
volunteering for a campaign (Valentino et al., 2011). Interestingly, they found the 
interaction effect between resources people possess and feelings of anger (not anxiety) on 
the level of increased participatory behaviors.  
In addition, Valentino and colleagues (2009b) and Weber (2013) also revealed that 
the experience of anger helps people build participatory habits by tapping into a sense of 
political interest and efficacy. Anger can make people politically active via enhanced 
perceptions of self-control (Weber, 2013), and participation, in turn, leads to increased 
levels of interest and efficacy (Valentino et al., 2009b). Last but not least, examining the 
relationship between U.S. government monitoring of citizens’ legal activities and 
individuals’ political engagement, Best and Krueger (2011) demonstrated that while anger 
is associated with increased political activity, anxiety is negatively associated with 
participation.  
However, in a recent experimental study, Lu and Myrick (2016) revealed that anger 
led to cheap participation intent, but not to costly intentions, whereas anxiety had a 
marginally significant impact on costly participation (e.g., donation, volunteering) but not 
on cheap participation intent (e.g., sharing/talking with others). 
In sum, anxiety and anger seem to have divergent effects on political participation. 
Groenendyk (2011) suggested that the differing effects of anxiety can be explained by the 
use of different methodologies and measurements. For instance, Brader (2006b) and 
Valentino et al. (2008, 2011) manipulated emotions like anxiety through an experiment, 
while Marcus et al. (2000) relied on survey data. In terms of measurement, while Brader 
(2005, 2006b) directly induced emotions using campaign ads, Marcus et al. (2000) and 
MacKuen et al. (2010) operationalized anxiety by combining measures of anxiety and 
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anger. Speaking of its consequences, anxiety causes divergent effects on different levels of 
participatory behaviors. For example, anxiety is shown to enhance cognitive attentiveness 
(Brader, 2005, 2006b; Hutchings et al., 2006; MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus et al., 2000; 
Redlawsk et al., 2007; Valentino et al., 2008, 2009a), while it also discourages costly 
behaviors due to its risk aversion tendency (Huddy et al., 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 
2001). 
Based on the review of literature, I propose the following hypotheses and a research 
question regarding anger, anxiety, and participation: 
H7a: Anxiety will have a smaller impact on political engagement than anger, 
affecting only cheap forms of political participation intent. 
H7b: Anger will have a greater impact on political engagement than anxiety, 
affecting both cheap and costly forms of political participation intent. 
Here, drawing on past literature on political participation (Lu & Myrick, 2016; 
Valentino et al., 2011; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995), I look into five different types 
of costly activities (i.e., voting, attending a rally, volunteering for a campaign, donating 
money, and contacting a candidate or campaign) and three different kinds of cheap 
activities (i.e., wearing a campaign button, displaying a bumper sticker, and putting up a 
yard sign). While H7a and H7b are proposed to find out the differential effects between 
anxiety and anger on either costly or cheap forms of political activities, RQ6 asks if there 
is any differing effect between the two emotions on participation intentions regardless of 
the perceived cost of political activities, such as general participation intention. Thus, RQ6 
is posed as follows: 
RQ6: How do anger and anxiety differ from each other in affecting people’s 
participation intent? 
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Researchers often examined the mediating role of emotions while making sense of 
the relationship between information seeking behaviors and political participation (e.g., Lu 
& Myrick, 2016; Wojcieszak et al., 2016). However, the way in which different 
information seeking patterns mediate the relationships between discrete negative emotions 
and participation are understudied. Based on the selective exposure literature, it can be 
assumed that individuals’ information search, which is affected by negative emotional 
experiences, in turn, influences political activities (Groenendyk & Banks, 2014; Stroud, 
2011; Taber & Lodge, 2005; Valentino et al., 2009a). Contributing to the literature, the 
dissertation examines the indirect effects of discrete negative emotions on political 
participation mediated by distinct information seeking pattern. Thus, I raise the following 
research question: 
RQ7: Do different patterns of information seeking in terms of the (a) amount and (b) 
direction mediate the relationship between the discrete negative emotions 
(anger, anxiety) and political participation? 
Unexplored Emotion: Disgust and its Impact on Information Seeking and 
Participation 
Besides anger and anxiety, the current study also includes a less studied emotion 
on the negative side: disgust. Disgust is one of the most basic emotions people experience 
in their daily lives even without conscious appraisal processes, and is closely related to 
survival and adaptation (Izard, 1992; Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996; 
Russell & Barrett, 1999). Disgust is an easily experienced emotion in political contexts like 
political advertising, elections, and other campaigns (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014; DeBell, 
2016; Woolf, 2007).  However, there is a very limited amount of literature on the effect 
of disgust on information processing and political participation (Olatunji & Sawchuk, 
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2005). Considering the pervasiveness of disgust experience, the lack of academic inquiry 
is surprising, thus calls for attention.   
Disgust has rarely been studied in political contexts and is frequently confounded 
with anger or fear (DeBell, 2016; Woolf, 2007). It is empirically difficult to disentangle 
disgust from the others as they correlate and co-occur with one another (Hutcherson & 
Gross, 2011; Jamali, & Shahbaztabar, 2017). However, appraisal theorists have argued that 
disgust is distinct from other negative emotions like anger in terms of their appraisals (e.g., 
Lazarus, 1991). Briefly discussing the differences, disgust is different from anger as it 
promotes an avoidance tendency whereas anger evokes an approach tendency (Lazarus, 
1991; Nabi, 2002). Anxiety also motivates flight and avoid, but disgust, unlike anxiety, 
attracts attention and leads to further elaboration of an offending object (Woolf, 2007). 
More specifically, disgust is found to be a strong motivator of avoidance behavior, 
increasing physical activity and information seeking (Woolf, 2007). Englis (1990) also 
argued that disgust has a lingering effect and is more memorable than other negative 
emotions. In this sense, disgust is considered to be effective in a persuasive context like 
health promotion (DeBell, 2016; Woolf, 2007). 
Specifically, the category of moral disgust seems highly applicable to political 
studies, as it is usually the case where people feel morally, not physically, disgusted by 
politics or politicians. Scholars argue that the experience of moral disgust not only 
motivates behavior but sets social norms of rightness and wrongness (e.g., Ben-Nun 
Bloom, 2014; Looy, 2004). Emotional reactions like disgust can be the best predictors of 
people’s moral evaluations (Haidt & Hersch, 2001). For instance, when people feel 
disgusted with tobacco companies or other commercial industries like pharmaceutics, 
weaponry, or oil drilling, they usually think it is immoral to do what they do, such as killing 
people or harming human health, animals, or nature.  
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In the political context, people also experience disgust often as finding out about 
political leaders’ wrongdoings such as bribery, sexual misconduct, or lobbying. In the 
sense, when people feel morally disgusted toward politicians, partisan bickering, or politics 
in general, they are motivated to act to stop, reject, or avoid the disgust-evoking object 
(DeBell, 2016). Particularly, DeBell (2016) found that when politics elicits anger and it 
continues, the constant vitriol can turn into disgust, which, in turn, causes an avoidance of 
politics or rejection of the entire system in general. In the sense, it can be assumed that if 
people constantly experience disgust or feel highly disgusted by politicians or politics in 
general, people can avoid political activities such as voting or following news on the media 
in general. 
Looking into the physiology of feeling negative emotions like disgust can be 
another way to predict the effect of disgust on information seeking or participatory 
behaviors. It can be assumed that the increased physiological reactions from experiences 
of disgust can be a predictor of increased physical activity. For instance, Gruszczynski, 
Balzer, Jacobs, Smith, and Hibbing (2013) showed that individuals’ high-physiological 
arousal tendency correlates with political participation, using electrodermal activities. 
Specifically, they demonstrated that increased physiological measures of arousal and 
attention significantly and positively affected political participation (Gruszczynski, Balzer, 
Jacobs, Smith, & Hibbing, 2013). Their finding alludes to the possibility that negative 
emotions like disgust, especially considering the fact that disgust is more closely associated 
to physiological reactions than other complex emotions like shame or guilt, have an impact 
on people’s physical activities (Lazarus, 1991).  
Due to the lack of literature on disgust in the political realm, it is hard to predict the 
impact of disgust on information seeking and participation. Low intensity experiences of 
disgust may lead to an increased action tendency and arouse interest (Englis, 1990; Woolf, 
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2007), while high intensity experiences of disgust may deter people from taking any action, 
leading people to avoid politics in general (DeBell, 2016). In general, political scholars 
agree that disgust is an emotion with an aversion and avoidance tendency (DeBell, 2016, 
Marcus et al., 2000). Based on this literature, I propose the following non-directional 
hypotheses and RQs: 
H8a: Individuals experiencing disgust will seek out a different amount of 
information compared to those not experiencing the emotion (i.e., control 
group).  
H8b: Individuals experiencing disgust will differ in their intentions to participate in 
politics compared to those not experiencing the emotion (i.e., control group). 
RQ8: How does disgust differ from anger or anxiety in terms of its impact on 
information seeking (i.e., amount, direction)? 
RQ9: How does disgust differ from anger or anxiety in terms of its impact on 
political participation (i.e., intention)? 
SUMMARY  
In this chapter, I went over the current literature on the effect of discrete emotions 
on people’s information search and participation behaviors. Overall, the current state of the 
literature on political emotions has very limited ability to specify how discrete positive 
emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and pride) affect information processing and political 
participation. Although a few theories predict how different emotions (e.g., anger, anxiety, 
and enthusiasm) lead to distinctive cognitive processes, such as affective intelligence 
theory and expectancy violation theory, they only partially explain how discrete positive 
emotions could affect information processing and are vulnerable to alternative 
explanations.  
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Acknowledging a noticeable gap in our understanding of the discrete emotional 
effects on information processing and participation, only general predictions about the 
effects of discrete positive emotions have been made. To find out more about the 
differential effects of discrete positive emotions, I proposed a set of research questions on 
the relationships among discrete positive emotions, information search, and participation 
intention in politics. Overall, hope, pride, and enthusiasm may influence information 
seeking behaviors, and they may have a positive impact on political activities depending 
on the valence and amount of information people are receiving.  
In contrast to positive emotions, there has been a significant amount of research 
looking at the effects of discrete negative emotions on information seeking and 
participation. Theories of affective intelligence and expectancy violation predict the 
different pathways from discrete negative emotions to information search and to 
participation. However, the current state of literature is far from reaching a consensus about 
how negative emotions (i.e., anger, anxiety, or disgust) affect information search and 
participation intentions. Thus, I proposed research questions to find out their differential 
effects on information search in terms of direction (e.g., pro-attitudinal or counter-
attitudinal) and political activities in terms of cost (i.e., cheap v. costly activities). 
To answer the research questions and hypotheses proposed in the chapter, I 
designed and executed an online experiment, as detailed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Method 
To study how different enthusiasm, hope, and pride are in terms of appraisal 
components, I conducted an online survey. To investigate (a) whether discrete positive 
emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and pride) and negative emotions (i.e., anger, anxiety, 
and disgust) have differential effects on (a) information seeking behaviors and (b) 
participation intentions, I conducted an online experiment. These studies are outlined 
below, each with a discussion of how the study addresses the research questions and 
hypotheses posed earlier.  
APPRAISAL DETERMINANTS OF POSITIVE EMOTIONS: STUDY 1 (SURVEY)  
First, research has examined whether emotional experiences – enthusiasm, hope, 
and pride – can be explained by certain appraisal determinants, such as anticipated effort, 
valence, and clarity. An online survey was administered to identify different cognitive 
appraisal determinants for enthusiasm, hope, and pride. Drawing from appraisal theories, 
different appraisal components were identified and selected to best measure each emotion. 
As appraisal theorists lack a general consensus on how many and which set of appraisal 
determinants best represent enthusiasm, hope, and pride, the purpose of the analysis is 
exploratory rather than confirmatory. I relied on previous analyses of the cognitive 
determinants of discrete positive emotions (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Johnson-Laird & 
Oatley, 1989; Shiota, 2003; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). Frijda et al. (1989) and 
Shiota (2003) studied enthusiasm, which has been nearly missed in the cognitive 
psychology literature, and helped to determine the dimensions (e.g., resource acquisition) 
of the understudied emotion. They shed light on the potential dimensions of enthusiasm by 
suggesting its theoretical foundation. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) and Tong (2007) studied 
a wide range of emotions (e.g., joy, awe, challenge, romantic love, serenity) including hope 
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and pride, measuring the emotions using different sets of cognitive dimensions. Tong’s 
(2007) work is particularly noteworthy because it compares and contrasts the different 
measures of positive emotions developed by his predecessors using discriminant analyses. 
As the present study only examines three emotions, enthusiasm, hope, and pride, instead 
of using all the dimensions used by Tong (2007) and others, I only include the most relevant 
and discriminant dimensions predicting the three in order to create a parsimonious model 
which explains the three positive emotions. This study advances Tong’s (2007) work on 
positive emotions since not only it includes enthusiasm in the study, but also identifies and 
tests additional appraisal dimensions (e.g., action tendency, resource acquisition) to 
differentiate the three emotions. Also, most importantly, this study is the first attempt at 
studying the different appraisal dimensions of the three emotions in the political context. 
The proposed model is shown in Figure 1. 
 No political research to date has directly examined appraisal constructs of political 
emotional experiences. I extend upon scholarship on political psychology (MacKuen et al., 
2010; Valentino et al., 2011) as well as the studies of positive discrete emotions (Frijda et 
al., 1989; Scherer, 1982; Shiota, 2003) to design this study. 
Participants 
One hundred sixty-nine participants were recruited considering the fact that at least 
five cases are required to estimate one parameter in the model (Bentler, 1989; Bentler & 
Chou, 1987, also see Figure 1), and the proposed model has 30 parameters to be estimated. 
All of the participants in this study were recruited using the communication research 
system of a large Southwestern university and they received credit counted toward their 
classes for their participation. Participants ranged in age from 18- to 25-years-old (M = 
20.5, SD = 1.24). Approximately 50.9% of the sample identified as White/Caucasian, 5.9% 
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as African American or Black, 22.9% as Hispanic or Latino, 15.3% as Asian American, 
3.5% as multiracial, and 1.2% identified as other races or ethnicities. About 78.2% of the 
participants identified as women and 21.2% as men. In total, 61.2% of the sample had 
completed at least high school and 11.8% finished 2-year college. When it comes to 
political ideology, approximately 62.9% of the sample identified as liberal, 32.4% as 
conservative, and 4.1% identified as independent.  
 
                                                             
Figure 1. The proposed model of confirmatory factor analysis of positive emotions and 
their appraisal components 
 
Procedure 
After agreeing to participate in the study, subjects were randomly assigned to one 
of three emotion-inducing conditions in which they were asked to recall and describe in 
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writing personal experiences of one positive emotion (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, or pride). 
Different subjects were asked to perform this task in such a way that equal numbers of 
responses were obtained for each of the three emotional states. To induce different 
emotions, I relied on the recall method of emotional experience (e.g., imagining or reliving 
concrete situations in which people have felt a certain emotion strongly) which has been 
used by many emotion scholars from cognitive psychology and political science (e.g., 
Bower 1981; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007; Valentino et 
al., 2008, 2011).  
The recall method was used for several reasons. First, the primary beneﬁt of the 
recall instruction method is that it is one of the best and well-received practices to isolate 
discrete emotions and induce each of them independently. Considering the tendency of co-
occurrence among the positive emotions found in the literature (Barrett et al., 2001, Tong 
& Jia, 2017), certain emotional stimuli like music, video clips, or news articles are likely 
to induce unintended emotions across subjects. A key reason for this is that emotional 
responses depend not only on the features of such stimuli, but also on how individuals 
evaluate the stimuli in relation to their past experiences or situations (Lerner & Keltner, 
2001). For example, a hope-inducing video clip may simultaneously elicit joy in some 
people, enthusiasm in others, and a mix of both emotions in still others. Second, this 
technique can reliably generate the speciﬁc emotional response of interest across subjects 
by prompting them to focus explicitly on a certain subject, person, or situation with or in 
which they experienced the particular emotion strongly, and can provide consistent results 
compared to other emotion-inducing methods (Tong, 2007).  
Specifically, the following instruction was given: “Please recall and describe a time 
when you felt (enthusiasm/hope/pride) during the 2016 presidential campaign. Examples 
of things that have made some people feel (enthusiastic/hopeful/proud) are statements and 
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speeches given by the candidates during party conventions or debates. Recall as many 
details of the incident as you can. Try and remember as vividly as you can what this 
(enthusiasm/hope/pride) situation was like. When you have this memory clearly in mind, 
answer these questions. First, describe this (enthusiasm/hope/pride) experience. Second, 
what happened in this situation to make you feel (enthusiasm/hope/pride)? Third, what did 
it feel like to be feeling (enthusiasm/hope/pride)? Describe it as if you are describing to a 
person who has never felt (enthusiasm/hope/pride) so that the person will know what it 
feels like. Please take a few minutes to write down your answer.” 
After each description, participants filled out a questionnaire that assessed their 
cognitive appraisals and perceptions of that specific experience. The participants were 
asked to rate each appraisal item, using the recalled episode as the reference, on a 5-point 
scale that ranged from 1 (Definitely yes) to 5 (Definitely not). Also, they were told that if 
any item was not applicable to the recalled episode in question, they should indicate 0 
signifying ‘not relevant.’ For instance, after describing an emotional episode, they were 
asked questions like “how pleasant was this situation?” and “did you think that the 
circumstances would get better?” The appraisal items asked in the three emotion conditions 
were selected following the rationale explained below. Then the participants answered 
questions on demographics and political orientations. 
Selection of Appraisal Components 
Every positive emotion has a set of core appraisal components that differentiate it 
from other emotions (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1982). Instead of using all the cognitive 
appraisal components identified in the past research on discrete positive emotions, I 
considered each of the three emotions individually and only retained appraisal components 
that were found to be highly relevant to hope, pride, and/or enthusiasm based on the 
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findings of appraisal literature and other related works (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Shiota, 
2003; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Snyder, 2000).  
I trimmed down the cognitive appraisal components for the three emotions for the 
following reasons: First, appraisal theorists propose varying sets of appraisal components 
and not every appraisal component is relevant to or works well to differentiate enthusiasm, 
hope, and pride (see, for example, Frijda et al., 1989; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For 
instance, Tong (2007) identified 17 dimensions to differentiate 14 positive emotions but 
concluded that some dimensions should only be relevant to one, or maybe two, emotions. 
Past studies shed light on the fact that not every appraisal component is necessary or 
relevant to measure emotional experiences, thus I only draw on the most relevant and 
reliable appraisal components from the past studies. Second, including too many appraisal 
components would make the analyses and interpretation unwieldy and require an 
unattainable sample size for the study. Lastly, since the purpose of the analyses was to 
confirm the discriminatory power of previously explored or identified appraisal 
components, I selectively chose the most reliable and relevant appraisal components which 
best explained or classified hope, pride, and enthusiasm. For enthusiasm, there is very 
limited research on its appraisal components (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989), thus, I explored and 
included new appraisal components (i.e., resource acquisition) based on the theoretical 
literature and developed a set of cognitive items to measure the cognitive patterns of 
experiencing enthusiasm.  
Given that I aimed to document cognitive patterns of enthusiasm, hope, and pride, 
and to uncover the appraisal variables that strongly differentiate them, I opted for ten 
appraisal dimensions which were meant to include the important components studied 
previously (see Table 1) and hypothesized that the three emotions would be indicated by 
different sets of appraisal dimensions (see Figure 1 and Table 2). The ten appraisal 
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dimensions include the following: Pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, agency 
(self/others/circumstances), self-regard, expected change, mastery, action tendency, social 
appropriateness, and resource acquisition. The conceptualization of each of the ten 
appraisal dimensions follows below. In terms of making up each appraisal dimension (see 
Table 1), I followed the groupings of cognitive appraisal items for each appraisal 
dimension by Tong (2007) and Smith and Ellsworth (1985) which were shown to be 
reliable and accurate measures based on factor analyses. The action tendency component 
and its items were adapted from the work by Frijda et al. (1989) and I created the resource 
acquisition component based on the literature (Shiota, 2003).  
A few dimensions (i.e., pleasantness, agency, certainty) are included to predict all 
three emotions. Importantly, pleasantness and action tendency dimensions are included to 
predict all three emotions since they have been theorized to be the most basic and 
foundational dimensions to differentiate emotions. However, this does not mean that 
enthusiasm, hope, and pride have all the same levels of pleasantness or action tendency. 
Literature has shown that pride and enthusiasm are perceived as much more pleasant than 
hope (e.g., Shiota, 2003), and that enthusiasm has a higher level of action tendency than 
hope or pride (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). Hope is a less certain emotion than pride or 
enthusiasm (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Snyder, 2000). Differentiating the three in terms of 
these common dimensions is also needed as they are expected to show different levels of 
dimensions even though they share the dimensions as fundamental components.  
Conceptualization of Ten Appraisal Components 
Pleasantness  
The component of pleasantness indicates the level of perceived pleasantness or 
unpleasantness of a situation where people experience emotions. Appraisal literature 
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generally assumes that the environment where people feel positively-valenced emotions is 
perceived as pleasant and positive (Fredrickson, 2001; Tong & Jia, 2017), however, not 
every positive emotion is equally rated on the level of pleasantness. Positive emotions like 
hope and challenge can be rated low or even negatively depending on the perceived 
uncertainty and threats in a situation (Tong, 2007).  
Anticipated Effort  
The dimension of anticipated effort concerns the perceived amount of effort needed 
to deal with either potential or present obstacles or problems in an emotional experience 
(Tong, 2008). The component is one of the classic appraisal dimensions adopted and 
studied by many appraisal scholars (Ellsworth & Smith, 1987; Tong, 2007). Positive 
emotions like challenge and hope can score high on the dimension as the emotional 
experience is believed to make people expect some obstacles along the pathway to attaining 
a goal.  
Certainty  
The certainty dimension explains how well or confidently people feel that they 
know what happens in a situation that leads to a certain emotional experience. If the 
situation is perceived as uncertain, people usually feel unsure of what is happening and 
cannot understand or predict what will happen in the moment. As mentioned, hope is 
believed to score lower than pride on the certainty dimension (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). 
Agency (self/other/circumstance)  
The agency dimension can be identified by asking what people think about the 
cause of an event or happening and also by asking how people feel about the controllability 
of the situation. If people think a situation or event can be attributed to themselves, and feel 
they have a control over the situation, agency is perceived to be in themselves. If people 
think the cause of the situation or happening is not themselves, but other people or 
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circumstances, and feel that they do not have control over the situation, agency is believed 
to be in others or the circumstances of the situation.       
Self-Regard (Self-worth)  
The self-regard appraisal estimates how worthy people think of themselves. Thus, 
if situation makes people doubt their opinions, beliefs, or goals, it could lower people’s 
self-regard or self-worth (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). It is possible that people feeling 
positive emotions tend to regard themselves more highly than those experiencing negative 
emotions, but it is not always the case. Angry people may regard themselves more highly 
than happy individuals as the high level of self-regard could contribute to their emotional 
experience (e.g., since they regard themselves highly, they can be easily offended by 
others).    
Change  
The change component estimates the extent to which there is a high or low 
possibility for positive change in an environment or situation. If people expect positive 
change, the situation can be rated highly. The dimension is found to be correlated with the 
dimension of agency or certainty; the more agency or control people have in themselves, 
the more they perceive that positive change is possible (Tong & Jia, 2017) 
Mastery  
The mastery dimension concerns the perception where one sees oneself as 
competent in getting things done (i.e., goal attainment), and is conceptualized as whether 
people feel that they can achieve something in the situation they are in, or achievement 
could result from the situation (Tong, 2007). If the situation seems rewarding or satisfying 
either psychologically or physically, people feel increased mastery. Also, if the situation 
increases people’s prospect of possible gains (e.g., job, monetary reward, or other goals), 
their mastery level is expected to increase. 
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Action Tendency  
The dimension of action tendency has not been frequently adopted by appraisal 
theorists to predict or explain discrete positive emotions, possibly because positive 
emotions carry smaller effects on people’s action than negative ones (Fredrickson & Cohn, 
2008). Nonetheless, I adapt and include it in the study based on Frijda and colleagues’ 
(1989) research on positive emotions. Frijda et al. (1989) define action tendency as 
“individuals’ readiness to engage in or disengage from interaction with some goal object 
in some particular fashion” (p. 213). The interaction can be in any form of physiological 
change or physical movement, such as getting excited, shouting, jumping, talking to others, 
partially motivated by the approach or avoidance tendencies (Frijda, 1987; Scherer, 1984).  
Social Appropriateness  
The appraisal of the social appropriateness component estimates how appropriate 
one thinks it is to feel and act on certain emotions in the context with others (Tangney, 
1999; Tesser & Collins, 1988). The appraisal is also one of the least studied since it takes 
into account interpersonal relationships as well as social reflection one may have during an 
emotional experience (Tong, 2007). People may feel less proud if feeling or acting on an 
emotion deemed less socially desirable or acceptable, such as one celebrating his 
achievement while a close friend is going through hardship. The dimension is believed to 
predict the experience of pride in social settings (Tong, 2007). 
Resource Acquisition 
 The last appraisal component included in the study to predict the experiences of 
enthusiasm, hope, and pride is resource acquisition. Due to scant literature studying 
enthusiasm as a discrete emotion, a new appraisal dimension was needed. Shiota (2003) 
suggests that the experience of enthusiasm engages the perception where people see a 
possibility of having an increased amount of resources to attain their goals. Thus, the 
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appraisal of resource acquisition may be closely related to goal achievement, positive 
change, mastery, and pleasantness. 
Drawing from appraisal studies, the following three different sets of appraisal 
components are identified for each emotion for the model construction (see Figure 1 and 
Table 2): Enthusiasm can be predicted by high level of pleasantness, agency (self & others), 
high level of certainty, resource acquisition, and high level of action tendency (Frijda et 
al., 1989). Hope can be specified with the low or negative level of pleasantness, agency 
(circumstance), low level of certainty, change, low level of action tendency, and anticipated 
effort dimensions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Snyder, 2000; Tong, 2007). Lastly, pride may 
require evaluative dimensions like pleasantness (high), agency (self), certainty, mastery, 
social appropriateness, and positive self-regard (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007).  
 
Table 1. The groupings of cognitive items for ten appraisal dimensions (Cognitive items 
under each appraisal component) 
Cognitive items under each appraisal component  
1. Pleasantness  
Was this situation pleasant? 
Was the situation enjoyable? 
Was this situation unpleasant?  
Did you try to think about something else that would make you feel good in the 
situation? 
Was any person hurt in this situation? 
Did you feel cheated or wronged in the situation?  
2. Anticipated effort 
Was the situation cognitively challenging to process? 
Did you feel that this situation required you to expend effort (mental or physical)? 
Did you feel that you needed to exert yourself to deal with this situation? 
Did you pay close attention to this situation? 
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(Table 1 continued) 
Did you notice any problem that had to be solved before you could get what you 
wanted? 
Did you project that there would be obstacles between you and what you wanted? 
3. Certainty  
Were you certain about what made you feel that way? 
Did you understand the situation well? 
Were you certain about the situation? 
Were you confused about what was happening in the situation? 
Did you know most of what you needed to know in the situation? 
Were there many things you did not know about the situation? 
4. Agency (self, others, circumstances) 
Self 
Did you feel that you were in control of the situation? 
Did you cause what happened in the situation? 
Others 
Did you feel that someone else was controlling the situation?  
Did someone else cause what happened in the situation? 
Circumstances 
Did you feel that circumstances or forces beyond anyone's control caused the 
situation? 
Did circumstances or forces beyond anyone's control cause what happened in 
the situation? 
5. Self-Regard  
Did your self-esteem decrease in the situation? 
Did the situation make you see yourself in a negative way?  
Did you see yourself as someone who could change for the better? 
Did the situation undermine your goals/needs/desires?  
Did the situation make you doubt your opinions/beliefs? 
Did you actually feel or obtain something that you deserved? 
6. Change 
Did you feel that you could do something to change or improve the situation?  
Did you expect that your circumstances would get better?  
Did you feel that there was nothing much you could do to change circumstances? 
Did you think that other people could do something to make the situation better?  
7. Mastery 
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(Table 1 continued) 
Did you expect to achieve something you desired (e.g., goals, needs) in the 
situation? 
Did you actually feel or obtain something that made you feel good? 
Did you fulfill duties/obligations that ought to be fulfilled?  
Was the situation potentially rewarding? 
Did your expectations of what you could achieve decrease? 
8. Action tendency  
Did you want to talk about the situation with someone else? 
Did you feel like making any kind of immediate actions in the situation? 
Did you want to stay close to the situation? 
Did you want to stay away from the situation? 
Did you feel excited, aroused, or restless? 
Did you want to talk, move, jump, laugh, shout, or undertake things? 
9. Social appropriateness 
Was it appropriate to feel what you felt? 
Was it inappropriate to feel what you felt? 
Do you think people who are important to you would feel the same as you about the 
situation? 
Do you think other people would feel the same as you about the situation? 
Do you think other people think that it was appropriate for you to feel what you 
felt? 
If you did something well in the situation (if not, select "not relevant"), was it due 
to other people? 
10. Resource acquisition 
Did your expectations of what you could achieve increase in the situation? 
Did you recognize any possible increase in resources to achieve any of your 
goals/needs? 
Did the situation make it easier for you to achieve any of your goals/needs? 
Did the situation make it harder for you to achieve any of your goals/needs? 
Did you feel a sense of achievement in the situation? 
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Table 2. The appraisal dimensions of enthusiasm, hope, and pride 
Emotion Appraisal dimension 
Enthusiasm Pleasantness 
Action tendency 
Certainty 
Agency (self & others) 
Resource acquisition 
Hope Pleasantness (negative) 
Action tendency  
Certainty (negative) 
Agency (circumstances) 
Anticipated effort 
Change 
Pride Pleasantness 
Certainty  
Agency (self & others) 
Mastery 
Positive self-regard  
Social appropriateness 
 
The results of the first study, which aims to classify the three positive emotions 
using distinct sets of appraisal dimensions, would ensure that I am actually testing three 
discrete emotional constructs of enthusiasm, hope, and pride and their differential effects 
in a political context. Since the current literature has not only established that anger, 
anxiety, and disgust are different from one another in terms of their appraisal dimensions 
(Lazarus, 1991; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Nabi, 1999, 2002), but also shown empirical 
evidence for their differential effects (Johnston et al., 2015; MacKuen et al., 2010; 
Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 2013), I did not test the appraisal composites of negative 
emotions. 
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DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS ON INFORMATION SEEKING AND PARTICIPATION: STUDY 2 
(EXPERIMENT) 
Testing the effect of discrete positive and negative emotions on information seeking 
behavior has merit in the context of appraisal studies on discrete political emotions. A lack 
of scholarly consensus on the differential effects of discrete positive emotions on 
information seeking and participation led me to pose RQ2 through RQ4 and H2 through 
H4 and to design an online experiment that would help answer the questions. I also posed 
RQ5 through RQ9 and H5 to H8 to further investigate the differential effects of discrete 
negative emotions on information search and participatory activities in politics (see Figure 
2 for the theoretical model). The experiment was conducted between April and May in 
2017. 
Figure 2. The theoretical model specification of emotion, information seeking, and 
participation (intention) 
Positive emotion 
(Enthusiasm, 
hope, or pride) 
 
Negative emotion 
(Anxiety, anger, 
or disgust) 
 
No emotion 
(Control) 
Amount of 
info-seeking 
Direction of 
info-seeking 
Political 
participation 
(Intention) 
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Participants 
A total of 387 subjects were recruited (the reasoning behind the sample size is 
explained under the plan of analysis). All the subjects in the experiment were recruited 
using Amazon.com’s crowd sourcing website, Mechanical Turk (Mturk.com). Although 
participants sampled using Mturk are not representative, they are more diverse than student 
samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Also, 
the study findings using Mturk samples are found to be comparable or similar to those of 
the same political experiments using different samples (Bersinsky et al., 2012), even 
though Mturk subjects tend to exhibit a high level of attention to political surveys (Clifford 
& Jerit, 2012). Since the study I conducted was an experiment rather than survey requiring 
a representative sample, the sample using Mturk.com was acceptable. Participants who 
completed the experiment were compensated with $1.00 upon completing the study.  
After cleaning and dropping ineligible data (e.g., not finished answers, invalid 
answers),2 the size of each emotion group is as follows: (1) the control (no emotion) group 
had 66, (2) enthusiasm condition had 46, (3) hope condition had 58, (4) pride condition 
had 58, (5) anger condition had 53, (6) anxiety group had 51, and (7) disgust group had 55 
of participants. Participants ranged in age from 19- to 73-years-old (M = 37.8, SD = 12.3). 
Approximately 71.7% of the sample identified as White/Caucasian, 5.6% as African 
American or Black, 5.6% as Hispanic or Latino, 12.4% as Asian or Asian American, 1.7% 
as multi-racial, and 3% identified as other races or ethnicities. About 52.4% of the 
                                                 
2 The original raw data set had 405 participants instead of 387. After removing the incomplete or 
unfinished answers (n = 10), 395 participants were retained. Then, I removed 8 more due to the following 
reasons: 1) Not following the instruction for emotion manipulation (e.g., writing down random answers to 
get compensation), 2) clearly indicating the emotional experience which participants were asked to describe 
was not applicable to their own experience (e.g., saying “honestly, I did not feel hopeful at all during the 
campaign”), and 3) the amount of information seeking was shown to be outliers (i.e., SD was greater than 4 
from the mean). Even though this practice may theoretically have an effect on the randomization, 
negatively influencing the experimental protocol, the overall number of described incidents (n = 8) was 
very small, and the additional analyses with the dataset (n = 395) showed that the findings in the study still 
held up. 
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participants identified as men and 47.6% as women. Approximately 19.7% of the sample 
had completed at high school and 54.1% finished 2-year or 4-year college. Participants 
reported their yearly household income; approximately 30.9% earned $0 – $39,999, 
44.28% earned $40,000 – $79,999, and 24.9% earned $80,000 or more. When it comes to 
political ideology, approximately 61.8% of the sample identified as liberal, 38.2% as 
conservative. Since the study aimed to collect the data on how discrete positive or negative 
emotions affect information seeking and participation, participants were required to have 
political party affiliation, being either a Democrat or Republican, in that way they can feel 
either positive or negative toward one of the two political parties, the Democratic or 
Republican Party.  
Procedure 
Before the emotional manipulation, participants were asked about their 
partisanship, political interest, political efficacy, and the candidates for whom they voted 
in the 2016 presidential election. Then subjects were randomly assigned to one of the six 
emotion conditions or to a control group. To induce an emotional state, subjects were asked 
to recall and write about something that caused them to experience a speciﬁc emotion. 
Similar manipulations have been used in past political studies (Isbell et al., 2006; Valentino 
et al., 2011). 
Subjects were given the following emotion-manipulating task:  
“Now I would like you to describe a moment during the 2016 presidential campaign 
when your preferred party made you feel (enthusiastic/ hopeful/ proud/ angry/ anxious/ 
disgusted). Examples could be statements and speeches given by a candidate during 
debates, party conventions, or campaigns. Please recall as many details of the incident as 
you can and remember as vividly as you can what this situation was like. When you have 
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this memory clearly in mind, answer these questions. First, describe this experience. 
Second, what happened in this situation to make you feel (enthusiastic/ hopeful/ proud/ 
angry/ anxious/ disgusted)? Third, what did it feel like to be (enthusiastic/ hopeful/ proud/ 
angry/ anxious/ disgusted)? Describe it as if you are describing to a person who has never 
felt (enthusiastic/ hopeful/ proud/ angry/ anxious/ disgusted) so that the person will know 
what it feels like. Take a few minutes to write down your answer. The length of your answer 
should be at least 400 characters to be approved for the reward.”  
To give a better understanding of the manipulation of each emotion, a random 
response from each emotional condition is presented below. In the enthusiasm condition, 
one said that “First I was thinking about how the Democratic Party would be the first to 
put in a female president. I felt enthusiastic because you were going to see history made in 
America by having the first female to serve as president of the country and the free world. 
It felt great the closer it came to election day, and I was very enthusiastic when election 
day finally came. The enthusiasm was something that I have not felt before on election day 
since President Obama became the first President of color in the United States of America.” 
In the hope condition, one gave the following response: “I felt hopeful at the 
presidential debates when Trump said he was going to change Obamacare. It gave me hope 
that things could get better in this country. It felt very promising to have that kind of hope 
that things could improve. I also felt hope because Trump would always say God Bless and 
reference God in his speeches and we need a leader who has a strong faith in God. That 
gives the best feeling of hope because we need a leader who will guide us.” 
 In the pride condition, one respondent described the moment as follows: “I was 
proud of the first debate between Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton. After watching some 
messy and contentious and downright petty debates between Republican candidates, it was 
nice to hear a debate focused on actual issues and not mudslinging. Whenever candidates 
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lower themselves to simply insulting each other instead of talking about what's concerning 
the country and its citizens (for whom they work for, regardless of whether they forget), 
it's an insult to the intelligence of the citizenry and a total lack of respect for the offices for 
which they are running. But that first primary debate between Bernie and Hillary 
exemplified what we should be seeing as we consider the candidates, and it made me feel 
proud not only because it set a good example, but because the intelligent debate actually 
made me feel more involved with the process, like they were giving me something to 
consider, and I felt like an important part of the process.” 
In the anger condition, one gave the following response: “In the first debate where 
Donald Trump was interrupting Hillary Clinton and saying “Wrong, wrong, wrong,” I was 
angry with Donald and with his lack of respect toward Hillary and toward the moderator, 
and the spread of rumors that were not true. I did not like his attitude. I do not know why 
the Republican Party chose him. Also, I was angry with all the racist comments to the 
Mexican emigrants and all the things about the Mexican wall.” 
In the anxiety condition, one respondent described the moment as follows: “The 
moment the Republican Party selected their candidate to represent them, it just sent a chill 
down my spine. At the time, it felt unrealistic that Clinton would lose the election, but there 
was that thought she might when leaks started coming out. Trump's campaign and promises 
felt like the United States taking several steps backwards when it came to just freedom. 
The idea of making Mexico pay for a wall was just insane. Here we are in 2017 and my 
anxiety is just even worst when Trump is meeting with foreign leaders and him dealing 
with foreign policy from Syria to North Korea. He can just start a war just like that without 
congressional approval.” 
In the disgust condition, one response described the experience as follows: “I didn't 
follow their campaign closely, as I am not much into politics, but the first thing that I 
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remember at this moment is my impression about the Democrats, which was that they 
actually worried more about situations outside the U.S. For example, most of the world 
wanted the Democratic Party to win because they were more appropriate to other countries 
than to ours. Why would somebody care for the democracy of Kosovo? Kosovo was a 
Serbian country, and I don't see any reason why the Democrats would try to help Kosovo. 
And many other countries. I was disgusted when I noticed that they would rather work 
harder for foreign countries than for ours.” 
Lastly, in the control condition, respondents were asked to write down about 
something they usually do before going to bed. The prompt read as follows: “Now I would 
like you to describe what you usually do right before you go to bed on a normal day. 
Examples could be reading a book, checking social media accounts, or drinking a cup of 
tea. Please recall as many details of your everyday night routine. When you are ready, 
answer these questions. First, describe what you usually do before going to bed. Second, 
describe how that helps you fall asleep every night. Take a few minutes to write down your 
answer. The length of your answer should be at least 400 characters be approved for the 
reward.”  
For instance, one respondent in the control condition answered as follows: “Right 
before bed, I do the following: I check my email to make sure that everything was replied 
to and completed before I go to bed. I check my bank account balances and make notes of 
what bills/expenses are coming up for the following day. I get my outfit out and ready for 
the next day. I get my son's outfit out and ready for the next day. I catch up on current 
events using several news outlet apps on my phone. I check social media mediums such as 
Instagram, Snapchat, Facebook, and Twitter. I make sure that I have a meal plan for the 
following day. I watch an episode of a show I may have stored on my DVR. Lastly, I write 
down what I need to do for the week to remain productive.” 
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Once completing the emotion manipulation procedure, subjects were asked to read 
news articles on a mock new website which contained 12 news articles, and then to answer 
questions about their intentions to engage in eight different forms of political behavior.  
Manipulation Check (Emotion Measure) 
A manipulation check was performed to make sure the emotion manipulation was 
successful. First, to test whether or not the manipulation was effective, two graduate 
students who are very familiar with content analysis coded the presence of intended 
emotions in the open-ended responses, whether present (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). 
Coders could easily identify the dominant emotion expressed in each response with 
intercoder agreement exceeding 98% for all six emotion conditions. For each of six 
emotion conditions, all of the responses were coded by both coders. Table 3 shows a 
satisfactory intercoder reliability measures in terms of both percentage agreement and 
Krippendorff’s alpha.3 However, while the intended emotion occurred most strongly in 
each condition, there were a significant amount of responses that expressed more than one 
emotion (See Table 3). Especially, under the enthusiasm condition, more than 20% of the 
responses expressed hope and/or pride simultaneously. Enthusiasm was also detected 
under the hope and pride conditions at the ratios of 12 to 14%. Under the disgust condition, 
anger was detected in approximately 14% of the responses. Further, a noticeable amount 
of anxiety was expressed in either the anger or disgust condition.  
                                                 
3 According to Krippendorff (2004), the alpha estimate .67 and above is considered sufficient for 
exploratory research and the estimates in Table 3 show acceptable intercoder reliability being very close to 
the threshold. Also, Krippendorff’s alpha takes into account the balanced frequency of each category (i.e., 0 
= absent, 1 = present) in a coding unit (i.e., each emotion) when calculating the alpha (2004). In the 
experiment, the study was designed to ask participants to feel an intended emotion (coded as 1), and the 
non-presence of the intended emotion (in this case, coded as 0) negatively distorted the alpha measure. 
Thus, the estimated alpha (.66) does not invalidate the reliability of coding since the experiment is designed 
to induce an emotion in each emotional condition.         
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One respondent, for example, expressed both anxiety and anger in the anxiety 
condition, saying the following: “A moment when the Democratic Party made me feel 
anxious during the 2016 election was when they were talking about women's rights to have 
an abortion. They spoke about how an unborn child is not a person, that it has no rights and 
is only a fetus. The thing that made me feel anxious is the idea that a living being is not a 
person and has no rights. I also think there was a bit of anger that caused the anxiety. I was 
mad that democrats thought abortion is okay. Because I didn't have an outlet for the anger 
at that moment, the anger developed into anxiety. It was devastating to me that people 
could think that way. Being anxious felt like I was out of control. My chest felt tight and I 
was restless. I couldn't get my mind off of abortion. My thoughts were racing and I was 
helpless in that moment.” 
While these deviations from a perfectly independent induction are not ideal, high 
tendency of emotion co-occurrence is the nature of emotion manipulation when it comes 
to discrete emotions like enthusiasm or disgust (e.g., Forgas, 1999; Fredrickson & 
Branigan; 2005, Tong & Jia, 2017). Despite the noticeable rates of co-occurrence of 
emotions, the intended emotion occurred clearly in the respective condition across all 
groups. 
Table 3. Intercoder reliability and descriptive statistics of emotion co-occurrence 
(Percentage) 
 Enthusiasm Hope Pride Anger Anxiety Disgust 
Intercoder 
agreement (%) 
98% 98% 100% 100% 98% 100% 
Krippendorff’s 
alpha 
.66 .66 1.00 1.00 .66 1.00 
Emotion               
co-occurrence 
23.9% 20.7% 12.1% 13.2% 13.7% 14.5% 
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Measure of Information Search 
After the emotional manipulation, participants were asked to look at a mock news 
website and decide which articles they want to read based on the headlines and pictures 
only. To examine the effects of discrete positive and negative emotions on information 
seeking in terms of amount and direction, I designed a news website containing twelve 
different news articles, including four articles obviously favoring the Republican Party, 
four articles obviously favoring the Democratic Party, and four other non-political articles 
unrelated to politics or parties (e.g., weather, technology, or economy). Figure 3 shows a 
screenshot of the news website designed for the study. The display and order of 12 news 
articles on the mock news page was randomized for every view and participants could only 
see the photos and title leads of news articles before they clicked on any articles. 
Descriptive statistics on participants’ news reading time and direction can be found in 
Chapter 6 when discussing findings.4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Descriptive statistics about participants’ news reading time and direction are presented in the later part of 
the dissertation. For positive emotion groups, Table 8 shows the descriptive data of news reading time (i.e., 
median, IQR) across three positive emotion and control groups; Table 10 shows the means and SEs of the 
number of articles read by participants across the groups; Table 12 presents the means and SEs of pre-
attitudinal reading time across the groups. For negative emotion groups, Table 18 shows the descriptive 
data of news reading time (i.e., median, IQR) across three negative emotion and control groups; Table 20 
shows the means and SEs of the number of articles read by participants across the groups; Lastly, Table 22 
presents the means and SEs of pre-attitudinal reading time across the groups. 
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Figure 3. News website: Displaying 12 confirming, challenging, and miscellaneous 
stories 
 
Rather than relying on self-reported news consumption or intention to seek 
information, the experiment simulates an information seeking environment to monitor 
actual information consumption (Gadarian & Albertson, 2014; Knobloch-Westerwick & 
Meng, 2011). In this controlled condition, subjects could choose news stories which they 
find interesting (ranging from 0 up to 12 stories) and spend as much or as little time 
browsing the site and reading news stories, and behavioral measures were collected and 
recorded unobtrusively. The main advantage of this design is that the researcher does not 
need to make assumptions about the type or content of information that subjects read and 
does not have to rely on self-report data on information seeking behaviors or intentions. 
Valentino and colleagues (2008, 2009a) also utilized a similar type of design to test the 
effects of different emotions on information search in a campaign.  
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Pretest of News Leads and Articles 
News headlines presented on the news site were selected and adapted from outlets 
such as the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Washington Post, and 
Newsweek, making sure that the valence of news headlines sounded partisan (except for 
the miscellaneous articles). The source of each article (e.g., The New York Times, Wall 
Street Journal, USA Today) was not shown to participants so that source recognition does 
not influence information-seeking behaviors. Each article (headline and content) could be 
considered as confirming, challenging, or balanced with respect to the participants’ attitude 
towards the candidates. To ensure that the headlines be perceived as either confirming, 
challenging, or neutral to the participants’ partisan leaning, I ran two pre-tests of the news 
headlines and articles.  
The levels of perceived partisan leaning and interestingness of the news headlines 
and articles were tested over two online surveys using Mechanical Turk. The first test was 
conducted between February 24th and 25th 2017 with 112 participants. The participants 
ranged in age from 21 to 70-years-old (M = 36.7, SD = 12.03) and 39.3% of the participants 
identified as women and 60.7% as men. Approximately 57% of the sample identified as 
White/Caucasian, 3.6% as African-American or Black, 7.1% as Hispanic or Latino, 25% 
as Asian-American, and 7.2% identified as other races. Approximately 12.5% of the 
sample had completed at least high school and 58.1% finished college. More than half of 
them identified as liberal (53.6%), 32.1% as conservative, and 14.3% as independent.  
The survey asked participants how they perceived the interestingness and partisan leaning 
of 12 news articles and their headlines. Every participant was compensated with 70 cents 
for their participation.  
Since not every news article and its headline yielded the expected partisan leaning 
(either pro-Democratic or pro-Republican) and interest levels, I conducted the second 
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survey in which 14 news articles and their headlines were tested. Some of the 14 news 
articles were edited from the first test and others were newly adopted from multiple news 
outlets for the test. The second test was conducted on March 20th, 2017 and had 113 
participants who were recruited on Mechanical Turk again. Participants ranged in age from 
20 to 69-years-old (M = 34.2, SD = 11.51) and 36.3% of the participants identified as 
women and 63.7% as men. Approximately 55% of the sample identified as 
White/Caucasian, 9.7% as African-American or Black, 6.2% as Hispanic or Latino, 25.7% 
as Asian-American, and 3.6% identified as other races. Approximately 9% of the sample 
had completed at least high school and 70% had a college degree. 58.4% of the sample 
identified as liberal, 26.5% as conservative, and 15% as independent. Each participant was 
compensated with 60 cents for their participation.  
Based on the results of two pre-tests of news articles, I selected the 12 most fitting 
articles for the study; four pro-Democratic, four pro-Republican, and four non-political 
(miscellaneous) news articles (see Appendix A). The level of perceived interestingness of 
12 articles was tested and moderated to be equally interesting (see Table 4 for the pretest 
results of 12 news articles). To minimize the impact of the use of photographs on article 
choice, all twelve articles had the same sized-photo next to the headlines. The appearances 
or colors of the photos were not too distinctive from one another, ensuring that none of 
them drew more or less attention from readers. Lastly, the length of 12 articles was similar 
(see Table 4). 
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Table 4. Perceived interest & partisan leaning of news articles  
Categories Title leads 
Partisan 
leaning (SD) 
Perceived 
interest (SD) 
Number 
of words 
Pro-
Democratic 
articles 
GOP and White House Lost 
Big on Health Care  
5.22 (1.50) 3.03 (1.10) 228 
Democratic Party's Image 
More Positive Than GOP’s 
5.25 (1.78) 3.17 (1.28) 220 
Donations pour into help 
Elizabeth Warren after 
Senate rebuke 
5.08 (1.43) 3.01 (1.20) 185 
Key Democrats target 
President Trump on ethics 
5.10 (1.53) 3.47 (1.24) 257 
Pro-
Republican 
articles 
Sanders Finally Blames 
Establishment Dems for 
Trump Victory  
2.84 (1.56) 3.23 (1.16) 265 
Republicans unveil new bill 
to replace Obamacare  
3.07 (1.63) 3.36 (1.01) 230 
Americans grew more 
positive toward GOP's 
Obamacare Replacement 
2.92 (1.63) 3.02 (1.19) 230 
Pew Research: Republicans 
More Knowledgeable Than 
Democrats 
2.21 (1.59) 2.88 (1.24) 180 
Non-political 
articles  
Rock 'n' roll pioneer Chuck 
Berry dies at 90 
4.03 (.79) 2.93 (1.25) 254 
Fire near Boulder, Colorado, 
may be Human-Caused 
4.03 (.17) 3.04 (1.11) 244 
More than 50 percent of 
California Still in a Drought 
4.02 (1.38) 2.91 (1.05) 244 
After Short-Lived Tenure, 
Uber President Quits Amid 
Company Turmoil 
4.08 (.74) 2.87 (1.11) 227 
*Note:  
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Scale of Partisan leaning: from very much pro-Republican (1) to neutral (4), to very 
much pro-Democratic (7) 
Scale of Perceived interest: from not interesting at all (1) to extremely interesting (5) 
 
Information Search Measures 
When it comes to information search on the mock news site, subjects were given 
the following instruction: “In the following, you will be directed to an online news website. 
Please browse through to gain an impression of the articles. Please read what you find 
interesting, just as you normally would. There is no assigned number of articles that you 
should read, and you don’t have to read the articles as a whole. So, you can read as many 
or as few articles as you want. When you are done browsing and reading, click on the next 
button below, then a questionnaire will upload automatically. You will not be tested on the 
contents of the articles.”  
To make sure that participants had a chance to browse the news page, I mandated 
them to spend at least two minutes on the site. Participants were given unlimited time to 
browse and read any of 12 news stories and were able to opt out of reading if they wanted 
to stop. The total number and valence (either congenial or non-congenial to their partisan 
affiliation) of articles read as well as the time spent on each news story were recorded using 
a tracking program.  
Dependent Variable Measures 
Intent to participate 
After finishing the information search task, participants were asked about their 
intentions to participate in different forms of political activities. Forms of political 
participation included eight items of cheap and costly political activities: 1) Wear a 
campaign button, 2) display a bumper sticker, 3) put up a yard sign, 4) attend a rally for 
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campaign or candidate, 5) vote for a candidate, 6) donate money to campaign, 7) volunteer 
for candidates’ campaign, and 8) contact a candidate or campaign staffs. The measures of 
political participation were drawn and adapted from past political literature (e.g., 
Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). For costly participatory 
activities, based on past literature (e.g., Valentino et al., 2011; Verba et al., 1995), I 
measured: (1) voting in the 2018 midterm (intent), (2) volunteering for a campaign or 
candidate, (3) donating money, (4) attending a rally, and (5) contact a candidate or 
campaign staffs. For cheap forms of participation, I included the following variables: (6) 
wearing a campaign button, (7) display a bumper sticker, and (8) put up a yard sign. The 
participant’s intent to perform each activity was measured on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 
(extremely likely) to 7 (extremely unlikely). For the descriptive statistics, see Tables 13 
and 23.  
Other Variable Measures 
The following variables were included and measured in my analysis to check the 
random assignment of the experiment: Demographic information (i.e., age, gender, 
race/ethnicity, annual household income, education level, religious affiliation, and marital 
status), general interest in politics, party affiliation (Democrat or Republican), strength of 
partisan affiliation (strong or weak), political efficacy, and general efficacy. Based on the 
methodological outline discussed here, I turn to report the results of the survey in Chapter 
5 and the experiment in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 5. Construct of Discrete Positive Emotions: Enthusiasm, Hope, 
and Pride 
In the cognitive psychology and emotion studies literatures, there is abundant 
evidence indicating that the various positive emotions people experience, such as pride, 
serenity, and hope, have different constructs, and thus have different effects on behaviors 
like information search (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007).  
However, it comes as a surprise that there has been a void of studies on discrete positive 
emotions in political research. In the political realm, people experience a wide range of 
emotions with both positive and negative valence. Even though some studies have 
discussed the differential effects of negative emotions, mainly anger and anxiety, on 
individuals’ political activities (e.g., Valentino et al., 2011), most of the political studies 
have treated a range of discrete positive emotions as a single emotion with positive valence 
(e.g., Brader, 2006b; MacKuen et al., 2010). High correlations and blurred conceptual 
boundaries among positive emotions in political contexts are possible reasons why these 
emotions are difficult to study separately (Barrett, 2006; Just et al., 2007), but a recent 
study in cognitive psychology alludes to another reason for a void of discrete positive 
emotion studies in politics. Tong and Jia (2017) recently discussed the co-occurrence of 
discrete positive emotions (e.g., awe, hope, joy, pride, and surprise) and their shared 
appraisal dimensions.  Due to the overlap of appraisal dimensions that discrete positive 
emotions comprise, some of them are highly likely to occur simultaneously. The high co-
occurrence of discrete positive emotions makes it difficult for researchers to differentiate 
them from one another and even renders the study of their differential effects in politics 
difficult. 
This study takes an exploratory step in political studies as it investigates the makeup 
of three discrete positive emotions: enthusiasm, hope, and pride. The investigation of the 
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constructs of discrete positive emotions is a needed step to explicate how similar or 
different positive emotions are to or from one another as they in turn may affect behavior. 
Thus, the main goal of the first study is to identify three different sets of appraisal 
dimensions (or determinants/ components) of three emotions: enthusiasm, hope, and pride.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I examine the validity and reliability of the 
appraisal dimension measures used in the study. This is important since some of the 
cognitive appraisal dimension measures have not been tested before and were developed 
by the author based on the literature, thus calling for examination. The present analyses 
include reliability tests and principal components factor analyses. Second, I discuss the 
results of ANOVAs to look at whether levels of any appraisal dimension differ across three 
emotion groups. Then, most importantly, I test the three-emotion model presented in the 
previous chapter (Figure 1). To do so, I conduct a series of confirmatory factor analyses 
and examine the model fit using covariance structure modeling. This is important as it 
directly addresses RQ1 and H1, and the model can explain when and why people 
experience different positive emotions. Lastly, based on the results, I briefly discuss the 
importance and limitations of the first study.  
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS OF COGNITIVE APPRAISAL ITEMS  
Before answering the RQ1, which asks about the appraisal dimensions that best 
predict the three positive emotions, I test whether the cognitive items under each appraisal 
dimension are reliable and valid measurements of the ten proposed appraisal dimensions 
in Table 1 from Chapter 4. Thus, before proceeding to test the proposed model, the 
groupings of cognitive items under each appraisal dimension were tested using principal 
component analysis (PCA) for their factor loadings.  
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Table 5 shows the reliability measure of each appraisal dimension scale (i.e., 
Cronbach’s alpha) and factor loadings (i.e., PCA) for each cognitive item under the 
appraisal dimensions. Based on the factor analyses, principal components of ten 
dimensions (e.g., self-regard, effort) were extracted using orthogonal rotations (i.e., 
varimax) to avoid overestimating the loadings. To calculate the factor loadings for each 
appraisal dimension, I used the component matrix before the rotation for the stricter 
interpretations (Pituch & Stevens, 2016).  To enhance the internal consistency of the 
appraisal dimension measures, items with low item-total correlations (< .30) were removed 
(denoted with * in Table 5). Note that this procedure is generally recommended and 
accepted as conventional in the fields of social science (Cristobal, Flavián, & Guinaliu, 
2007; De Vaus, 2002). The items with factor loading coefficients of .30 or less in absolute 
values (denoted with ** in Table 5) were also omitted as researchers typically consider 
variables with factor loadings of at least .30 as worthy of consideration in the interpretation 
(Bryant & Yarnold; 1995; Pituch & Stevens, 2016). 
 
Table 5. Reliability and factor analysis of cognitive appraisal items  
 Cognitive items under each appraisal dimension  Loadings 
1. Pleasantness (α = .86) 
Was the situation pleasant?  
Was the situation enjoyable?  
Was the situation unpleasant?  
Did you feel cheated or wronged in the situation?  
Was any person hurt (physically or emotionally) in the situation? 
Did you try to think about something else that would make you 
feel good in the situation?  
 
.871 
.798 
.792 
.779 
.654 
.485 
2. Anticipated effort (α = .74) 
Did you need to exert yourself to deal with the situation?  
 
.781 
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(Table 5 continued) 
Did the situation require you to expend mental/physical effort? 
Was the situation cognitively challenging to process?  
Did you notice any problem that had to be solved before you could 
get what you wanted?  
Did you project that there would be obstacles between you and 
what you wanted? 
Did you pay close attention to this situation? (*) 
 
.776 
.696 
.632 
 
.579 
 
.318 
3. Certainty (α = .75)   
Did you understand the situation well?  
Were you certain about the situation?  
Did you know most of what you needed to know in the situation?  
Were you certain about what made you feel that way?  
Were you confused about what was happening in the situation?  
Were there many things you did not know about the situation?  
 
.865 
.817 
.762 
.690 
.552 
.331 
4. Agency (self, others, and/or circumstances) 
 Self (α = .76) 
Did you feel that you were in control of what was happening? 
Did you cause what happened?  
Others (α = .83) 
Did you feel that someone else was controlling what was 
happening?  
Did someone else cause what happened? 
Circumstances (α = .90) 
Did you feel that circumstances or forces beyond anyone's 
control were controlling what was happening? 
Did circumstances or forces beyond anyone's control cause 
what happened? 
 
 
.868 
.868 
 
.903 
 
.903 
 
.943 
 
.943 
5. Self-Regard (α = .69) 
Did the situation make you doubt your own opinions/beliefs? 
Did the situation make you see yourself in a negative way?  
Did the situation undermine your goals/needs/desires?  
Did your self-esteem increase in the situation?  
Did you see yourself as someone who could change for the better? 
Did you actually feel or obtain something you deserved? (*) 
 
.829 
.782 
.702 
.550 
.453 
.420 
6. Change (α = .70) 
Did you expect that your circumstances would get better? 
 
.817 
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(Table 5 continued) 
Did you think that other people could do something to make the 
situation better? 
Did you think you could do something to change or improve the 
situation? 
Did you feel that there was nothing much you could do to change 
the circumstances? (*) 
 
.780 
 
.744 
 
.327 
7. Mastery (α = .77) 
Was the situation potentially rewarding? 
Did you actually feel or obtain something that made you feel 
good? 
Did you expect to achieve something you desired (e.g., goals, 
needs) in the situation? 
Did you fulfill duties/obligations that ought to be fulfilled? 
Did your expectations of what you could achieve decrease? (*/**) 
 
.838 
.785 
 
.776 
 
.668 
.068 
8. Resource acquisition (α = .79) 
Did the situation make it easier for you to achieve any of your 
goals/needs? 
Did you feel a sense of achievement in the situation? 
Did your expectations of what you could achieve increase in the 
situation?  
Did you recognize any possible increase in resources to achieve 
any of your goals/needs? 
Did the situation make it harder for you to achieve any of your 
goals/needs? (*/**) 
 
.822 
 
.819 
.802 
 
.727 
 
.295 
9. Action tendency (α = .75) 
Did you want to remain close to the situation?  
Did you feel excited, aroused, or restless?  
Did you want to talk about the situation with someone else?  
Did you want to talk, move, jump, laugh, shout, or undertake 
things? 
Did you want to stay away from the situation? 
Did you feel like making any kind of immediate actions in the 
situation? 
 
.760 
.729 
.674 
.665 
 
.665 
.513 
10.  Social Appropriateness (α = .76) 
Do you think other people think that it was appropriate for you to 
feel what you felt?  
 
.784 
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(Table 5 continued) 
Do you think other people would feel the same as you about the 
situation?  
Do you think people who are important to you would feel the same 
as you about the situation?  
Was it appropriate to feel what you felt? 
Was it inappropriate to feel what you felt? (*) 
If you did something well in the situation (if not, select "not 
relevant"), was it due to other people? (*) 
 
.742 
 
.714 
 
.705 
.392 
.347 
Note: (*) denotes the items with item-total correlations less than .30, and (**) denotes the 
items with factor loadings less than .30. All the items with these denotations were omitted 
from the scale. Cronbach’s alphas reported here exclude the deleted items.  
The analyses in Table 5 show that the final measures of appraisal dimensions are reliable, 
based on the Cronbach’s alpha, and yield ten distinct constructs. I removed the responses 
indicating “not relevant” from the analysis.  
 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON APPRAISAL DIMENSIONS ACROSS THREE EMOTIONS 
Even though it was hypothesized that the three positive emotions are predicted by 
different sets of appraisal dimension (H1), a series of ANOVA tests are done to see if the 
levels of appraisal dimension across three emotions differ. It is important to note that the 
argument here is not that hope, pride, and enthusiasm are different from one another on 
every single appraisal examined here. The primary purpose of the chapter is not to find out 
the discriminant power of each appraisal dimension. However, identifying more or less 
discernible or discriminating appraisal components for the three emotions could help to 
differentiate enthusiasm, hope, and pride on each appraisal examined in the study. Thus, to 
find out whether the three positive emotions can be differentiated on an individual appraisal 
dimension, a series of one-way ANOVAs across the three emotion groups were conducted, 
one for each dimension. The results of F tests indicate that the three emotions are not 
significantly different from one another on any of the dimensions (p > .05 for each analysis, 
see Table 6).  
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics (means, SEs) and results of ANOVA predicting the 
appraisal dimensions across three emotion groups 
Appraisal dimension Enthusiasm Hope  Pride F(2, 166) Sig. 
Pleasantness 
2.52 
(.12) 
2.52 
(.13) 
2.55 
(.11) 
.307 .736 
Anticipated effort 
2.97 
(.09) 
2.90 
(.11) 
2.91 
(.10) 
.180 .836 
Certainty 
2.44 
(.10) 
2.19 
(.09) 
2.34 
(.09) 
1.785 .171 
Agency (self) 
3.60 
(.13) 
3.50 
(.13) 
3.51 
(.16) 
.143 .867 
Agency (others) 
2.70 
(.13) 
2.63 
(.15) 
2.28 
(.13) 
2.616 .076 
Agency (circumstances) 
2.70 
(.13) 
2.64 
(.15) 
2.28 
(.13) 
2.376 .096 
Self-regard 
2.31 
(.09) 
2.26 
(.09) 
2.27 
(.09) 
.070 .933 
Change 
2.81 
(.12) 
2.61 
(.10) 
2.75 
(.11) 
.821 .442 
Mastery 
2.45 
(.11) 
2.56 
(.11) 
2.48 
(.11) 
.236 .790 
Resource acquisition 
2.70 
(.09) 
2.66 
(.11) 
2.57 
(.10) 
.474 .623 
Action tendency 
2.49 
(.10) 
2.66 
(.11) 
2.58 
(.11) 
.681 .508 
Social appropriateness 
2.29 
(.08) 
2.19 
(.09) 
2.17 
(.08) 
.551 .578 
Note: The items for each appraisal dimension were measured on five-point scales ranged 
from 1 (Definitely yes) to 5 (Definitely not).  
 
The non-significant ANOVA results in Table 6 may be explained in terms of the 
high correlation and co-occurrence among hope, pride, and enthusiasm, as will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. In term of co-occurrence, prior studies on 
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appraisal theories (e.g., Barrett et al., 2001; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Tong & Jia, 2017) 
show that even though discrete emotions with the same positive valence co-occur, they are 
different. For instance, Tong and Jia (2017) examined the appraisal-positive emotion 
relationships and argued that as positive emotions and some appraisals correlate 
significantly, the emotions’ overlap on relevant appraisal dimensions was highly predictive 
of their co-occurrence even after the pleasantness dimension was excluded. Following the 
same logic, hope, pride, and enthusiasm can overlap on a range of appraisals, and non-
significant ANOVA results may indicate that the emotions may have co-occurred within 
the participants. Thus, the non-significant results of ANOVAs do not mean that the three 
emotions are not distinct from one another.  
 Also, recall that study participants were asked to recall a particular emotion-
inducing event. The situations that they recalled, however, could have led them to feel 
several different emotions simultaneously considering the high co-occurrence in the data 
(see Table 3). Also, even though participants did not verbally report other emotions they 
had felt in the situation described, it is still possible that they had felt other emotions but 
did not explicitly report them. This is consistent with literature showing a general tendency 
of co-occurrence amongst positive emotions (Frijda et al., 1989; Forgas, 1999; Tong & Jia, 
2017). To the extent that this may have occurred, there appears to be no differences 
amongst those who were asked to recall situations that led to feeling pride, enthusiasm, or 
hope. Yet depending on the combinations of the emotions people experienced, there may 
be meaningful distinctions. The factor analysis in the next section addresses this idea. 
Specifically, participants who were asked to recall a pride-evoking situation could 
or may have experienced enthusiasm simultaneously, reflecting the high co-occurrence and 
correlation between the two emotions (r = .96, p < .001). Subsequently, the incidents where 
subjects experienced more than one positive emotion were similarly rated on several 
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appraisal dimensions across three emotion groups, resulting in non-significant ANOVA 
results. Thus, regardless of the emotion condition (hope, pride, or enthusiasm), people may 
show similar levels of mastery (for enthusiasm, M = 2.45, SE = .11; for pride, M = 2.48, 
SE = .11; see Table 6) or self-agency (for hope, M = 3.50, SE = .13; for pride, M = 3.51, 
SE = .16). Just because they show similar levels of self-agency, mastery, certainty, and/or 
other appraisals, however, it cannot and should not be argued that the experience of one 
positive emotion is identical to that of another positive emotion. In short, the non-
significant ANOVA results do not mean that the emotions are not distinct from one another. 
Moreover, what is important is that not every appraisal examined here is predictive 
of the three emotions. Considering the tendency of high co-occurrence and correlation 
among the three emotions within the study participants, an alternative approach is needed 
to differentiate the emotions in terms of their appraisal constructs because the distinction 
of three emotion groups using ANOVA is no longer enough after taking into account the 
co-occurrence of three emotions. In the sense, to find out the unique sets of appraisal 
dimensions of the three emotions, I will turn to confirmatory factor analysis using the three 
emotions as latent variables.  
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THREE-EMOTION MODEL 
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to identify a set of appraisal 
components that can explain a significant amount of variance in enthusiasm, hope, and 
pride, using structural equation modeling. Mplus7 was used to conduct a CFA of the 
retained appraisal dimensions (N =169 participants). Before conducting the CFA, I 
calculated the two-tailed correlations and standard deviations for all appraisal dimensions 
in the model (see Table 7). Overall model fit was determined using a chi-square test as well 
as both absolute fit and incremental fit indices. Due to problems with relying solely on the 
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chi-square tests, the absolute model fit was assessed using the RMSEA as well as the 
SRMR (Hu & Bentler, 1995, 1999). Further, incremental model fit was determined using 
the CFI. Acceptable fit was determined based on the recommendations by Schreiber et al. 
(2009) and Weston and Gore (2006) – specifically the adequate fit included CFI values 
greater than .90 to .95, RMSEA values less than .06 to .08, and SRMR values less than .08 
to .10.  
 
Table 7. Bivariate correlations between appraisal dimensions  
Varia
ble 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 SD 
1  
MAS 
1            .82 
2  
APP 
.30** 1           .65 
3  
REG 
.51** .35** 1          .67 
4  
EFF 
.23** .11 .05 1         .74 
5  
CER 
.27** .33** .41** .05 1        .69 
6  
A_S 
.09 -.13 -.02 .08 .03 1       1.05 
7 
A_O 
.15 .26** .19* .16* .17* -.25 1      1.06 
8 
A_C 
-.13 .02 -.08 .05 
-.22*
* 
.14 .12 1     1.09 
9 
PLS 
.27** .19* .44** 
-.27*
* 
.39** .12 -.07 -.11 1    .91 
10 
RES 
.48** .20** .49** .18* .30** .18* .11 -.02 .44** 1   .74 
11 
ACT 
.41** .25** .44** .13 .41** .03 .22** -.06 .40** .49** 1  .79 
12 
CHG 
.28** .17* .41** .39** .23** .19* .18* .08 .11 .37** .35** 1 .84 
Note: Two-tailed correlations are reported with * denoting p < .05 and ** denoting p < .01.  
Abbreviation was used to indicate as follows: MAS; Mastery, APP; (Social) 
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Appropriateness, REG; Self-regard, EFF; Anticipated effort, CER; Certainty, A_S; 
Agency (self), A_O; Agency (other), A_C; Agency (circumstance), PLS; Pleasantness, 
RES; Resource acquisition, ACT; Action tendency, CHG; Change.  
 
In order to evaluate the three-factor model with the appraisal dimensions, the three 
latent factors (hope, enthusiasm, and pride) were allowed to correlate with one another and 
each appraisal dimension was predicted by the set of cognitive items tested in the previous 
section (see Table 5).5 The results of the CFA (Figure 4), however, did not yield adequate 
model fit indices (χ2 = 106.42, p < .05, CFI= .864, SRMR= .079, RMSEA= .091, 90% 
confidence interval [.069, .114], see Figure 4). The residual variance in the agency in 
circumstances dimension was approximately 99 percent (p < .001), meaning that the 
proportion of variance explained in the dimension by hope is less than 1 percent, and hope 
was not significantly predicted by the agency (circumstance) dimension as theorized (p = 
.49). Thus, I decided to drop agency in circumstance from the model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 All cognitive items were first standardized within participants and then averaged to form their respective 
appraisal dimensions. The standardization of each item helps to address the possible problem of 
multicollinearity among the appraisal dimensions.  
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Figure 4. Theoretical CFA model (with agency self, other, and circumstance) of three 
discrete emotions with factor loadings, correlations, and residual variances 
 
Another CFA was done with agency in self and others only. Once again, the results 
of the CFA with agency in self and other dimensions returned poor model fit indices (χ2 = 
79.47, p < .05, CFI = .897, SRMR = .072, RMSEA = .089, 90% confidence interval [.064, 
.115]). The model was respecified using Wald and Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests to obtain 
the best model fit. The final selection of the model was determined following the 
aforementioned model fit criteria as well as for better interpretability of the factors, which 
are hope, pride, and enthusiasm here (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). Although the 
model modification or re-specification process may seem arbitrary, a model specification 
search is considered necessary, thus a common practice in social science, if the process 
results in an interpretable model that fits the data well (MacCallum, 1983). 
The Wald test indicated that dropping two non-significant parameters, hope by 
action tendency (B = -.056, SE = .107, p = .605), and pride by certainty (B = .369, SE = 
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.348, p = .290), did not hurt the model fit as the p values associated with the chi-square 
difference tests were larger than .05 for all the comparisons (for hope by action tendency, 
Δ χ2 = 3.290, Δ df = 1, p > .05; for pride by certainty, Δ χ2 = 2.176, Δ df = 1, p > .05). I 
excluded these two non-significant parameters for two additional reasons. First, out of all 
hypothesized parameters in the model, the data only supported a limited set of appraisals 
and parameters, and the re-specification could improve the parsimony of the theorized 
model (MacCallum, 1983). Second, the current literature on appraisal theories does not 
provide definite guideline in terms of the appraisal determinants of hope and pride, thus as 
long as the modification makes theoretical sense, changes could be made to the original 
model.   
There are theoretical reasons to remove the hope by action tendency parameter. 
First of all, hope was hypothesized to be action-oriented because scholars have assumed 
that all positive emotions lead to increased action tendency (e.g., Marcus et al., 2000; 
Valentino et al., 2011), however, no one has empirically tested and/or confirmed the action 
dimension of hope as a discrete emotion in political contexts. Secondly, in a theoretical 
sense, hope is categorized as a cognitively-oriented emotion, which requires more complex 
processing and evaluations of the environment (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). The 
expected, but not found, positive relationship between hope and action tendency may be 
an indication that hope requires enhanced cognitive activities, and may lead people to be 
psychologically taxed, thus less action-oriented (see Frijda et al., 1989; Just et al., 2007). 
When it comes to dropping the pride by certainty parameter, there are theoretical 
reasons to do so as well. Even though pride is positively related to certainty according to 
cognitive scholars (e.g., Tong, 2007), considering the specificity (e.g., high uncertainty and 
uncontrollability) of political events like a presidential election, it is reasonable to think 
that people may have felt quite uncertain about what was really going on even though they 
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experienced pride during events like presidential debates and primaries. Thus, I conclude 
that feeling pride in everyday situations may be quite different from experiencing pride in 
politics, and exclude the certainty dimension predicting pride in the model.   
The LM test also indicated that adding two parameters, allowing enthusiasm to be 
predicted by change, and hope to be predicted by agency in others, improved the model fit 
significantly (for enthusiasm by change, Δ χ2 = 20.689, Δ df = 1, p < .01; for hope by 
agency (others), Δ χ2 = 7.484, Δ df = 1, p < .01). The addition of both parameters makes 
theoretical sense for the following reasons. First, enthusiasm has rarely been studied as a 
discrete emotion in political contexts so far, thus adding new appraisal dimension, change, 
can be desirable and necessary to confirm the appraisal construct of enthusiasm. Further, 
enthusiasm can be experienced when people expect a positive change to happen in the 
future. Support for this idea comes from the correlations between change and other 
appraisal dimensions (see Table 7), especially with resource acquisition (r = .37, p < .01), 
certainty (r = .23, p < .01), and action tendency (r = .35, p < .01). Enthusiasm can be 
theorized to be positively related to change dimension as enthusiastic people see a 
possibility of resource acquisition, are highly certain, and thus action-oriented. Secondly, 
when it comes to hope, the emotion is frequently debated in terms of the agency appraisal 
dimension (see Reading, 2004; Snyder, 2000; Tong, 2007). I hypothesized that hopeful 
people feel in control of the overall situation following Tong’s (2007) appraisal study, but 
the circumstances, in the case of political hope, can include other people or agencies like 
politicians, interest groups, and party leaders in the study.  
Based on the specifications made to the theoretical model (Figure 4), the modified 
model was tested using CFA and the results yielded satisfactory model fit indices (χ2 = 
51.521, p < .05, CFI = .960, SRMR = .049, RMSEA = .055, 90% confidence interval [.019, 
.084], see Figure 5 for the final estimates of all parameters). 
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Two parameters, hope by certainty and pride by pleasantness, did not load 
significantly (p > .05). However, based on the chi-square difference tests, I concluded that 
dropping the parameters did not either help the model fit or make sense theoretically, thus 
the parameters were retained in the model for better interpretability of variance in the 
variables (i.e., appraisal dimensions) and factors (three emotions). Factor loadings, 
correlations among three factors, and error variances are reported in the final model (see 
Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Final CFA model of three discrete emotions with factor loadings, correlations, 
and residual variances 
 
To answer the RQ1, three different sets of appraisal dimensions were identified and 
tested for enthusiasm, hope, and pride. Enthusiasm was best predicted by pleasantness 
(positive), agency (self & others), certainty, change, resource acquisition, and action 
tendency. The result of the CFA does not perfectly, but does closely resemble what was 
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hypothesized from previous appraisal studies on the emotion (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989, see 
Table 2). When it comes to the model prediction, when enthusiasm is induced or 
experienced, people are likely to feel highly pleasant (B = 1.51, SE = .55, p < .01), engage 
in action (B = .66, SE = .05, p < .001), perceive the increase in resources for their goal (B 
= .71, SE = .05, p < .001), and have more agency in self (B = 2.22, SE = .97, p < .05) but 
not in others (B = -1.56, SE = .71, p < .05). Lastly, people feel certain (B = .58, SE = .07, p 
< .001) and perceive a positive change in an enthusiasm-evoking situation (B = .42, SE = 
.07, p < .001).  
Hope was hypothesized to be specified with six appraisal dimensions: pleasantness 
(negative), agency (circumstances), certainty, change, action tendency, and anticipated 
effort (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Snyder, 2000; Tong, 2007). However, the result shows 
that only four out of the six appraisal dimensions, excluding certainty and action tendency, 
explain the experience of hope. I dropped the action tendency dimension for the 
aforementioned reasons but the certainty dimension was retained in the model; certainty is 
negatively, and non-significantly, related to hope. People who feel hopeful about a political 
event are likely to perceive a positive change (B = .41, SE = .08, p < .001), but expect to 
expend their effort to reach future goals (B = .71, SE = .80, p < .001), and thus perceive the 
situation unpleasant (B = -.67, SE = .11, p < .001). They tend to think that other people, not 
themselves, are in control of the situation (B = .28, SE = .10, p < .01). It may seem 
counterintuitive that hope is negatively predicted by pleasantness. Yet because people feel 
uncertain and the situation seems to require their future effort, this may lead people to 
perceive the situation as unpleasant. This does not mean that hope is unpleasant, but means 
that the situation where people experience hope seems unpleasant. Although hope was 
hypothesized to be positively related to agency in circumstance, the result indicated that 
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the relationship between hope and the dimension (i.e., agency in circumstances) did not 
attain significance (B = .06, SE = .10, p > .05). 
Lastly, pride was theorized to be explained by the following dimensions: 
pleasantness (positive), agency (self & others), certainty, mastery, social appropriateness, 
and positive self-regard (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). Only four out of six 
dimensions, excluding pleasantness and certainty, explained the experience of pride. As 
discussed previously, the certainty dimension path was excluded from the model for better 
model fit and parsimony, but the pleasantness dimension path was retained for better 
interpretability of the emotion and the dimension is theoretically fundamental to explain 
emotions with positive valance like pride (Frijda et al., 1989; Tong, 2007). When it comes 
to the experience of pride in politics, people may have less self-agency (B = -2.15, SE = 
.98, p < .05) since the emotion is usually evoked by other agents (e.g., candidate, political 
party, or interest group) especially during political campaigns and elections. Supporting 
the logic, pride was positively predicted by agency in others (B = 1.75, SE = .71, p < .05).  
Also, people in a proud emotional state were likely to perceive themselves positively (B = 
.75, SE = .04, p < .001), feel a sense of mastery or achievement (B = .61, SE = .06, p < 
.001), and think that they deserve (or it is socially appropriate for them) to feel proud in 
the situation (B = .45, SE = .07, p < .001). 
Even though the proposed theoretical model was modified based on the findings of 
study 1, RQ1 was answered: the different sets of appraisal dimensions predicted 
enthusiasm, hope, and pride. Thus, H1, which proposed that each of the three positive 
emotions would display a different set of appraisal dimensions, was supported by the 
results of the study. 
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CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
There has been some research on the cognitive appraisals of discrete positive 
emotions. However, cognitive scholars and appraisal theorists have mainly focused on 
discrete negative emotions and argued that appraisal dimensions other than valence 
(pleasantness) should be examined to better explain people’s experience of various 
emotions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). The present study takes an appraisal-
oriented approach to explain the experiences of enthusiasm, hope, and pride in the context 
of political campaigns. The results provide supporting evidence showing that the three 
emotions are different in terms of their appraisal profiles. Some appraisal dimensions (e.g., 
change, effort, self-regard) worked better than others in predicting the experience of three 
emotions. Considering the non-significant results of the ANOVA tests (Table 6), each 
appraisal dimension examined here may not be discriminant factors of the three emotions. 
However, the results cannot or should not be directly translated to the conclusion that the 
three emotions are not distinct from one another. The purpose of current study is to find 
out whether different appraisal constructs measure (i.e., the different sets of appraisal 
dimension explaining each emotion) each of the three emotions, not to prove that the three 
emotions can be differentiated on each appraisal dimension.  
Considering the high correlations among enthusiasm, hope, and pride, especially 
between enthusiasm and pride (r = .96, p < .001, see Figure 5), it is very likely that 
participants in the study experienced more than one positive emotion in the moment they 
described in the study. For example, one may have felt hopeful and proud at the same time 
after he watched his candidate’s performance during a debate. Although the survey asked 
subjects to describe only one of the three emotional experiences, people may have still felt 
the combination of different emotions and/or failed to differentiate between the different 
emotion experiences. Future research should expand the analysis to come up with more 
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differentiating questions, or stronger manipulations of discrete emotions to capture the 
idiosyncrasy of individual emotions regardless of the context where people experience 
emotions.  
Also, even though the measure of the appraisal dimensions used in the study was 
examined in terms of its validity and reliability, the selection of relevant appraisal 
dimensions was a bit arbitrary despite being backed by literature. When it comes to the 
selection of different appraisal dimensions/determinants, scholars have used quite arbitrary 
criteria to pick the appraisal dimensions. For example, Tong (2007) combined and analyzed 
different sets of cognitive appraisal items and their respective appraisal dimensions (e.g., 
Roseman et al., 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and concluded that 17 dimensions have 
more discriminant power than a 6-dimensional model. Even though including more 
appraisal dimensions usually leads to more variance explained in emotions and their 
experience, the predictive power or classification accuracy of different sets of appraisals 
varies depending on individual emotions. For instance, Tong’s (2007) analysis of 17 
appraisals explained approximately 23% of variance in hope but Smith and Ellsworth’s 
(1985) six appraisal dimensions explained 41% of variance in hope. Likewise, the effort 
dimension was shown to be a significant predictor of hope but was not predictive of other 
emotions in the current study. Thus, future research on the appraisal-emotion relation 
should investigate more accurate but well-applicable sets of appraisals to study discrete 
positive emotions.   
Lastly but importantly, although the model specification or modification process 
has been adopted as a common practice in applications of structural equation modeling in 
the social science literature (MacCallum, 1986), it should be noted that the present analysis 
is not free from theoretical and practical limitations in terms of the application of model 
re-specification. The critical issue here is that the modified model is data-driven to an 
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extent, not backed by prior hypotheses. As a result, the analysis is no longer confirmatory, 
but rather exploratory, as the final model derived from the specification practice has not 
been confirmed in a theoretical sense. In the sense, the results in the study and the model’s 
goodness of fit and substantive meaning should be evaluated with caution as the model’s 
validity and replicability are open to question. Moreover, the final model proposed here 
should be cross-validated before any validity can be claimed (Cliff, 1983; MacCallum, 
1986; Saris et al., 2009).  
Despite the limitations discussed, the current analysis is a valuable addition to 
political communication research and appraisal studies. It is the first attempt of which I am 
aware to apply the theoretical framework of appraisal theories to a political context. Even 
though emotions have been one of the main foci of political research, discrete positive 
emotions, such as hope and pride, have never been tested or studied in regard to their 
appraisal profiles. Most of the findings from the study support appraisal theories, including 
the prediction of each positive emotion by the proposed set of appraisal components; 
however, some of the findings shed light on the uniqueness of emotional experience in 
political contexts. For example, unlike the pride experienced in interpersonal settings, 
political pride can be experienced without feeling agency in one’s self and without the 
assumed high-level of pleasantness in the situation. Also, the feeling of pride in a political 
context like a competitive election is a less certain experience than the feeling of the same 
emotion in an interpersonal context.  
In sum, even though emotional experiences are regarded as universal across 
cultures and individuals (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 2007), they can have some 
variability in terms of the context of emotion experience. In this sense, not only does the 
study examine the distinct appraisal constructs of discrete positive emotions, but it also 
deepens our understanding of the appraisal profiles of the three emotions in the political 
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context by modifying and adding new dimensions, such as resource acquisition and action 
tendency, to explain the experience of certain emotions. Even though the final model 
requires further examination, the findings can guide future studies on emotions in politics 
and be extended to study emotion effects. 
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Chapter 6. Effects of Discrete Emotions on Information Seeking and 
Participation 
Current academic discussions about emotions in the political realm have mainly 
focused on one notion: their effects. In modern democratic societies where active and 
deliberate participation in public affairs is a goal advocated by many political theorists, 
political scholars have been interested in finding ways to better inform, educate, and engage 
citizens (Brader, 2005; MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2011). 
Tapping into citizens’ emotions could be a viable solution as emotions act as a fundamental 
drive for people to act, learn, and get involved in various political activities (Lodge & 
Taber, 2005; Lodge et al., 2006).  
However, academic discussions about emotion effects in politics have been limited 
to a few discrete negative emotions, such as anger, fear, and anxiety (Marcus et al., 2000; 
Valentino et al., 2001; Verhulst & Lizotte, 2011). Meanwhile scholars have usually treated 
different positive emotions as a one-dimensional emotion which has positive valence 
without taking into consideration various cognitive constructs of positive emotions, such 
as variability in action tendency, agency, certainty, and change. For instance, Marcus et al. 
(2000) argued that positive emotions like enthusiasm, hope, and pride motivate people to 
be less effortful and less accurate information processors since they may feel complacent 
about the situation they are in, thus do not extend their search to seek out new information 
or better alternatives. Brader (2006b) discussed enthusiasm as increasing people’s political 
interest as well as participation in political activities. However, this only explains part of 
the complicated relationship between discrete positive emotions and people’s behaviors in 
politics.   
Importantly, the previous chapter of the dissertation showed that positive emotions 
in the political context (enthusiasm, hope, and pride) have different constructs and 
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dimensions which shed light on their differences. The examination of different sets of 
cognitive constructs or appraisal dimensions of discrete positive emotions lays out the 
theoretical guidance and foundation for scholars to study the differential effects of positive 
emotions in political research. Guided by the findings from the previous chapter, this 
chapter analyzes the linkage between discrete positive emotions and their effects in politics 
in terms of information seeking and political engagement. Not only that, the study also 
examines of the effects of three discrete negative emotions (anxiety, anger, and disgust) on 
information seeking and participatory behaviors to advance the literature on political 
psychology. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, the three positive emotions are investigated 
regarding the way they affect individuals’ information seeking behaviors. Information 
search was measured in terms of its amount (reading time and number of articles people 
read) and direction (either pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal). The results are discussed 
addressing the between-group differences in information search patterns. Second, the 
effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on a range of political activities are analyzed. Eight 
different political activities are discussed in terms of people’s intentions to engage in the 
activities depending on the emotional state. Third, the differential effects of three negative 
emotions (anxiety, anger, and disgust) on information seeking behavior (e.g., amount, 
direction) are examined and compared. Then, I turn to the differing dynamics between the 
three negative emotions and participants’ participation intention. Lastly, I wrap up the 
chapter by discussing the implications and limitations of the study. 
EFFECTS OF DISCRETE POSITIVE EMOTIONS ON INFORMATION SEEKING  
The second study was to find out whether the discrete positive emotions had 
differential effects on information seeking and political participation. The results of cross-
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tabulation and ANOVA for manipulation check of random assignment confirmed that no 
significant difference existed across four conditions on demographic attributes (i.e., age, 
gender, ethnicity, annual household income, level of education, marital status) and political 
orientation variables including party affiliation, strength of partisanship, political interest, 
and political efficacy.6    
H2 was tested to find out whether (a) enthusiastic, (b) proud, and (c) hopeful 
individuals seek out different amounts of information compared to those not manipulated 
to experience these emotions in the experiment. In the analysis, the following variables 
were examined as dependent variables; (1) time spent reading pro-Democratic news, (2) 
time spent reading pro-Republican news, (3) time spent reading non-political news, (4) 
time spent reading either pro-Democratic or pro-Republican news (i.e., partisan news), and 
(5) total time spent reading all the news.   
Due to the violation of normality assumption (i.e., normal distribution of error 
terms) in the data across the five dependent variables, I conducted the nonparametric test 
(i.e., Kruskal-Wallis test) for the variables and reported the nonparametric test results 
instead with medians and interquartile ranges for each group. The results of Kruskal-Wallis 
test show that there are no emotion effects on people’s reading time of pro-Republican 
news, non-political news, or total news articles (see Table 8). Reading times of four 
different news variables (i.e., pro-Republican, non-political, partisan, and total news 
reading time) in the control group were not different from those in the three emotion 
groups. However, there were significant differences across the emotional conditions in the 
                                                 
6 The results of manipulation checks for random assignment: Age (F[3, 224] = .326, p = .807); gender 
(F[3, 224] = 2.501, p = .060); ethnicity (χ2 [15] = 12.316, p = .655); household income (F[3, 224] = 1.214, 
p = .305); education (F[3, 224] = .580, p = .629); marital status (χ2[12] = 5.743, p = .928); party affiliation 
(F[3, 224] = .850, p = .468); partisan strength (χ2 [3] = .441, p = .604); political interest (F[3, 224] = 1.500, 
p = .215; political efficacy (F[3, 224] = 1.841, p = .140). 
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amounts of the time people spent reading pro-Democratic news articles (χ2 (3) = 7.967, p 
< .05). Based on the results of pairwise comparisons using Mann-Whitney U test (see Table 
9), the following differences were found: People in the enthusiasm condition spent more 
time reading pro-Democratic news than people in the pride group (p < .05) and people in 
the pride condition spent less time reading pro-Democratic news than those in the control 
condition (p < .05). Other between-groups differences did not reach the statistical 
significance. Thus, the results only partially supported H2 in regard to seeking out pro-
Democratic news. 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics (medians, IQRs) and effects of positive emotions on news 
reading time (in seconds) 
Dependent variable 
No 
emotion 
Enthusia-
sm 
Hope Pride χ2 (3) Sig. 
Pro-Democratic reading 
(D) 
18 
(52) 
14 
(38) 
0 
(36) 
0 
(31) 
7.967 .047 
Pro-Republican reading 
(R) 
13 
(70) 
2 
(54) 
16 
(57) 
15 
(56) 
.683 .877 
Non-political reading 
(N) 
22 
(52) 
21 
(83) 
1 
(37) 
18 
(46) 
1.249 .741 
Partisan reading 
(D plus R) 
67.50 
(140.25) 
52 
(107.50) 
36.50 
(104.50) 
50.50 
(98.75) 
1.860 .602 
Total reading 
(D plus R plus N) 
99.50 
(155) 
88 
(156) 
88 
(127.25) 
83.50 
(203.25) 
1.669 .644 
Note: The normality assumption was violated across all variables in the data. Thus, the 
nonparametric test (i.e., Kruskal-Wallis test) was conducted for the variables, and the 
nonparametric test results were reported instead.  
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Table 9. Pairwise comparisons of pro-Democratic article reading time (Mann-Whitney U 
test) 
* denotes p < .05. 
 
I also examined the number of news articles each participant read in the 
experiments as dependent variables. A series of univariate ANOVAs were used with four 
different dependent variables: (1) number of pro-Democratic news articles read, (2) 
number of pro-Republican news articles read, (3) number of non-political news articles 
read, and (4) total sum of news articles read (see Table 10). There were no significant 
emotion effects on the numbers of pro-Republican, non-political, and total news articles 
read across four conditions. However, the emotional condition made a marginally 
significant difference in the number of pro-Democratic news articles read across groups 
(F[3, 224] = 2.338, p < .10).  
 
 
 
(I) Emotion (J) Emotion 
M Rank 
Difference (I-J) 
Mann-
Whitney U  
Sig. 
Enthusiasm 
No emotion -.73 1498.00 .904 
Hope 9.06 1101.50 .113 
Pride 12.28* 1019.00 .029 
Hope 
No emotion -10.12 1601.50 .102 
Enthusiasm -9.06 1101.50 .113 
Pride 4.28 1558.00 .451 
Pride 
No emotion -14.26* 1474.00 .020 
Enthusiasm -12.28* 1019.00 .029 
Hope -4.28 1558.00 .451 
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics (means, SDs) and effects of positive emotions on 
between-groups news reading (number of articles read) 
Dependent Variable 
(Number of articles) 
No 
emotion 
Enthusi
asm 
Hope Pride F(3, 224) Sig. 
Pro-Democratic 
articles 
.95 
(.10) 
.87 
(.12) 
.69 
(.11) 
.57 
(.11) 
2.338 .074 
Pro-Republican 
articles 
.92 
(.11) 
.83 
(.13) 
.81 
(.12) 
.83 
(.12) 
.291 .832 
Non-political 
articles 
.62 
(.09) 
.54 
(.11) 
.56 
(.10) 
.47 
(.10) 
.418 .740 
Total # of articles 
2.50 
(.19) 
2.24 
(.23) 
2.07 
(.20) 
1.86 
(.21) 
1.770 .154 
 
The assumptions of equal variance did not seem to be violated as the p-values 
associated with Levene’s tests were greater than .05 (for pro-Democratic articles, p = .472; 
for pro-Republican articles, p = .127; for non-political articles, p = .129; and for total 
number of articles, p = .199). The estimated means of four different groups were used to 
compare the effects of emotions on the numbers of pro-Democratic news articles people 
read across groups. Tukey’s post-hoc tests revealed that only the comparison between the 
control and pride groups reached the marginally significant level, showing people in the 
control condition read more pro-Democratic articles than those in the pride condition (p < 
.10, see Table 11). In sum, discrete positive emotion effects on the between-groups 
differences in the number of pro-Democratic news articles people read were marginally 
significant, and only between the pride and control groups. Thus, H2 received minimal 
support in the analysis. 
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Table 11. Pairwise comparisons of the number of pro-Democratic articles read across 
groups 
Dependent 
variable 
(I) Emotion (J) Emotion 
M 
Difference 
(I-J) 
SE Sig. 
95% CI 
Lower  Upper 
Number  
of pro-
Democratic 
articles 
No emotion 
Enthusiasm .085 .166 .957 -.35 .52 
Hope .248 .156 .388 -.16 .65 
Pride .386
+ .156 .067 -.02 .79 
Enthusiasm 
No emotion -.085 .166 .957 -.52 .35 
Hope .163 .171 .778 -.28 .61 
Pride .301 .171 .297 -.14 .74 
Hope 
No emotion -.248 .156 .388 -.65 .16 
Enthusiasm -.163 .171 .778 -.61 .28 
Pride .138 .161 .827 -.28 .55 
Pride 
No emotion -.386+ .156 .067 -.79 .02 
Enthusiasm -.301 .171 .297 -.74 .14 
Hope -.138 .161 .827 -.55 .28 
+ denotes p < .10. 
 
It is worth noting that pride carries a larger negative impact on pro-Democratic 
news search than either no emotion or enthusiasm does (see Table 9 and 11). There seems 
to be no relevant literature supporting the finding on a negative impact of pride on 
information seeking, especially only for pro-Democratic news search. Since pride is 
experienced when one feels self-fulfilled for a valuable achievement, leading one’s self-
esteem to increase (Lazarus, 1991; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995), this may result in temporal 
decrease in cognitive attention to new information as people feel complacent with 
themselves and the situation, which is supported by the first study of this project. However, 
this still cannot explain why the effect is only detected in seeking pro-Democratic articles, 
leaving the puzzle unsolved.  
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H3 hypothesized that individuals who experience (a) enthusiasm, (b) hope, or (c) 
pride toward ingroup members will seek out more confirming information (vs. non-
confirming information) compared to those not experiencing these emotions. To test the 
hypothesis, I considered two different dependent variables: (1) the direction of news 
reading (if the subject read both pro- and counter-attitudinal news, it was coded 0; if only 
pro-attitudinal news was read, coded 1; and if only counter-attitudinal news was read, 
coded -1) and (2) the reading time of pro-attitudinal news. Pro-attitudinal news reading 
was calculated by subtracting pro-Republican news reading time from pro-Democratic 
news reading time for Democrats and by subtracting pro-Democratic news reading time 
from pro-Republican news reading time for Republicans.  
Examining the direction of news reading (i.e., pro- vs. counter-attitudinal reading) 
across different groups, subjects in the positive emotion conditions were not found to be 
significantly different from those in the control group in their news reading direction (F[3, 
224] = .814, p > .05) nor in pro-attitudinal news reading time (F[3, 224] = 1.288, p > .05) 
(see Table 12). The assumptions of equal variance of the dependent variables were not 
violated as the p values associated with Levene’s tests were greater than .05 (for pro-
attitudinal reading time, p = .374; for reading direction, p = .511). Also, none of the 
between-groups comparisons reached the statistical significance. Thus, H3 was not 
supported. 
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Table 12. Descriptive statistics (means, SDs) and effects of positive emotions on 
between-groups news reading (direction)  
Dependent 
variable 
No 
emotion 
Enthusia-
sm 
Hope Pride F(3, 224) Sig. 
Pro-attitudinal 
reading time 
38.09 
(39.53) 
13.87 
(47.34) 
52.44 
(42.02) 
10.86 
(42.64) 
1.288 .732 
Direction of news 
reading 
.09 (.08) .13 (.10) .01 (.09) .09 (.09) .814 .517 
Note: Due to the violation of normality assumption in the data, I conducted the 
nonparametric test (i.e., Kruskal-Wallis) for the dependent variable, pro-attitudinal reading 
time. The result showed no difference in the significant level, and I reported the 
nonparametric test result here, instead of that of ANOVA.  
 
 
H2 and H3 hypothesized about the differences in news reading behaviors between 
positive emotion groups and control group, whereas RQ2 asked about the differential 
effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on information seeking behaviors in terms of amount 
(both reading time and number of articles read) and direction (i.e., pro- or counter-
attitudinal) in general. In terms of the amount of news reading, the between-groups emotion 
effects were found only in the time people spent on reading pro-Democratic news articles. 
Other amounts of news reading time (i.e., non-political, pro-Republican, and total reading) 
were not different across the groups of positive emotions (hope, pride, or enthusiasm). The 
results of pairwise comparison shows that individuals who experienced enthusiasm spent 
significantly longer time reading pro-Democratic news than those who experienced pride 
(see Table 9). In regard to the direction of news reading, three discrete positive emotions 
(hope, pride, and enthusiasm) did not have any differential univariate effects on pro-
attitudinal news reading time nor on news reading direction. 
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EFFECTS OF DISCRETE POSITIVE EMOTIONS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
An analysis of the differential effects of discrete positive emotions on a range of 
political activities has been missing in political research. Scholars have generally agreed 
that emotions with positive valence increase the likelihood of political participation 
because of the assumed action tendency in positive emotions especially the one with strong 
positive valence such as enthusiasm (e.g., Marcus et al., 2000).  
To answer RQ3, I compared the between-groups intentions to engage in eight 
different forms of political activities from voting to campaigning. Before discussing the 
results of a series of ANOVAs, descriptive statistics across groups regarding the subjects’ 
intention to participate in eight different kinds of political activities are briefly discussed 
(see Table 13).7  
Table 13. Descriptive statistics of standardized intentions of political activities across 
groups 
Political activities 
(intention) 
N Mean SD SE 
95% CI for Mean 
Lower  Upper  
Vote in the 2018 
midterm election  
No emotion 66 .005 .841 .104 -.201 .212 
Enthusiasm 46 .054 1.084 .160 -.268 .376 
Hope 58 .037 1.104 .144 -.251 .324 
Pride 58 -.088 1.033 .136 -.360 .184 
Total 228 .000 1.007 .067 -.132 .131 
Volunteer  
No emotion 66 .000 .939 .116 -.231 .230 
Enthusiasm 46 .078 1.046 .154 -.233 .388 
Hope 58 .134 1.057 .138 -.141 .410 
Pride 58 -.173 .980 .129 -.431 .084 
                                                 
7 Intentions to engage in eight different political activities were measured on the Likert scale of 1 to 7, 
using the question “how likely are you willing to engage in the following activity?” And answers were 
recorded as follows: (1) Extremely likely; (2) Moderately likely; (3) Slightly likely; (4) Neutral; (5) 
Slightly unlikely; (6) Moderately unlikely; and (7) Extremely unlikely. Then, all the scores were 
standardized using the grand mean of each variable in the sample. Thus, the lower the score, the higher 
intention participants show. 
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Total 228 .006 1.002 .066 -.124 .137 
Donate money 
No emotion 66 -.016 .934 .115 -.246 .213 
Enthusiasm 46 .110 .985 .145 -.183 .402 
Hope 58 .087 1.101 .143 -.199 .374 
Pride 58 -.193 .968 .127 -.448 .061 
Total 228 -.009 .998 .066 -.139 .121 
Contact 
candidates, 
campaign staffs 
No emotion 66 -.033 .972 .120 -.271 .206 
Enthusiasm 46 .023 1.006 .148 -.276 .321 
Hope 58 .249 1.042 .136 -.023 .520 
Pride 58 -.223 .951 .125 -.473 .027 
Total 228 .003 1.000 .066 -.127 .133 
Wear a campaign 
button 
No emotion 66 .039 .968 .119 -.199 .277 
Enthusiasm 46 .200 .985 .145 -.093 .492 
Hope 58 .023 1.057 .138 -.253 .298 
Pride 58 -.240 .978 .128 -.497 .017 
Total 228 -.004 1.003 .066 -.134 .127 
Attend a rally 
No emotion 66 .060 .994 .122 -.185 .304 
Enthusiasm 46 .004 .955 .141 -.280 .287 
Hope 58 .287 1.105 .144 -.001 .575 
Pride 58 -.358 .849 .112 -.581 -.134 
Total 228 .001 1.004 .066 -.129 .132 
Put up a yard sign 
No emotion 66 -.026 .988 .122 -.268 .217 
Enthusiasm 46 .176 .998 .147 -.120 .473 
Hope 58 .022 1.071 .139 -.258 .301 
Pride 58 -.178 .937 .123 -.424 .068 
Total 228 -.011 1.000 .066 -.142 .119 
Post a bumper 
sticker  
No emotion 66 -.071 .979 .121 -.312 .169 
Enthusiasm 46 .186 1.008 .149 -.113 .486 
Hope 58 .238 1.011 .132 -.025 .502 
Pride 58 -.324 .931 .122 -.569 -.080 
Total 228 -.004 1.000 .066 -.134 .126 
Note. Intention to participate in political activities was measured on the scale of 1 
(Extremely likely) to 7 (Extremely unlikely). Standardized score was used was for all 
variables across groups. The lower score indicates the higher intention to participate in the 
described political activities. 
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A series of univariate ANOVAs were conducted using the eight different forms of 
activities as dependent variables. Discrete positive emotions did not affect intentions to 
participate in the following political activities (see Table 14): vote in the 2018 midterm 
election (F[3, 224] = .234, p > .05), volunteer (F[3, 224] = 1.134, p > .05), donate money 
(F[3, 224] = 1.144, p > .05), contact candidate or campaign staffs (F[3, 224] = 2.483, p > 
.05), wear a campaign button (F[3, 224] = 1.765, p > .05), and put up a yard sign (F[3, 224] 
= 1.085, p > .05). Also, the overall multivariate effect of discrete emotions on the general 
participation intention was not significant as the p value associated with Wilk’s Lambda 
was greater than .05 (F[24, 629.967] = 1.351, p > .05).  
However, univariate effects of discrete positive emotions were found significant in 
between-groups’ intentions to engage in the following political activities (see Table 14 for 
results): (1) attend a rally (F[3, 224] = 4.564, p < .01) and (2) post a bumper sticker (F[3, 
224] = 3.808, p < .05). The equal variance assumption was violated for one dependent 
variable, the intention to attend a rally, as the p value associated with Levene’s test was 
less than .05 (p = .002). Thus, instead of using univariate ANOVA, I used Welch’s 
ANOVA to address the problem of the heterogeneity of variances (Da & Quinn, 1989). 
The result of Welch’s ANOVA still shows statistically significant differences between 
intentions to attend a rally across different emotions (F[3, 121.111] = 4.629, p < .01).  
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Table 14. Descriptive statistics (means, SDs) and effects of positive emotions on political 
participation 
Dependent Variable 
No 
emotion 
Enthusi
asm 
Hope Pride F(3, 224) Sig. 
Vote in the 2018 election 
.00 
(.10) 
.05 
(.16) 
.04 
(.14) 
-.09 
(.14) 
.234 .873 
Volunteer for a 
campaign/candidate 
.00 
(.12) 
.08 
(.15) 
.13 
(.14) 
-.17 
(.13) 
1.134 .336 
Donate money 
-.01 
(.12) 
.11 
(.15) 
.09 
(.14) 
-.19 
(.13) 
1.144 .332 
Contact candidates or 
campaign staffs 
-.03 
(.12) 
.02 
(.15) 
.25 
(.14) 
-.22 
(.13) 
2.483 .062 
Wear a campaign button 
.04 
(.12) 
.20 
(.15) 
.02 
(.14) 
-.24 
(.13) 
1.765 .155 
Attend a rally 
.06 
(.12) 
.00 
(.14) 
.29 
(.14) 
-.36 
(.11) 
4.564 .003 
Put up a yard sign  
-.03 
(.12) 
.18 
(.15) 
.02 
(.14) 
-.18 
(.12) 
1.085 .356 
Post a bumper sticker 
.07 
(.12) 
.19 
(.15) 
.24 
(.13) 
-.32 
(.12) 
3.808 .011 
Note: Subjects’ scores on the measurement scale from 1 (extremely likely) to 7 (extremely 
unlikely) of the eight dependent variables were standardized. The result for the variable 
“attend a rally” was replaced by the result from Welch’s ANOVA. 
Between-groups comparisons of the differences in the two dependent variables are 
made using Tukey’s post-hoc tests. For the intention to post a bumper sticker, people in 
the pride condition showed higher intentions to post a sticker than people in the enthusiasm 
condition (SE = .39, M difference = 1.04, p < .05) as well as than people in the hope 
condition (SE = .37, M difference = 1.12, p < .05). Since the equal variances were not 
assumed across groups for the intention to attend a rally, Games-Howell post-hoc test was 
used to make pairwise comparisons on the variable (Games & Howell, 1976). Proud people 
showed significantly higher levels of intention to attend a rally than hopeful people (SE = 
.35, M difference = 1.29, p < .01). Other between-groups comparisons of subjects’ 
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participation intentions did not show any statistically significant results (see Table 15). 
These results answer RQ3 about the differences among the three positive emotions in their 
influence on political participation. 
Table 15. Pairwise comparisons of the intentions to post a bumper sticker and attend a 
rally 
Dependent  
variables 
(I) Emotion (J) Emotion 
M Difference  
(I-J) 
SE Sig. 
95% CI 
Lower Upper 
Intention to 
post a bumper 
sticker 
No emotion 
 
Enthusiasm -.522 .383 .523 -1.51 .47 
Hope -.607 .359 .330 -1.54 .32 
Pride .514 .359 .481 -.42 1.44 
Enthusiasm 
 
No emotion .522 .383 .523 -.47 1.51 
Hope -.085 .394 .996 -1.10 .93 
Pride 1.036* .394 .045 .02 2.05 
Hope 
 
No emotion .607 .359 .330 -.32 1.54 
Enthusiasm .085 .394 .996 -.93 1.10 
Pride 1.121* .370 .015 .16 2.08 
Pride 
 
No emotion -.514 .359 .481 -1.44 .42 
Enthusiasm -1.036* .394 .045 -2.05 -.02 
Hope -1.121* .370 .015 -2.08 -.16 
Intention to 
attend a rally  
No emotion 
Enthusiasm .109 .362 .991 -.84 1.05 
Hope -.483 .368 .557 -1.44 .48 
Pride .810+ .321 .062 -.03 1.65 
Enthusiasm 
No emotion -.109 .362 .991 -1.05 .84 
Hope -.591 .392 .435 -1.61 .43 
Pride .702 .349 .191 -.21 1.61 
Hope 
No emotion .483 .368 .557 -.48 1.44 
Enthusiasm .591 .392 .435 -.43 1.61 
Pride 1.293** .354 .002 .37 2.22 
Pride 
No emotion -.810+ .321 .062 -1.65 .03 
Enthusiasm -.702 .349 .191 -1.61 .21 
Hope -1.293** .354 .002 -2.22 -.37 
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Note: ** denotes p < .01, * denotes p < .05, + denotes p < .10. For the intention to attend a 
rally, Games-Howell post-hoc test was used. 
 
Based on the literature, H4 argued that individuals experiencing any of three 
positive emotions – (a) enthusiasm, (b) hope, or (c) pride – are more likely to participate 
in politics than those who are not. Examining H4, people in the control condition did not 
show lower levels of intention to participate in any of the eight political activities than 
people in the emotion groups (p > .05). Thus, H4 was not supported.   
Lastly, RQ4 asked if different patterns of information seeking in terms of (a) 
amount and (b) direction mediate the relationship between the three positive emotions 
(enthusiasm, pride, and hope) and political participation. As the results from the previous 
ANOVA show, the manipulation of positive emotions was not significantly related to the 
direction of information search, which means there are no differing effects across 
enthusiasm, hope, and pride on how people seek out pro- or counter-attitudinal political 
information. Thus, the mediation effect was non-existent for information seeking direction. 
Speaking of the amount of information search, both the reading time and number 
of pro-Democratic articles people read were tested as mediators in two separate regression 
models since the between-groups differences were shown to be statistically significant for 
the two (see Table 8 and 10). The results of OLS regression analyses show that the amount 
of information sought does not have any significant impact on the levels of intention to 
participate in the eight different political activities as well as the general intention to 
participate in politics (i.e., the average score of the eight different political activities) (see 
Table 16 and 17). As none of the regression coefficients for the information search were 
statistically significant in the eighteen different regression models predicting intended 
political activities after controlling for emotion effects, the mediation path where the 
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amount of information sought mediates the effects of positive emotions on the intention of 
political participation was not found (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Miles & Shevlin, 2001).  
The non-significant mediation findings can be mainly attributed to the non-
significant relationships between emotions and information seeking itself (related to RQ2) 
as well as the weak linkage between information search and intentions to participate in 
different political activities.  
Table 16. The effects of information search (reading time of pro-Democratic articles) on 
political activities (intention) 
Coefficient (SE) 
Dependent 
variable 
Vote in 
2018 
Volunt
eer 
Donate 
money 
Contact 
candidat
e 
Wear a 
campaig
n button 
Attend a 
rally 
Put up a 
yard 
sign 
Post a 
bumper 
sticker 
General 
participa
tion 
Constant 
1.934 
(.197) 
.137 
(.183) 
-2.023 
(.182) 
3.088 
(.181) 
.028 
(.182) 
3.939 
(.243) 
-.130 
(.182) 
4.136 
(.255) 
.004 
(.138) 
Reading 
time of pro-
Democratic 
articles 
.000 
(.001) 
-.027 
(.042) 
-.004 
(.042) 
-.017 
(.042) 
-.006 
(.042) 
.001 
(.001) 
.039 
(.042) 
.000 
(.001) 
-.003 
(.032) 
Enthusiasm 
.094 
(.297) 
.071 
(.193) 
.125 
(.193) 
.051 
(.191) 
.160 
(.193) 
-.074 
(.368) 
.212 
(.193) 
.531 
(.386) 
.108 
(.146) 
Hope 
.084 
(.279) 
.112 
(.181) 
.105 
(.181) 
.262 
(.179) 
-.015 
(.181) 
.515 
(.344) 
.065 
(.181) 
.615+ 
(.361) 
.138 
(.137) 
Pride 
-.119 
(.279) 
-.166 
(.184) 
-.185 
(.183) 
-.173 
(.182) 
-.292 
(.183) 
-.771* 
(.345) 
-.130 
(.183) 
-.503 
(.362) 
-.219 
(.139) 
Overall 
model 
F [4, 
223] 
= .294, 
p > .05 
F [4, 
223] 
= .867, 
p > .05 
F [4, 
223] 
= .647, 
p > .05 
F [4, 
223] = 
1.622, 
p > .05 
F [4, 
223] = 
1.096, 
p > .05 
F [4, 
223] = 
3.648 
p < .01 
F [4, 
223] 
= .828 
p > .05 
F [4, 
223] = 
2.858, 
p < .05 
F [4, 
223] = 
1.533, 
p > .05 
R2 .005 .019 .014 .035 .024 .061 .018 .049 .033 
*p < .05, +p < .10. 
Note: Standardized score is used for all dependent variables in the models. Independent 
variable of interest for each model is the reading time of pro-Democratic articles. 
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Enthusiasm, hope, and pride variables are dummy coded. Reference group for emotion is 
the control group. 
 
Table 17. The effects of information search (number of pro-Democratic articles) on 
political activities (intention) 
Coefficient (SE) 
Dependent 
variable 
Vote in 
2018 
Volunt
eer 
Donate 
money 
Contact 
candidat
e 
Wear a 
campaig
n button 
Attend a 
rally 
Put up a 
yard 
sign 
Post a 
bumper 
sticker 
General 
participa
tion 
Constant 
-.156 
(.157) 
.034 
(.156) 
-.033 
(.156) 
.070 
(.155) 
.002 
(.156) 
-.008 
(.153) 
-.118 
(.156) 
.011 
(.153) 
-.025 
(.118) 
# of pro-
Democratic 
articles 
.052 
(.088) 
.038 
(.087) 
-.001 
(.087) 
-.036 
(.086) 
.011 
(.087) 
.057 
(.086) 
.122 
(.087) 
-.084 
(.076) 
.024 
(.066) 
Enthusiasm 
.053 
(.194) 
.081 
(.193) 
.126 
(.193) 
.052 
(.191) 
.162 
(.192) 
-.052 
(.189) 
.212 
(.192) 
.254 
(.189) 
.111 
(.146) 
Hope 
.054 
(.181) 
.128 
(.180) 
.106 
(.180) 
.267 
(.178) 
-.011 
(180) 
.236 
(.177) 
.057 
(.180) 
.299 
(.177) 
.142 
(.137) 
Pride 
-.130 
(.183) 
-.147 
(.182) 
-.183 
(.182) 
-.168 
(.180) 
-.287 
(.182) 
-.429* 
(.179) 
-.139 
(.182) 
-.243 
(.179) 
-.215 
(.138) 
Overall 
model 
F[4, 
223] 
= .840, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
223] 
= .824,  
p > .05 
F[4, 
223] 
= .645, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
223]= 
1.624, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
223]= 
1.095, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
223]= 
3.448, 
p < .01 
F[4, 
223]= 
1.059 
p > .05 
F[4, 
223]= 
3.166, 
p < .05 
F[4, 
223]= 
1.559, 
p > .05 
R2 .018 .018 .014 .035 .024 .058 .023 .054 .034 
*p < .05, +p < .10. 
Note: Standardized score is used for all dependent variables in the models. Independent 
variable of interest for each model is the number of pro-Democratic articles people read. 
Enthusiasm, hope, and pride variables are dummy coded. Reference group for emotion is 
the control group. 
 
EFFECTS OF DISCRETE NEGATIVE EMOTIONS ON INFORMATION SEEKING  
To find out whether the discrete negative emotions had differential effects on 
information seeking, a series of ANOVAs were conducted. The results of cross-tabulation 
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and ANOVA for manipulation check of random assignment confirmed that no significant 
difference existed across four conditions on demographic attributes (i.e., age, gender, 
ethnicity, annual household income, level of education, marital status) and political 
orientation variables including party affiliation, strength of partisanship, political interest, 
and political efficacy.8   
Examining H5a and H5b, whether (a) anxiety or (b) anger has more or less impact 
on increasing the amount of information search compared to those not experiencing these 
emotions in the experiment, I include the following variables as dependent variables; (1) 
time spent reading pro-Democratic news, (2) time spent reading pro-Republican news, (3) 
time spent reading non-political news, (4) time spent reading either pro-Democratic or pro-
Republican news (i.e., partisan news), and (5) total time spent reading all the news. Due to 
the violation of normality assumption (i.e., normal distribution of error terms) in the data 
for the dependent variables, pro-Republican news reading and non-political news reading, 
I conducted the nonparametric test (i.e., Kruskal-Wallis test) for the variables. Also, if there 
was the violation of homogeneity of variances assumption (i.e., pro-Democratic news 
reading), I used the results of Welch’s ANOVA instead. 
The results show that there were no emotion effects on the people’s reading time of 
pro-Democratic news, pro-Republican news, or total news articles (see Table 18). 
However, there were significant differences across the emotional conditions in the amounts 
of the time people spent reading non-political news articles (χ2 [3] = 10.903, p < .05). The 
results of Kruskal-Wallis H test (see Table 18) showed that there was a statistically 
significant difference in the participants’ reading time of non-political news articles 
                                                 
8 The results of manipulation checks for random assignment: Age (F[3, 221] = 1.731, p = .162); gender 
(χ2[3] = 2.912, p = .405); ethnicity (χ2 [15] = 14.181, p = .512); income (F[3, 221] = .426, p = .735); 
education (F[3, 221] = .180, p = 908); religion (χ2 [15] = 17.623, p = .283); marital status (χ2 [12] = 5.743, p 
= .928); party affiliation (χ2 [3] = 1.705, p =.636); partisan strength (χ2 [3] = .846, p = .301); political 
interest (F[3, 221] = .108, p = .956); and political efficacy (F[3, 221] = .910, p = .437). 
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between the emotion treatments, with a mean rank reading time of 124.54 seconds for the 
control group, 123.93 seconds for disgust, 101.83 seconds for anxiety, and 98.04 seconds 
for anger group. To compare the mean ranks between anxiety, anger, disgust and control 
groups, I used Mann-Whitney U tests with two independent samples (i.e., pairwise 
comparisons). Table 19 presents the results of pairwise comparisons, showing that the 
anxiety group spent less time reading non-political articles than the control group (related 
to H5a, proposing that anxiety will increase information seeking) and that the anger group 
spent less time reading non-political articles than the control group (related to H5b, 
proposing that anger will depress information seeking). The comparison between anxiety 
and anger groups did not reach the statistical significance. Thus, the results did not support 
H5a but partially supported H5b as it applies to reading non-political articles.  
 
Table 18. Descriptive statistics (medians, IQRs) and effects of negative emotions on news 
reading time (in seconds) 
Dependent variable 
No 
emotion 
Anxiety Anger Disgust F(3, 221) Sig. 
Pro-Democratic reading 
(D) * 
18 
(52) 
19 
(82) 
 0 
(47) 
4 
(44) 
1.377 .254  
Pro-Republican reading 
(R) + 
13 
(70) 
0 
(42) 
8 
(63) 
21 
(75) 
4.563 .207 
Non-political reading 
(N) + 
14 
(28) 
3 
(40) 
0 
(22) 
12 
(54) 
10.903 .012 
Partisan reading 
(D plus R) 
67.50 
(140.25) 
51 
(126) 
44 
(156.50) 
59 
(162) 
.728 .536 
Total reading 
(D plus R plus N) 
99.50 
(155) 
70 
(132) 
71 
(176) 
89 
(223) 
.653 .582 
(*) denotes that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated with pro-
Democratic news reading (D), thus the ANOVA result for the variable was replaced with 
the results from Welch’s ANOVA. 
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(+) denotes that the normality assumption was violated in the data. In case of the violation, 
the nonparametric test (i.e., Kruskal-Wallis test) was conducted for the variables, and in 
case there were differences in significant level, the nonparametric test results were reported 
instead.  
Table 19. Pairwise comparisons of non-political article reading time (Mann-Whitney U 
test) 
* denotes p < .05. 
 
Additionally, I also examined the number of news articles each participant read in 
the experiments as dependent variables. Again, a series of univariate ANOVAs were used 
with four different dependent variables: (1) number of pro-Democratic news articles read, 
(2) number of pro-Republican news articles read, (3) number of non-political news articles 
read, and (4) total sum of news articles read (See Table 20). The assumptions of equal 
variances were violated with the numbers of pro-Republican and non-political articles read, 
thus the results for the variables were replaced with the results from Welch’s ANOVA.  
There were no significant emotion effects on the number of pro-Democratic news and pro-
Republican news articles read across four conditions. However, the emotional condition 
made a significant difference in the number of non-political news articles read across 
(I) Emotion (J) Emotion 
M Rank 
Difference (I-J) 
Mann-
Whitney U  
Sig. 
Anxiety 
No emotion -11.72* 1346.00 .031 
Anger 1.92 1301.50 .664 
Disgust -10.68* 1120.00 .037 
Anger 
No emotion -13.95* 1339.00 .010 
Anxiety -1.92 1301.50 .664 
Disgust -12.33* 1124.50 .016 
Disgust 
No emotion -.48 1800.50 .934 
Anxiety 10.68* 1120.00 .037 
Anger 12.33* 1124.50 .016 
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groups (F[3, 221] = 5.090, p < .05). Also, I found a significant difference across the 
emotion groups in the total number of articles read (F[3, 221] = 3.539, p < .05, see Table 
20). 
Table 20. Descriptive statistics (means, SDs) and effects of negative emotions on 
between-groups news reading (number of articles read) 
Dependent Variable 
(Number of articles) 
No 
emotion 
Anxiety Anger Disgust 
F(3, 
221) 
Sig. 
Pro-Democratic 
articles 
.97 
 (.11) 
.88 
(.14) 
.58 
(.10) 
.78 
(.12) 
1.986 .117 
Pro-Republican 
articles 
.91 
(.12) 
.63 
(.11) 
.81 
(.12) 
.85 
(.10) 
1.101 .314 
Non-political 
articles 
.62 
(.10) 
.25 
(.06) 
.26 
(.07) 
.55 
(.09) 
5.090 .002 
Total # of articles 
2.50 
(.23) 
1.76 
(.22) 
1.66 
(.19) 
2.18 
(.19) 
3.539 .016 
Note: The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated with the numbers of pro-
Republican and non-political articles read, thus the ANOVA results for the variables was 
replaced with the results from Welch’s ANOVA.  
 
Comparing the main effects of emotions on the numbers of non-political articles 
and total articles people read across groups, the estimated marginal means across four 
different groups were used. Since the equal variances were not assumed across groups for 
the number of non-political news articles read, Games-Howell post-hoc test was used to 
make pairwise comparisons on the variable (see Table 21, Games & Howell, 1976). The 
comparisons showed that people in the control group read more non-political articles than 
those in anger or anxiety groups and that people in the disgust group read more than those 
in the anxiety or control conditions. When it comes to the total number of news articles 
read across groups (Table 21), people in the control group read more than those in the anger 
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or anxiety conditions. Other comparisons did not reach significance. Again, the results 
rejected H5a but partially supported H5b. The finding (H5b), angry people seek less 
information than people in the control group, is only applicable to searching non-political 
information and the total amount of article regardless of partisanship.   
Table 21. Pairwise comparisons of the number of articles read across negative emotion 
groups 
 
Dependent 
variable 
(I) Emotion (J) Emotion 
M 
Difference 
(I-J) 
SE Sig. 
95% CI 
 Lower Upper 
 
Number of 
non-political 
news articles 
No emotion 
Anxiety .366* .116 .011 .06 .67 
Anger .357* .122 .021 .05 .66 
Disgust .076 .133 .941 -.22 .38 
Anxiety 
No emotion -.366* .116 .011 -.67 -.06 
Anger -.009 .095 1.00 -.33 .31 
Disgust -.291* .108 .042 -.61 .03 
Anger 
No emotion -.357* .122 .021 -.66 -.05 
Anxiety .009 .095 1.000 -.31 .33 
Disgust -.281+ .115 .074 -.60 .04 
Disgust 
No emotion -.076 .133 .914 -.38 .22 
Anxiety .291* .108 .042 -.03 .61 
Anger .281+ .115 .074 -.04 .60 
 
Total  
number of 
news articles  
No emotion 
Anxiety .735+ .295 .063 -.03 1.50 
Anger .840* .291 .022 .09 1.59 
Disgust .318 .288 .688 -.43 1.06 
Anxiety 
No emotion -.735+ .295 .063 -1.50 .03 
Anger .104 .310 .987 -.70 .91 
Disgust -.417 .307 .527 -1.21 .38 
Anger 
No emotion -.840* .291 .022 -1.59 -.09 
Anxiety -.104 .310 .987 -.91 .70 
Disgust -.521 .304 .319 -1.31 .27 
Disgust 
No emotion -.318 .288 .688 -1.06 .43 
Anxiety .417 .307 .527 -.38 1.21 
Anger .521 .304 .319 -.27 1.31 
Note: * denotes p < .05 and + denotes p < .10.   
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Due to the violation of the equal variances assumption, Games-Howell post-hoc test was 
used for the number of non-political articles read. For the total number of articles, Tukey’s 
post-hoc test was used as the equal variances were assumed. 
H6 hypothesized that (a) individuals who experience anxiety will seek out more 
counter-attitudinal (non-confirming) information compared to those not experiencing the 
emotion and that (b) individuals who experience anger will seek out more pro-attitudinal 
(confirming) information than those not experiencing the emotion. To test the hypotheses, 
I considered two different dependent variables: (1) the direction of news reading (if the 
subject read both pro- and counter-attitudinal news, it was coded 0; if only pro-attitudinal 
news was read, coded 1; and if only counter-attitudinal news was read, coded -1) and (2) 
the reading time of pro-attitudinal news. Pro-attitudinal news reading was calculated by 
subtracting pro-Republican news reading time from pro-Democratic news reading time for 
Democrats and by subtracting pro-Democratic news reading time from pro-Republican 
news reading time for Republicans.  
Examining the direction of news reading (i.e., pro- vs. counter-attitudinal reading) 
across different groups, subjects in the negative emotion conditions were not significantly 
different from those in the control group in their news reading direction (F[3, 221] = .136, 
p > .05) nor in pro-attitudinal news reading time (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2[3] = 1.183, p > 
.05, Table 22). The assumption of normality was violated for the pro-attitudinal reading 
time; thus, the non-parametric test results are reported instead. None of the between-groups 
comparisons including control v. anxiety, control v. anger, and anger v. anxiety, reached 
the statistical significance. Both H6a and H6b were not supported. 
RQ5 asked about the differential effects of anger and anxiety on information 
seeking behaviors in terms of any direction (e.g., selective exposure or avoidance) in 
general if there is any varying impact. However, with respect to the direction of news 
  
 
 
 145 
reading, the two discrete negative emotions (anger and anxiety) did not have any 
differential effects. 
 
Table 22. Descriptive statistics (means, SDs) and effects of negative emotions on 
between-groups news reading (direction)  
Dependent 
variable 
No 
emotion 
Anxiety Anger Disgust F(3, 221) Sig. 
Pro-attitudinal 
reading time 
38.00 
(38.49) 
91.41 
(82.63) 
29.62 
(18.60) 
29.81 
(29.27) 
1.183 .757 
Direction of 
news reading 
.09  
(.07) 
.04 
(.08) 
.11 
(.09) 
.09 
(.08) 
.136 .939 
Note: Due to the violation of normality assumption in the data, I conducted the 
nonparametric test (i.e., Kruskal-Wallis) for the dependent variable, pro-attitudinal reading 
time. The result showed no difference in the significant level, and I reported the 
nonparametric test result here, instead of that of ANOVA.  
 
H7a, H7b, and RQ6 ask about the differential effects of anxiety and anger on 
political participation intention, and for the purpose of organization, I will discuss them in 
the next section, under the effects of negative emotions on political participation. 
Hypotheses 8a hypothesized about the effect of disgust on information seeking, 
proposing that people experiencing disgust will seek out different amounts of information 
compared to those not experiencing the emotion (i.e., control group). The results of 
ANOVA (see Table 18) and pairwise comparisons of emotion effects on non-political news 
reading time (see Table 19) show that participants who experienced disgust did not spend 
a different amount of time reading either partisan (pro-Democratic or pro-Republican) or 
non-political news articles compared to those in the control group. Thus, H8a was not 
supported.  
  
 
 
 146 
Comparing the effect of disgust to that of anxiety or anger, however, I found a 
differential effect of disgust on reading non-political news articles, as disgust increased 
people’s non-political news reading compared to anger or anxiety (see Table 19 and 21). 
Answering RQ8, disgust significantly increased the amount of reading time of non-political 
articles as individuals in the disgust condition read more non-political articles than those 
in the anxiety and anger conditions. However, when it comes to the effect on information 
search direction, disgust was found indistinguishable from anxiety or anger (see Table 22). 
In sum, the results suggest that both anxiety and anger reduce non-political news 
consumption compared to disgust or neutral emotions. As there is no evidence that anxiety 
or anger lead to selective exposure or avoidance, it is clear that anxiety or anger do not 
always lead individuals to be motivated information processors. The findings may differ 
from some previous research for many reasons, such as the nature of the 2016 campaign or 
the stimuli used in this study. The results are consistent with the idea that anger and anxiety 
may motivate people to veer away from general information search, such as seeking non-
political news, however.  
Disgust, on the other hand, seems to motivate people to seek more non-political 
content to curb the experience of the non-pleasant emotion or to stay away from politics in 
general (DeBell, 2016), as the results show that politically disgusted people read more non-
political content more than those who are anxious or angry about politics. However, the 
analysis does not provide evidence of the distinct effect of disgust on information search 
direction.  
EFFECTS OF DISCRETE NEGATIVE EMOTIONS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
Scholars have generally agreed that emotions with negative valence (anger, anxiety, 
and fear) affect the likelihood of political participation to a varying degree because of their 
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differences in certainty, familiarity and approach-avoidance tendency (e.g., Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000; Nabi, 2003; Marcus et al., 2000). The current study aims to take a further 
step by looking into discrete negative emotions by examining their differential effects on a 
range of intended political activities. H7a and H7b hypothesized that anger and anxiety 
have a differing effect on two forms of political participation; one is cheap, and the other 
costly forms of participation.9 
 Descriptive statistics across four different groups regarding subjects’ intention to 
participate in eight different kinds of political activities are presented in Table 23. Note 
that the lower the score, the higher participants’ intentions to participate were.  
 
Table 23. Descriptive statistics of standardized intentions of political activities across 
negative emotion groups 
Political activities 
(intention) 
N Mean SD SE 
95% CI for mean 
Lower Upper 
Vote in the 2018 
midterm election  
No emotion 66 -.135 .749 .092 -.319 .049 
Anxiety 51 -.094 .909 .127 -.350 .161 
Anger 53 .004 1.070 .147 -.290 .299 
Disgust 55 .245 1.230 .166 -.087 .578 
Total 225 .000 1.000 .067 -.131 .131 
Volunteer  
No emotion 66 .019 .912 .112 -.206 .243 
Anxiety 51 -.258 1.048 .147 -.552 .037 
Anger 53 .024 1.058 .145 -.268 .315 
Disgust 55 .194 .975 .131 -.070 .457 
Total 225 .000 1.000 .067 -.131 .131 
                                                 
9 Intentions to engage in eight different political activities were measured on the Likert scale of 1 to 7, 
using the question “how likely are you willing to engage in the following activity?” And answers were 
recorded as follows: (1) Extremely likely; (2) moderately likely; (3) slightly likely; (4) neutral; (5) slightly 
unlikely; (6) moderately unlikely; and (7) extremely unlikely.  
Standardized score (ranging from negative to positive values) was used was for all eight variables across 
groups.  
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(Table 23 continued) 
Donate money  
No emotion 66 -.051 .897 .110 -.272 .169 
Anxiety 51 -.044 1.032 .144 -.335 .246 
Anger 53 -.021 1.054 .145 -.311 .270 
Disgust 55 .123 1.050 .142 -.161 .407 
Total 225 .000 1.000 .067 -.131 .131 
Contact candidates 
or campaign staffs 
No emotion 66 -.048 .971 .119 -.286 .191 
Anxiety 51 -.174 1.096 .154 -.483 .134 
Anger 53 .043 1.001 .138 -.233 .319 
Disgust 55 .177 .933 .126 -.075 .430 
Total 225 .000 1.000 .067 -.131 .131 
Wear a campaign 
button 
No emotion 66 .069 .946 .116 -.164 .301 
Anxiety 51 -.165 .967 .135 -.437 .107 
Anger 53 -.104 1.071 .147 -.400 .191 
Disgust 55 .171 1.014 .137 -.103 .445 
Total 225 .000 1.000 .067 -.131 .131 
Attend a rally  
No emotion 66 .016 .963 .119 -.221 .252 
Anxiety 51 -.092 1.029 .144 -.382 .197 
Anger 53 -.145 1.012 .139 -.423 .134 
Disgust 55 .206 .996 .134 -.063 .475 
Total 225 .000 1.000 .067 -.131 .131 
Put up a yard sign 
No emotion 66 -.053 .972 .120 -.292 .186 
Anxiety 51 -.048 .993 .139 -.327 .231 
Anger 53 -.176 1.072 .147 -.472 .119 
Disgust 55 .279 .936 .126 .025 .532 
Total 225 .000 1.000 .067 -.131 .131 
Post a bumper 
sticker  
No emotion 66 -.055 .945 .116 -.287 .178 
Anxiety 51 -.118 .995 .139 -.397 .162 
Anger 53 -.109 1.108 .152 -.414 .196 
Disgust 55 .280 .931 .126 .028 .531 
Total 225 .000 1.000 .067 -.131 .131 
Note. Intention to participate in eight political activities was measured on the scale of 1 
(Extremely likely) to 7 (Extremely unlikely). Standardized score was used was for all 
variables across groups. The lower score indicates the higher intention to participate in the 
described political activities. 
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To compare the between-groups intentions to engage in eight different forms of 
political activities from voting to campaigning, a series of ANOVAs were conducted using 
eight different forms of activities as dependent variables. The results (presented in Table 
24) show that, contrary to the theoretical expectation, the univariate effect of discrete 
negative was not found on any of eight political activities: vote in the 2018 midterm 
election (F[3, 221] = 1.674, p > .05), volunteer (F[3, 221] = 1.854, p > .05), donate money 
(F[3, 221] = .373, p > .05), contact a candidate or campaign staff (F[3, 221] = 1.178, p > 
.05), wear a campaign button (F[3, 221] = 1.300, p > .05), attend a rally (F[3, 221] = 1.303, 
p > .05), put up a yard sign (F[3, 221] = 2.105, p > .05), and post a bumper sticker (F[3, 
221] = 1.969, p > .05). Also, the overall multivariate effect of discrete emotions on the 
general participation intention was found to be non-significant as the p value associated 
with Wilk’s Lambda was greater than .05 (F[24, 621.266] = 1.132, p > .05).  
H7a and H7b were not supported as anxiety and anger did not show different effects 
on any of both cheap and costly political activities. Answering RQ6, how anger and anxiety 
differ from each other in affecting participatory activities, I did not find any significant 
differences of anger or anger across the activities. Turning to disgust (H8b), those in the 
disgust condition were no more or less likely to participate in political activities than those 
in the control condition. Discussing RQ9, whether disgust differs from anger or anxiety in 
influencing political activities, the data did not show any meaningful difference in 
participation intentions. 
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Table 24. Univariate effect of discrete negative emotions on political participation 
Dependent Variable 
No 
emotion 
Anxiety Anger Disgust F(3,221) Sig. 
Vote in the 2018 election* 
-.14 
(.09) 
-.09 
(.13) 
.00 
(.15) 
.25 
(.17) 
1.674 .243 
Volunteer 
.02 
(.11) 
-.26 
(.15) 
.02 
(.15) 
.19 
(.13) 
1.854 .138 
Donate money 
-.05 
(.11) 
-.04 
(.14) 
-.02 
(.14) 
.12 
(.14) 
.373 .773 
Contact candidates or 
campaign staffs 
-.05 
(.12) 
-.17 
(.15) 
.04 
(.14) 
.18 
(.13) 
1.178 .319 
Wear a campaign button 
.07 
(.12) 
-.16 
(.14) 
-.10 
(.15) 
.17 
(.14) 
1.300 .275 
Attend a rally 
.02 
(.12) 
-.09 
(.14) 
-.14 
(.14) 
.21 
(.13) 
1.303 .274 
Put up a yard sign  
-.05 
(.12) 
-.05 
(.14) 
-.18 
(.15) 
.28 
(.13) 
2.105 .100 
Post a bumper sticker 
-.05 
(.11) 
-.12 
(.14) 
-.11 
(.15) 
.28 
(.13) 
1.969 .120 
Note: Subjects’ scores on the measurement scale (from 1 to 7) of the eight dependent 
variables were standardized. The smaller score indicated the higher intention to 
participation.  
(*) denotes that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated for the variable, 
vote in the 2018 election, thus the ANOVA result for the variable was replaced with the 
result from Welch’s ANOVA.  
 
Lastly, RQ7 asked if there is any mediating effect of individuals’ information 
search behaviors on the relationship between negative emotions and political participation 
intention. Since there was no meaningful association between the negative emotions and 
participatory activities, information search cannot be a mediator of the relationships.  
As the number of non-political articles and the total number of articles read by 
participants were affected by the type of negative emotions they experienced (see Table 
20), however, I conducted OLS regression analysis to find out if there is any impact of 
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information search on participatory intentions of eight different activities (Table 25 and 
26). The results show that after controlling for emotion effects, the number of non-political 
articles people read had a significant impact on people’s intention to wear a campaign 
button (B = .179, SE = .105, p < .10), display a yard sign (B = .307, SE = 103, p <.01) and 
bumper sticker (B = .231, SE = 104, p < .05, see Table 25). The effect was not theorized or 
hypothesized in the study but seems interesting. It is possible that the people who seek 
more information in non-political contents may be more likely or willing to engage in risk 
free, cheap forms of political activities, such as displaying a bumper sticker, but not in 
costly forms of activities, such as attending a rally or donating money. Also, this can be 
interpreted that individuals who do not closely follow the political news or are not 
interested in politics in general may still be drawn to engage in cheap forms of political 
activities via general information search.  
Also, the total number of articles people read had a significant impact on people’s 
intention to display a yard sign (B = .084, SE = .042, p < .05) and bumper sticker (B = .077, 
SE = .042, p < .10) after taking into account the effect of negative emotions (see Table 26).  
Even though this result does not address RQ7 in term of the mediating effects of 
information search, it is worth noting that the level of people’s information search (only 
non-political and overall reading) affects some types of political activities (i.e., displaying 
a bumper sticker or yard sign) after controlling for the negative emotion effects. 
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Table 25. The effects of information search (number of non-political articles) on political 
activities (intention) 
Coefficient (SE) 
Dependent 
variable 
Vote in 
2018 
Volunte
er 
Donate 
money 
Contact 
candidat
e 
Wear a 
campaig
n button 
Attend a 
rally 
Put up a 
yard 
sign 
Post a 
bumper 
sticker 
General 
participa
tion 
Constant 
-.059 
(.139) 
-.070 
(.139) 
-.159 
(.140) 
-.102 
(.140) 
-.042 
(.139) 
-.060 
(.139) 
-.244 
(.136) 
-.199 
(.137) 
-.117 
(.108) 
# of non-
political 
articles 
-.123 
(.105) 
.142 
(.105) 
.173 
(.106) 
.088 
(.106) 
.179+ 
(.105) 
.122 
(.106) 
.307** 
(.103) 
.231* 
(.104) 
.140+ 
(.082) 
Anxiety 
-.004 
(.189) 
-.224 
(.189) 
.070 
(.191) 
-.094 
(.190) 
-.168 
(.189) 
-.063 
(.190) 
.118 
(.186) 
.022 
(.188) 
-.043 
(.148) 
Anger 
.096 
(.187) 
.056 
(.187) 
.092 
(.188) 
.122 
(.188) 
-.109 
(.187) 
-.116 
(.188) 
-.013 
(.184) 
.028 
(.185) 
.019 
(.146) 
Disgust 
.371* 
(.182) 
.186 
(.181) 
.187 
(.183) 
.232 
(.183) 
.116 
(.182) 
.200 
(.182) 
.355* 
(.178) 
.352+ 
(.180) 
.250 
(.142) 
Overall 
model 
F[4, 
220]  
= 1.600, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
220]  
=1.853, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
220] 
= .948, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
220]  
= 1.056, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
220]  
= 1.707, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
220]  
= 1.314, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
220]  
= 3.845, 
p < .001 
F[4, 
220]  
= 2.733, 
p < .05 
F[4, 
220]  
= 2.160, 
p > .05 
R2 .028 .033 .017 .019 .030 .023 .065 .047 .038 
**p < .01, *p < 0.05, +p < .10. 
Note: Standardized score is used for all dependent variables in the models. Independent 
variable of interest for each model is the number of non-political news articles people read. 
Anxiety, anger, and disgust variables are dummy coded. Reference group is the control 
group.  
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Table 26. The effects of information search (total number of articles) on political 
activities (intention) 
Coefficient (SE) 
Dependen
t variable 
Vote in 
2018 
Voluntee
r 
Donate 
money 
Contact 
candidat
e 
Wear a 
campaig
n button 
Attend a 
rally 
Put up a 
yard 
sign 
Post a 
bumper 
sticker 
General 
participa
tion 
Constant 
-.010 
(.162) 
.071 
(.162) 
-.158 
(.163) 
-.066 
(.163) 
-.011 
(.163) 
-.036 
(.163) 
-.264 
(.160) 
-.247 
(.161) 
-.108 
(.127) 
Total # of 
articles 
-.050 
(.042) 
.036 
(.042) 
.043 
(.043) 
.007 
(.043) 
.032 
(.043) 
.021 
(.043) 
.084* 
(.042) 
.077+ 
(.042) 
.031 
(.033) 
Anxiety 
.004 
(.188) 
-.250 
(.188) 
.028 
(.190) 
-.121 
(.189) 
-.210 
(.189) 
-.092 
(.189) 
.068 
(.186) 
-.006 
(.187) 
-.071 
(.147) 
Anger 
.098 
(.187) 
.036 
(.187) 
.066 
(.189) 
.096 
(.188) 
-.146 
(.188) 
-.143 
(.188) 
-.052 
(.185) 
.011 
(.186) 
-.004 
(.146) 
Disgust 
.265* 
(.182) 
.186 
(.182) 
.188 
(.184) 
.227 
(.183) 
.112 
(.183) 
.197 
(.183) 
.359* 
(.181) 
.379* 
(.181) 
.249+ 
(.142) 
Overall 
model 
F[4, 
220]  
= 1.606, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
220]  
= 1.569, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
220] 
= .530, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
220] 
= .887, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
220] 
= 1.115, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
220]  
= 1.033 
p > .05 
F[4, 
220]  
= 2.609 
p < .05 
F[4, 
220]  
= 2.331, 
p > .05 
F[4, 
220]  
= 1.643, 
p > .05 
R2 .028 .028 .014 .016 .020 .018 .018 .041 .029 
**p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10. 
Note: Standardized score is used for all dependent variables in the models. Independent 
variable of interest for each model is total number of articles people read. Anxiety, anger, 
and disgust variables are dummy coded. Reference group is the control group.  
 
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS  
This chapter investigated the dynamics between discrete emotions (both positive 
and negative) and information search and political participation. The impact of discrete 
positive emotions on information seeking and participatory behaviors was examined 
independently to that of negative emotions. Thus, the results of the study will be discussed 
by differentiating the effect of positive emotions from that of negative ones here.  
  
 
 
 154 
Research on the effect of discrete positive emotions on human behaviors like 
information seeking and participation has remained largely inconclusive, even though 
political researchers have been interested in finding effects (Barrett, 2006; Engelken-Jorge 
et al., 2011). The present study takes an experimental approach to investigate the 
differential effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on various political activities. The 
results, however, provide little evidence that the three emotions affect participation 
intentions differently. The differences in appraisal constructs documented in the previous 
chapter may not be large or powerful enough to yield varying impacts on people’s 
information seeking behaviors or political engagement. 
The linkage between discrete positive emotions and information search receives 
limited support. Much like the mixed results from previous research on the relationship 
between positive emotion and information seeking (MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus et al., 
2000; Valentino et al., 2011), the findings from the experiment advance complicated 
questions. Even though I found a differential effect between pride and enthusiasm on 
reading pro-Democratic news articles (the reading time of pro-Democratic articles was 
significantly longer for enthusiastic individuals than for those in the pride condition), the 
results of the chapter show that discrete positive emotions are not a definitive factor in how 
people seek out information in terms of amount or direction. Moreover, even though the 
comparisons did not reach statistical significance, the finding that people in the control 
group read more news articles than people in the groups of positive emotions may seem 
counterintuitive as some argue that positive emotions help people to engage in information-
processing (Lecheler, Schuck, & Vreese, 2013; Valentino et al., 2011). The inconsistent 
effect of positive emotions on information search was in line with the suggestion that 
positive emotions lead people to be less cognitively attentive to and less motivated to 
process new information (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Martin et al., 1993). It can be reasoned 
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that individuals in the study did not want to engage in any further information search as 
they may have wanted to maintain their positive affective state by avoiding any new piece 
of information (Isen & Means, 1983; Isen & Patrick, 1983). 
On a different note, contrary to the conventional belief and research findings to 
date, which argue that emotions with positive valence have a positive impact on political 
participation (e.g., Brader, 2005, 2006b; Valentino et al., 2008; Valentino et al., 2011), the 
experiment shows that in most categories of political activities, such as voting, 
volunteering, and donation, the differential effects between positive emotion and no 
emotion conditions on the participation intention were not significant. This can be 
interpreted as positive emotions may not help increase political engagement. However, the 
results of the present chapter can provide some evidence to support the differential effects 
of discrete positive emotions, as pride is better at activating intentions for some political 
activities (i.e., attending a rally, posting a bumper sticker) than other positive emotions. 
Although pride did not significantly increase participation intentions for all of the 
participatory acts examined, it is noteworthy that those in the pride condition had higher 
intentions to participate across all categories. Even though the results cannot be generalized 
across different political activities, this highlights the need for researchers to further 
examine the effects of positive emotions in the political context. 
Discussing the impact of discrete negative emotions on information seeking and 
participation intentions, different dynamics were found across emotion groups (anxiety, 
anger, and disgust). Although I did not find the anticipated effect of discrete negative 
emotions on information search in terms of direction (i.e., selective exposure/avoidance), 
there was a significant, and positive, effect of disgust on the amount of non-political news 
reading. Disgusted participants read more non-political articles than those in the anxiety or 
anger conditions. This finding is partially supported by literature arguing that disgust 
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promotes an avoidance tendency, yet it is not fully explained as literature also suggests 
increased information search on an offending object (Woolf, 2007). Also, both angry and 
anxious participants read fewer non-political news and overall articles than those in the 
control group. The impact of discrete negative emotions on information seeking behaviors 
clearly complicates the literature on discrete negative emotion effects as it was argued that 
anxiety increases the information search and anger reduces it (H5a & H5b). That anxiety 
reduced the amount of information search, may be because the non-political news content 
did not draw interest from the participants as they felt anxiety related to the 2016 election 
campaign.  
Contrary to what was expected, there were no differential effects of discrete 
negative emotions on intended political activities. This contradicts the previous literature, 
which argues that anger and anxiety have varying impacts on different forms of political 
activities (i.e., costly vs. cheap activities). That the impact was not found in the experiment 
could be possibly attributed to the high co-occurrences among anger, anxiety, and disgust 
in participants’ responses (see Table 3). In other words, due to the mixed emotions (anger, 
anxiety, and/or disgust) people experienced in the emotion manipulation stage, the effects 
of each discrete one may not be well distinguished on participation intention. On top of the 
visibly detected, thus coded, co-occurring emotions, it is possible that participants 
prompted by the negative emotion induction have experienced more than one emotion than 
they described in the answers, and this could have contributed to the non-finding. The 
tendency of co-occurrences within discrete negative emotions is also supported by past 
literature (e.g., MacKuen et al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2011). 
Particularly, the non-distinguishable effects of anxiety, anger, and disgust in the 
study could be attributed to the unique campaign atmosphere of the 2016 election. For 
example, people’s choice in 2016 was often described as choosing among ‘lesser of two 
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evils’ as a disdain for the other candidate being a major factor in people’s candidate support 
(Delkic, 2016). A Pew Survey also found that majorities of Americans described 
themselves as “frustrated” and “disgusted” with the campaign (Pew Research Center, 
2016). Given the contentious political atmosphere of the 2016 campaign, I can make 
assumptions that most voters experienced some combinations of negative emotions like 
anger, frustration, and disgust at certain points during the 2016 campaign, and that the 
overall negative emotional experience may have had a complicating effect on the 
dependent variable as participants recalling the situation where they had felt anxious, 
angry, or disgusted. Even if the co-occurrence explanation does not hold up, the uniqueness 
of the 2016 campaign might have played as a confounding variable, affecting both emotion 
manipulation and participation intention.  
Further, the current study did not find any evidence showing the mediation effect 
of information seeking behavior on participation intention for either positive or negative 
emotions (RQ4 & RQ7). As discussed, this could be mainly because there were only 
minimal effects of discrete emotions (both positive and negative) on participation 
intentions generally. As emotions did not carry large effects on different participation 
intentions, the pathways from emotions to participation intentions via information seeking 
end up being undetectable.  
Last but not least, the study advances the current literature on discrete emotion and 
political psychology as largely understudied emotions were included and examined. Even 
though the findings do not perfectly dovetail with the current literature findings in terms 
of information seeking and intended political participation (e.g., DeBell, 2016; Woolf, 
2007), the results of the study should not be taken lightly.  
The limited findings on the effects of discrete emotions on information seeking and 
political participation in this chapter should be taken into account when discussing the 
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complexity of discrete emotions and their effects. The findings of the chapter then suggest 
a few challenges that are central to the task of theorizing about the relationships among 
discrete political emotions, information search, and political participation.  
First, the experiment only asked participants to recall emotional episodes during 
the 2016 presidential campaigns. Considering that the experience of emotions is sensitive 
to its context (Kim, Ford, Mauss, & Tamir, 2015), experiencing a certain emotion during 
an election season may be a very different experience from experiencing the same emotion 
in other contexts during non-election seasons. For instance, cognitive antecedents of an 
emotional experience during a presidential election campaign could more pressing and 
noticeable, thus people may be more apt to experience strong emotions like enthusiasm 
and disgust than other times. Moreover, the negatively charged campaign in 2016 may have 
prompted participant to think or feel in a biased manner since people’s memories about an 
unusual event can cause them to perceive and process things differently (Schmidt, 2012). 
Thus, the findings on the effect of discrete emotions may not be generalizable beyond this 
particular context. 
As discussed earlier, the 2016 election context poses a significant limitation as the 
front-runners from both parties were rated historically unfavorably by the public according 
to several polls (e.g., CBS News, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2016). Considering the 
unique context of the 2016 election, it is likely that people were increasingly turned off by 
the candidates and campaign/election news. Even though people are generally more tuned 
to media outlets to get news coverage during highly salient events like presidential election, 
the unusual level of negativity around the 2016 election could have complicated the effect 
of positive emotions on participants’ general information seeking and political activities. 
It also may have been responsible for the observed patterns with respect to negative 
emotions. This particularity can explain the limited findings of the study, and therefore, the 
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findings regarding the different levels of information seeking and participation intention 
may not be generalized beyond the context and topic of the 2016 presidential election. In 
the sense, future studies on emotion effects in politics need to expand their efforts to 
broaden the spectrum of political contexts of emotional episode or experience. 
Lastly, in regards to the tendency of co-occurrences of discrete emotion, the method 
of emotion manipulation could be improved as the recall method used in the study may not 
be the most desirable or effective emotion-inducing method. To increase the validity of 
emotion manipulation as well as measurement, scholars should adopt better methods, such 
as Ecological Momentary Assessment where subjects are randomly asked to evaluate the 
most current event which engaged their attention while they were pursuing daily activities 
(e.g., Tong & Jia, 2017). Using this type of advanced method, scholars may collect more 
current and even simultaneous data in the context like political campaigning and elections 
that do not rely solely on subjects’ memory and impression. If scholars can afford to 
measure emotions right at the moment (or right after) when people are experiencing them, 
the validity of emotion measured in a study would be significantly improved. Thus, 
researchers need to put a collective effort to better investigate discrete emotions 
independently from one another and their relations with other variables of interest like 
participation, learning, and attitude. 
Despite the limitations discussed, the findings in the chapter significantly advance 
our understanding of the relationships among discrete emotions, information search, and 
political participation in two regards. First and foremost, the findings lead me to draw an 
important conclusion that not all positive emotions have the same magnitude of positive 
impact on information search or political participation. Some emotions work better than 
others in mobilizing certain behaviors, and people who do not experience a positive 
emotion at all may seek out more information than those who feel positive. Especially, 
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contrary to the common belief and findings in political literature, people in the pride 
condition show higher levels of participation intention in a few activities (i.e., post a 
bumper sticker, attend a rally) than those in the enthusiasm or hope condition. Enthusiasm 
has been regarded as a highly arousing emotion, which in turn leads to higher action 
tendency (Frijda et al., 1989; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2011). However, the 
comparisons of enthusiasm with other discrete emotions, hope and pride, tell us a quite 
different story. This finding calls for the need to include discrete positive emotions other 
than enthusiasm into the political discussions of emotion effects.  
Second, despite the limited findings on the link between discrete emotions and 
information search patterns, this chapter alludes to the complexity of individuals’ 
information seeking behavior. Maybe the differences among enthusiasm, hope, and pride, 
and among anxiety, anger, and disgust are not imposing or discriminating enough to make 
a difference in individuals’ news reading patterns, especially the direction of news reading. 
Yet, a few interesting linkages were found between information seeking and underexplored 
discrete emotions, such as pride and disgust; for example, disgust increasing non-political 
reading relative to anger and anxiety.  
It is true that people’s information seeking and other behaviors are influenced and 
determined by many different factors beyond their emotional state, such as their interest in 
given subjects, level of intellectual complexity, personal relevance to topics, salience of 
issues, and efficacy. Considering the findings of a differential effect of positive emotions 
on pro-Democratic reading and that of negative emotions on non-political reading, further 
academic endeavors that explicate differential emotional effects grounded in cognitive 
appraisal theories (e.g., Lazarus 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) may help to explain why 
some emotions lead people to seek out more or less of different type of information. Even 
though the effect of different appraisal dimensions for each emotion on information 
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seeking was not of interest of the study in this chapter, based on the findings from the 
previous chapter on discrete emotions and their respective appraisals, I postulate that I 
could find a clearer effect of different emotions on information seeking behaviors after 
dissecting the effect of each emotion into the effects of different appraisals. This 
examination will give us an up-close look into overlapping effects between discrete 
emotions on information seeking and participation. For example, when looking into the 
effect of hope on information seeking, if I dissect the overall effect of hope into that of 
individual appraisals, certainty and anticipated effort, for instance, should I find that 
certainty leads to decreased information search and effort leads to increased information 
search. In this way, I may clarify that why hope does or does not carry a detectable impact 
on information search behavior. Thus, the present findings suggest that different cognitive-
appraisal constructs of discrete emotions need to be taken into account as one of the 
subjects of academic investigation and concerted effort in studying information search and 
beyond in politics. 
Thus far, I described and discussed the findings, limitations, and implications of 
the two studies in Chapter 5 and 6. In the final chapter, I briefly summarize the main agenda 
of the dissertation by turning to its theoretical backdrop, main contributions and 
importance, and the possible trajectory of future research.     
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
On November 8, 2016, the world tuned in as the U.S. presidential election unfolded, 
leading to an upset victory of Trump, who become the 45th president of the U.S. Supporters 
of Clinton and now-President Trump gathered at rallies to watch the vote count. As the 
night went on, Trump supporters grew more ecstatic while Clinton supporters fell into 
despair and disappointment. Angry Clinton fans and protesters poured out onto the streets 
in cities across the nation, expressing anger and resistance as shouting out the words “Not 
My President” (Taylor, 2016). The emotional highs and lows seemed especially dramatic 
and volatile around the 2016 presidential election. What perplexes me here is how exactly 
politics make us emotional and, in turn, mobilizes us. To date, we do not have an accurate 
answer to the question, and the unprecedented 2016 election makes it particularly important 
to study these questions in a novel context. 
When political leaders use the rhetoric of positivism, the electorate has seemed to 
respond in some way (Cadwell, 2013). Positive emotions are very frequently referenced 
emotions in the political rhetoric to galvanize the electorate (Engelken-Jorge, 2011). By 
tapping into positive emotions, political leaders and parties have won not only hearts but 
votes (Brader, 2005). The general assumption in the dynamics is that positive expectations 
change attitudes toward the leaders and parties, thus mobilize the citizenship, or vice versa 
(Waterman, Jenkins, Smith, & Silva, 1999). On the other hand, the use of negativity in 
political campaigning or ads may have different implications. The prevalence of negativity 
in politics, such as negative campaigns against opposing candidates, can lead voter to be 
more attentive to information, more participatory, or get turned off by the politics (Brader, 
2006; DeBell 2016; Valentino et al., 2011). Political scholars have been asking and 
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answering questions on why and/or how exactly people respond in a particular way to such 
emotional stimuli.  
In this dissertation, I’m less concerned with how political leaders use rhetoric, and 
more concerned with the emotions that the public feels, some of which are inspired by 
political leaders’ words and actions. Throughout the dissertation, I analyze emotions and 
their effects in politics. Doing do, I chose to focus on three positive as well as three negative 
emotions reflecting the growing academic interest in the role of positive emotions and all 
the negativity and bickering going around in contemporary politics (Groeling, 2010).  
Emotions, whether positive or negative, not only permeate politics but also 
undergird a wide range of individuals’ behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs in politics 
(Civettini, 2011). To get a better grasp on what emotions are, how different they are from 
one another, and how different emotions work in politics, I posed four main questions that 
guided this research: First, what are enthusiasm, hope, and pride? Second, how different 
are they from one another? Third, how do the three emotions affect individuals’ 
information seeking and political participation? Lastly, how do three different negative 
emotions (i.e., anger, anxiety, and disgust) affect individuals’ information seeking and 
political participation?  
The answers to the questions illustrate that emotions are a powerful, yet not fully 
understood, tool for public learning and mobilization. In this chapter, I first show that 
unearthing how discrete emotions work in politics, especially regarding positive emotions, 
required departures from and extensions on prior literature, especially cognitive 
psychology. The approach significantly contributes to the fields of political communication 
and political psychology both conceptually and methodologically. Second, I illustrate how 
my main findings document the constructs of different type of positive emotions as well as 
the role of positive and negative emotions in politics to shape individuals’ behaviors. Third, 
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I discuss possible avenues for future research. Finally, I conclude with the importance of 
emotion studies to the electorate and political system.  
DEPARTING FROM APPRAISALS TO CAPTURING THEM 
Beyond Valence: Discrete Emotion Model 
Studying the effects of emotion has been one of many subjects of interest for 
political scholars. The present research drew upon research traditions and findings to study 
emotions and their effects, however, the approach to study emotions has usually centered 
on two dimensions: valence and/or arousal. With the dimension-oriented approach, the 
incongruency among the research findings regarding the effects of both positive and 
negative emotions could not be reconciled (Brader, 2005, 2006a; Valentino et al., 2011).  
Recently, political researchers started to pay attention to different attributes of 
emotions with a discrete emotions approach (e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Weber, 2013). With 
the new perspective of discrete emotion model, different emotions with the same valence, 
whether positive or negative, could be treated separately. The basic assumption of the 
discrete emotion model is that for an emotion to occur or be experienced, there should be 
antecedents which are encapsulated by what is called (cognitive) appraisal (Frijda et al., 
1989; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Taking into account a range of cognitive 
appraisal components, scholars can differentiate different emotions with the same valence 
and predict their distinct effects based on the appraisal components. However, this 
approach has not been in use in political research, especially regarding positive emotions. 
In other words, there has been a disproportionate emphasis on studying negative emotions, 
such as anger, fear, and anxiety, in the field of political communication (Engelken-Jorge et 
al., 2011; MacKuen et al., 2010). The negativity bias in emotion studies has yielded a void 
in understanding of positive emotions and their impact in politics. 
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This dissertation recognizes the void and draws from the discrete emotion model, 
particularly previous research findings in the cognitive psychology literature. Although 
there are a wide range of positive emotions such as serenity, joy, or awe, I decided to 
prioritize three politically relevant positive emotions: enthusiasm, hope, and pride. Past 
research on positive emotions in politics renders justification and immediate need to study 
the three emotions as they (especially hope and pride) are prevalent and noticeable 
emotions in political contexts like elections and campaigning (e.g., Just et al., 2007; Marcus 
et al., 2000; Snyder, 2000), yet have never been studied in terms of their appraisal 
constructs.  
To uncover the constructs of enthusiasm, hope, and pride, the notion of cognitive 
appraisal of antecedents of emotions was discussed and each positive emotion was defined 
in terms of its appraisal constructs. I mainly drew upon the findings on appraisal theories 
to identify and discriminate the unique sets of appraisals that conceptualize the three 
emotions (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2001; Frijda et al., 1989; Tong; 2007), but also to advance 
appraisal theories by proposing additional appraisal dimensions like change and resource 
acquisition. Finalizing the selection process of appraisal dimensions, ten most (potentially) 
discriminating appraisal dimensions were identified: (1) pleasantness, (2) action tendency, 
(3) certainty, (4) change, (5) agency, (6) anticipated effort, (7) self-regard, (8) social 
appropriateness, (9) mastery, and (10) resource acquisition.   
Instead of using all the appraisals for all three emotions, I proposed a theoretical 
model (Figure 1) with the three emotions predicted by three different, yet overlapping, sets 
of appraisal dimensions to be as parsimonious as possible. In the model, each emotion was 
matched with five to six appraisal dimensions to capture the subtle nuances between 
different emotional experiences. This conceptual approach contributes to political literature 
as no study has yet measured the appraisal components of the three emotions in political 
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contexts. I operationalized the appraisal dimensions of the three emotions using relevant 
cognitive items that asked about details of the antecedents which induced one of the three 
emotions. Even though the conceptualizations and operationalizations of the three 
emotions were grounded in the literature, they were once again tested to identify whether 
they hold true in the political context. The findings reported in Chapter 5 illustrate the 
potential benefits of studying discrete positive emotions as well as the need for them to be 
studied separately in a political setting. 
Methodological Contributions 
This project not only contributes to the conceptualization of enthusiasm, hope, and 
pride in political contexts but also is a valuable addition to the study of political 
communication in two regards. First, I applied the measure of cognitive appraisal 
dimensions developed in cognitive psychology to assess and capture discrete emotions in 
politics. This is an important advance as it shows that discrete emotions are unique from 
one another, but when it comes to their construct and measure, each of them is universal 
and generalizable regardless of the context. Adopting the measures from cognitive 
psychology literature, and then applying them to study political emotions has seldom been 
executed in the political psychology research. Thus, the facts that the conceptualizations 
and measures (i.e., appraisal dimensions) of the three emotions held up in the current study 
passing its reliability and validity tests, and that the three emotions were shown to be 
distinct can assure the generalizability of appraisal dimension measures across different 
contexts including politics.    
Second, I employed statistical modeling techniques, such as CFA, ANOVA, and 
MANOVA, to theorize the model of discrete positive emotions and their effects. 
Considering the fact that political scholars have never proposed or tested a model of 
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discrete emotions especially in relation to the dimensions of cognitive appraisals, testing 
and confirming the proposed theoretical model of discrete positive emotions contributes to 
collective knowledge in political emotions as the statistical analysis yielded a strong model 
fit. Importantly, future research on political emotions can borrow from the present study to 
advance our understanding of discrete positive emotions in politics.  
The theoretical and methodological foundations of the dissertation assisted me with 
answering the key questions of interest; how people experience different positive emotions 
and what effects the discrete emotions (both positive and negative) carry on individuals’ 
political behaviors. The answers to these questions help to uncover how different they are 
and why they have different effects on individuals.  
FROM DISCRETE EMOTION TO PARTICIPATION 
Emotion is a slippery concept as I advanced in the introduction and Chapter 2. To 
define and account for what exactly emotion is and how it is experienced, I relied on 
appraisal theories (Frijda, 1987; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Lazarus; 1991; Scherer, 
1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The framework of appraisal theories is an appropriate 
lens for the investigation of complicated dynamics of political emotions, whether it is 
positive or negative, as it argues that different emotional experiences can be attributed to 
different cognitive evaluations of antecedents or environments where people encounter 
different stimuli. In short, Nussbaum (2001) asserted that emotion carries a cognitive 
component in it. By drawing from the appraisal components of emotions, I could 
differentiate enthusiasm, hope, and pride. Not only do individuals experience different 
positive emotions depending on their appraisals of environments, but also are affected as a 
result of experiencing discrete positive emotions. The results in Chapter 5 paint a 
compelling picture of the ways in which discrete positive emotions are distinct from one 
  
 
 
 168 
another and can have differing influence on the citizenry in terms of political engagement. 
As the work of identifying appraisal components is far more established for negative 
emotions than for positive emotions (Johnston et al., 2015; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; 
Nabi, 2002, 2003; MacKuen at al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2011), I undertake this work only 
for the under-studied positive emotions.  
Idiosyncrasy of Enthusiasm, Hope, and Pride 
The most frequently referenced positive emotion in political literature is enthusiasm 
(Barrett et al., 2001; Brader et al., 2010; Engelken-Jorge et al., 2011; Groenendyk & Banks, 
2014; Marcus et al., 2000). By defining and measuring enthusiasm, scholars often collapse 
all different positive emotions without considering the differences that may result from the 
occurrence of other distinct positive emotions like pride. It is no doubt that enthusiastic 
people may also feel other emotions like pride, joy, or hope simultaneously. This tendency 
to experience different positive emotions at the same time has challenged and complicated 
researchers’ efforts to study positive emotions (Just et al., 2015; Tong & Jia, 2017). The 
findings from the field of cognitive psychology helped me to construct the three mutually 
inclusive, yet different sets of appraisal dimensions predicting enthusiasm, hope, and pride. 
The overlap of appraisal components of the three emotions accounts for the high likelihood 
of co-occurrence of the three emotions (Tong & Jia, 2017) and allowed me to better 
construct the model predicting enthusiasm, hope, and pride.  
The following sets of appraisal dimensions were identified to predict each positive 
emotion. Enthusiasm can be explained by pleasantness, action tendency, agency (self, not 
others), resource acquisition, change, and certainty. Hope can be predicted by a lack of 
pleasantness, anticipated effort, change, a lack of certainty, and agency (others). Lastly, 
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pride is found to be explained by mastery, self-regard, social appropriateness, certainty, 
and agency (others, not self).   
Specifically, enthusiasm is experienced when a situation or incident is highly 
pleasant. When people notice a positive change and think the change would make it easier 
for them to attain desired goals or results (i.e., resource acquisition), have a control over a 
situation, and feel certain about the situation, they feel enthusiastic. This emotion makes 
people action-oriented. Feeling hopeful, on the other hand, cannot be perceived as pleasant 
in the same way as enthusiasm. Hope is experienced when a situation/incident is deemed 
to be less pleasant but there seems to be a possibility for change in the future. To achieve 
the desired change, people usually perceive that the situation would require them to expend 
effort. Hopeful people are less certain and perceive that other people are in control of the 
situation. Hope has been found to be more cognitively complicated than other positive 
emotions (Just et al., 2007), thus this may explain the low levels of pleasantness and 
certainty. Compared to enthusiasm and hope, pride is found to be a socially-integrated 
emotion which means that the emotion is usually experienced in the presence of others 
(Smith & Mackie, 2008). To illustrate, pride is likely to be induced when individuals 
perceive their deeds or behaviors are socially appropriate and desirable. In the sense, people 
usually sense a feeling of achievement (i.e., mastery) and this may lead to enhanced level 
of self-esteem. However, when it comes to the agency over the situation, people are less 
likely to feel like they are in control.  
The identification of the three different sets of overlapping appraisal dimensions 
(i.e., pleasantness, agency, change, certainty) sheds light on the high correlations among 
the three emotions. Even though the correlations do not necessarily mean co-occurrence, it 
may allude to the finding that more than one positive emotion is likely to be experienced 
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simultaneously or that positive emotions become indistinguishable especially under salient 
political events like political campaigning (Just et al., 2007).  
Most importantly, the confirmation of the three distinct sets of appraisal dimensions 
significantly contributes to and advances our collective knowledge of discrete positive 
emotions in politics. Understanding emotion and its dynamics in politics is such a 
complicated subject to entangle, thus has rendered itself conceptually and 
methodologically challenging. Political actors, such as parties, government leaders, and the 
citizenry, may all engage in this messy game partially mobilized by certain stimuli. These 
stimuli likely act as antecedents that result in or are carried over to different cognitive 
appraisals. Appraisal theorists argue that cognitive appraisal is what differentiates discrete 
emotions. The findings in Chapter 5 dovetail fairly well with previous research in appraisal 
studies, drawing a conclusion that positive emotions in the political context also can be 
explained and predicted with appraisal components. However, the findings should be 
viewed with caution as the survey results (i.e., ANOVA) did not distinguish each appraisal 
dimension across enthusiasm, hope, and pride. The important implication of the study is 
that even though positive emotions may not be distinct in terms of levels of individual 
appraisals, they are discrete in terms of their constructs. Importantly, the results of the study 
highlight the need to treat discrete emotions as latent factors rather than as observed 
variable in an analysis.   
Moreover, one of the dissertation’s key contributions to the political literature can 
be further discussed in light of possibly fruitful avenues for future studies. As advanced, 
emotion experience is contextual, and the findings from the first study suggest that feeling 
hopeful, proud, or enthusiastic in a political context may be different from experiencing 
the same emotions in other contexts. Some of the new findings went beyond the current 
literature of appraisal theories; such as that political pride is far more others-oriented and 
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less self-oriented in terms of agency than interpersonal pride, and that feeling hope or pride 
can be a far less pleasant experience than feeling the same emotion in other contexts. 
Reflecting on the findings, the importance of the context of emotion experience should be 
addressed, and future studies in emotion should take into account and compare distinct 
levels of appraisal components within the same emotion when studying cross-contextual 
emotion experiences.  
In the context of salient political events, people are likely to experience lots of 
different emotions, whether positive or negative (Gould, 2011). Collapsing all the emotions 
together regardless of their appraisal differences only captures a partial picture. Discrete 
positive emotions, in this sense, should be the subject of interest for political scholars as 
well as psychologists. Yet, the development of more accurate sets of appraisal dimensions 
is very much needed to increase the explained variance in each emotion as the political 
emotions may be more complicated and dynamic than we expect depending on context or 
incident.  
Discrete Emotions, Information Search, and Participation 
Part of the electorate’s beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors should be influenced by the 
state of their hearts (Brader, 2005; Lodge & Taber; 2011). Uncovering how each discrete 
emotional state influences people’s behaviors in politics, Chapter 6 discussed the dynamics 
among both positive and negative emotions, information search, and political participation. 
There were few differential effects of discrete emotions on information seeking. The lack 
of findings for positive emotions may be due to the following reasons: Based on the 
findings in Chapter 5, it is possible that (1) the differences in the appraisal dimensions 
across the three positive emotions were not large enough to make a difference in 
information search and that (2) the overlapping appraisals of the positive emotions result 
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in non-discriminating information search behaviors. In regard to the limited effects of both 
positive and negative discrete emotions, the reasons can be the following: (3) Information 
seeking is not only affectively driven but also cognitively oriented (Wojcieszak, Bimber, 
Feldman, & Stroud, 2016), thus could be influenced by a range of both known (e.g., 
intellectual complexity, openness) and unknown variables not included in the present 
analysis. (4) Significant levels of co-occurrences within both positive and negative 
emotions blur the unique effect of each discrete emotion. (5) Lastly, the unusual context of 
the 2016 election (e.g., historic unfavorable ratings of two front-runners) complicated the 
discrete emotion effects as people may have experienced or been exposed to an 
overwhelming mixture of negative emotions.     
The sampling method of the two studies posed another limitation. As both studies 
in the dissertation adopted non-probability samples, the biased selection of the samples, 
especially considering the fact that both samples had more than 60% of self-identified 
Democrats or liberals, may have affected the results. However, to date, we do not have any 
empirical evidence showing that partisan affiliation affects the way people experience 
emotions in general or that partisans have a tendency to experience a certain discrete 
emotion uniquely (e.g., Democrats are more prone to feel hopeful than Republicans). The 
purpose of this study was not external validity, however, and the experimental protocol 
helps to assure the internal validity of the study. 
However, the study documents that positive emotions are not always effective in 
promoting people’s information searching behaviors as the differences in the effects 
between positive emotions and no emotion were not confirmed (except that no emotion 
works better than pride in increasing pro-Democratic news reading). This is quite contrary 
to the literature that argues that positive emotions increase information processing (e.g., 
Lecheler et al., 2013). Despite the inconsistency, the findings shed light on the possibility 
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that complacent or happy individuals are not accurate or willful information seekers in all 
contexts and that people may become willful information seekers when they are in the 
neutral emotional state. In everyday politics, politicians often use the rhetoric of positivism 
to evoke positive emotions among the electorate; the perceived positivism may lead to 
increased participation and some other actions but not to information search. Speaking of 
the effects of negative emotions, going negative while campaigning or in elections may not 
be the smartest option for campaign managers to choose if they want to engage the 
electorate, as anger and anxiety had minimal effects on political information seeking and 
no negative emotion had a positive impact on engaging in political activities.   
The findings in Chapter 6 document that beyond the differences in demographics 
and major political attributes, individuals’ emotional state can make a meaningful 
difference on their decision to engage in few political activities. Although they share the 
same valence, enthusiasm, hope, and pride still pose a differing impact on political 
activities, such as attending a political rally, posting a bumper sticker, and contacting 
candidates or campaign. To date, scholars have assumed and found that enthusiasm is the 
most action-oriented positive emotion (Hutchings et al., 2006; Marcus et al., 2000). Yet, it 
is quite revealing to find that pride actually has a more powerful impact on certain activities 
like attending a rally and posting a bumper sticker, than enthusiasm or hope.  
Comparing the effect of positive emotions to that of negative emotions, some 
practical take-aways for political strategists or communication consultants may include the 
finding that the effect of overall positive emotions outperforms that of negative ones on 
political engagement. Specifically, pride could carry trickle-down effects to other positive 
emotions, especially enthusiasm, considering the high correlation (r = .96). It is possible 
that positive emotional experience can snowball to other positive emotions. Also, reflecting 
on what Cappella and Jamieson (1997) suggested to break the spiral of political cynicism, 
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positive emotions (or more intriguingly, disgust, in regard to its positive effect on 
information search) can potentially counteract the negative effects of general cynicism 
prevalent in the contemporary political environment, which is particularly dampened by 
strategic news framing by political media outlets (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; DeBell, 
2017; Woolf, 2006). 
In addition, even though the current project did not reveal a link from emotions to 
information search to political engagement, it proposes an interesting subject for future 
research. With the effects of discrete emotions on information seeking and participation 
intention being the main interest of the second study, the very limited effects of discrete 
emotions is one of the reasons for finding no linkage. However, considering the positive 
impacts of political knowledge, information acquisition, and education on political 
participation documented in literature (Verba et al., 1995), people’s information search 
behaviors in terms of both amount and direction could be a potent influencer of political 
engagement, thus is worth further study. Thus, we can look into the dynamics between the 
appraisal dimensions and information seeking/participation instead of between an emotion 
itself and information seeking/participation to find out which appraisal components (e.g., 
expected change, certainty, or agency) may lead to increased or decreased information 
seeking, thus to participation intention.    
Linking the findings of Chapter 5 and 6 together, it implies that not every positive 
emotion works better than no emotion in engaging the citizenry. In specific, the findings 
in Chapter 6 paint a persuasive picture showing that positive emotions like hope and 
enthusiasm do not help engage people in politics more than no emotion. Hope can be less 
action-oriented mainly because of the low levels of certainty and pleasantness. Also, hope 
can deter people from mobilization as they find there is no agency in themselves in a 
situation even though they notice a possibility of change. When politicians are engaged in 
  
 
 
 175 
hope-evoking talks, the possibility of change in the future may be projected, but it may be 
less likely for ordinary citizens to lead or take initiative in change as it is political leaders, 
not the citizenry, who have high stakes, thus are more invested in making the suggested 
change.  
When it comes to the effect of enthusiasm, people can feel too euphoric to take an 
actual action. Chapter 5 discovered that enthusiasm is felt as highly pleasant. Thus, when 
people are in a highly pleasant state, such as feeling enthusiastic, they may be less willing 
to take initiative in making a change or take an action as the present already feels quite 
alright (e.g., mood maintenance theory). Although this hypothesis requires further 
investigation as the emotion is also found to score high on the action-tendency dimension 
(refer to the result section of Chapter 5), this could be why some studies, but not others, 
find positive effects of enthusiasm as they use a dimensional approach by collapsing hope, 
pride, and enthusiasm all together.  
The present study brings along few additional points that deserve further 
examination. First, even though the differential effect of discrete emotions on people’s 
information seeking is not as noticeable as that of the emotions from valence-focused or 
dimensional model, they still paint an interesting picture of how people act differently 
when they experience emotions like hope, pride, anxiety and/or disgust. Thus, when 
studying people’s learning and engagement in politics, the differentiation or separation of 
discrete emotions should be done with more attention and academic rigor as they may show 
varying effects across different political activities.  
Last but not the least, the serial process from feeling emotions, to information 
seeking, to political participation needs to be examined by including more possible paths 
and variables from both the affective and cognitive sides. For example, by including 
variables like the intensity of felt emotion or level of information attainment, the linkages 
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among emotions, information seeking, and participation could be better explicated. It still 
remains as a perplexing relationship, thus should be the main foci of future research which 
centers on what mediates or moderates the relationship between discrete emotion and 
politics, if it is not the level or direction of information people seek out. 
CONCLUSION: IMPORTANCE OF KNOWING EMOTIONS IN POLITICS 
During the 2016 presidential campaign, young voters expressed their enthusiasm 
toward the Bernie Sanders’ bid for presidency by waving the sign saying #FeelTheBern. 
As he rose to be a competitive contender to Hillary Clinton, the enthusiasm eventually 
earned him more young votes than Trump and Clinton combined (Blake, 2016; Healy & 
Alcindor, 2016). The 73-year-old senator’s message and speeches energized grassroots 
movements into massive rallies and imbued young voters with enthusiasm (Schreckinger, 
2015).  
On the other side of the partisan line, Trump was claiming his full credit for 
expanding the Republican base to include independents and even Democrats as 
Republicans continued to shattering turnout records in the primaries and caucuses (Dinan, 
2016). Although it may be controversial, CNN reported in October 2016 that “Trump 
supporters’ enthusiastic reception during campaign underscores the grassroots enthusiasm 
that no previous GOP nominee has conjured in years” (Collinson, 2016).  
In both cases, the positive affective energy may have enabled people to see the 
pathways to their desired goals and believe that the goals are attainable (Civettini, 2011). 
The electorate not only makes sense of but also feels politics as it described by Redlawsk 
and colleagues (2010). The way politics makes the electorate feel has been discussed in the 
burgeoning fields of political psychology and communication.  
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This project punctuates the ever-increasing attention to the politics of emotions by 
countering claims about its effective, and potentially abusive (as it could be disguising and 
misleading) power over voters (Engelken-Jorgen et al., 2011). The dissertation makes clear 
that politics evokes discrete emotions, and they affect citizens’ participatory behaviors, but 
only to a limited extent. Although citizens experience different types of positive and 
negative emotions, they played only a limited role in determining whether people engaged 
in politics in the context of the 2016 campaign. Finally, and importantly, the different 
constructs of appraisal dimensions of discrete emotions may be the reason why they do 
differ in influencing political learning and participation in some circumstances. 
These findings in the dissertation matter for citizens, who must become more aware 
of their own emotions enacted by the media, politicians, parties, or the overall rhetoric of 
politics, to make better conscious decisions on exercising their rights as citizenry. Although 
I did not find persistent effects of emotions on information search and participation 
intentions, the fact that I did in some instances after a limited manipulation signals the need 
for increased citizen awareness. The results also matter for political leaders as they are 
trying to win over the electorate and nurture the culture of participatory democracy. And 
they especially matter for anyone interested in understanding political participation for the 
sake of democracy.  
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Appendix A. Twelve News Articles for Experiment 
I. GOP and White House Lost Big on Health Care  
 
 
 
Republican leaders abruptly pulled their overhaul of the nation’s health-care system from 
the House floor on Friday, a dramatic defeat for President Trump and House Speaker 
Paul D. Ryan that leaves a major campaign promise unfulfilled and casts doubt on the 
Republican Party’s ability to govern. 
The decision leaves President Barack Obama’s chief domestic achievement in place and 
raises questions about the GOP’s ability to advance other high-stakes priorities, including 
tax reform and infrastructure spending. Ryan (R-Wis.) remains without a signature 
accomplishment as speaker, and the defeat undermines Trump’s image as a skilled 
dealmaker willing to strike compromises to push his agenda forward. 
In an interview with The Washington Post, Trump deflected any responsibility for the 
setback and instead blamed Democrats. “We couldn’t get one Democratic vote,” he said.  
“I don’t blame Paul,” Trump added, referring to Ryan. 
Congressional leaders made clear that the bill — known as the American Health Care Act 
— was dead. “It’s done, DOA,” said Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Greg 
Walden (R-Ore.), who drafted much of the legislation. “This bill is dead.” 
It remains far from certain that Republicans, in control of the White House and both 
houses of Congress, will be able to credibly foist responsibility for the nation’s health-
care woes onto Democrats. What is certain is that Republicans continue to have difficulty 
turning their campaign promises into legislative action. 
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II. Democratic Party's Image More Positive Than GOP’s 
 
 
According to the latest USA Today/Gallup poll, Americans are much more positive in 
their assessments of the Democratic Party than of the Republican Party -- consistent with 
a trend Gallup has measured since April 2016. Over the past several months, the public's 
ratings of the Republican Party have grown slightly more negative. The vast majority of 
Republicans and Democrats rate their respective parties favorably, while independents 
have a more positive than negative view of the Democratic Party, and a more negative 
than positive view of the Republican Party. 
The Jan. 2-4, 2017, poll finds 54% of Americans saying they have a favorable opinion of 
the Democratic Party, while 37% have an unfavorable opinion. Ratings of the Republican 
Party are much more negative, with 38% favorable and 50% unfavorable. 
The public's ratings of the Republican Party have grown negative in recent months, from 
44% in July 2016 to 50% in early February 2017. The current ratings are at roughly the 
levels seen in April 2016 and at several points in 2016. The party's unfavorable ratings 
are up four points since September 2016 and are now on the low end of what Gallup has 
measured since 2006. 
Ratings of the Democratic Party have not shown much change since July 2012, with 
between 51% and 57% rating the party favorably over this time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 180 
III. Americans Grew More Positive Toward GOP's Obamacare Replacement 
 
 
 
Half of American voters agree with the Republican charge that Obamacare will collapse 
if it’s left as is.   
50 % have a favorable opinion of the Affordable Care Act, unchanged from January, 
while 47 % have a negative view of Obamacare.   
Those are some of the findings from the latest national Fox News Poll. 
According to the poll, Americans have grown more positive in their assessments of the 
Republican Party’s plan to repeal and replace Obamacare. Over the past several weeks, 
the public's ratings of the GOP’s congressional efforts to replace the Affordable Care 
Act, also known as Obamacare, have grown considerably more positive.  
As of Jan. 2017, polling statistics showed a general negative opinion of the GOP’s efforts 
to dismantle Obamacare; with those in favor at 26% and those against at 54%. In the 
latest poll, however, the ratings of the plan to replace Obamacare are more positive, with 
34% favorable and 48% unfavorable. 
Almost half of voters (48 %) oppose the GOP plan -- but that doesn’t tell the full 
story.  Among those against it, one in four complains it doesn’t make enough changes to 
Obamacare.   
Overall, 34 % favor the current Republican plan to repeal and replace Obamacare.  And 
while a majority of Republicans favors it (69 %), a sizable minority is either against it (15 
%) or unsure (16 %).   
The Fox News poll is based on landline and cellphone interviews with 1,008 randomly 
chosen registered voters nationwide and was conducted under the joint direction of 
Anderson Robbins Research (D) and Shaw & Company Research (R) from March 12-14, 
2017.   
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IV. Pew Research: Republicans More Knowledgeable Than Democrats 
  
 
 
According the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan fact tank, Republicans outperformed 
Democrats on a 19-question common knowledge quiz. 
In a scientific survey of 1,168 adults conducted during September and October of 2016, 
respondents were asked not only multiple-choice questions, but also queries using maps, 
photographs and symbols. Among other subjects, participants identified international 
leaders, cabinet members, Supreme Court justices, nations on a world map, the current 
unemployment and poverty rates and war casualty totals.  
“Republicans generally outperformed Democrats on the current knowledge quiz.  On 13 
of the 19 questions, Republicans score significantly higher than Democrats and there are 
no questions on which Democrats did better than Republicans.  In past knowledge 
quizzes, partisan differences have been more muted, though Republicans often have 
scored somewhat higher than Democrats,” John Livingston, a senior researcher at the 
center said.  
In a 2010 Pew survey, Republicans outperformed Democrats on 10 of 12 questions, with 
one tie and Democrats outperforming Republicans on one of the 12.  The Pew’s latest 
survey reconfirmed the previous result demonstrating that Republicans outperformed 
Democrats on every single one of 19 questions.  
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V. Donations Pour into Help Elizabeth Warren After Senate Rebuke 
 
 
Liberal allies of Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren have collected more than $250,000 
for the Democrat's re-election campaign since the Republican-led Senate voted to silence 
her Tuesday night. 
MoveOn.org officials said more than 9,000 members stepped up to financially support 
Warren after the Senate's Republican leaders said she had violated Senate rules by 
"impugning the motives" of Sen. Jeff Sessions, the Alabama Republican who is President 
Trump's pick for attorney general. 
Warren's objectionable act: reading aloud on the Senate floor a 1986 letter from Coretta 
Scott King, the widow of civil-rights leader Martin Luther King Jr., opposing Sessions' 
nomination to a federal judgeship. King wrote that the Alabama Republican had used his 
then-position as a U.S. attorney to intimidate elderly black voters. 
"By standing with Elizabeth Warren, we're standing up against that kind of bigotry," 
MoveOn officials said in a statement Wednesday. "We're standing up for freedom of 
speech. And we're standing up for something else that is under threat in the age of 
Trump: Truth. Together, let's show that when our friends speak truth to power, a 
powerful movement rises to stand by their side." 
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VI. Sanders Finally Blames Establishment Democrats for Trump Victory 
 
 
Sen. Bernie Sanders spoke at the 2017 Sister Giant Conference in Washington D.C. In his 
speech, he voiced his harshest criticism of the Democratic establishment since his 
presidential campaign. 
“Let me suggest to you, and some will disagree with me and that’s okay, too. But let me 
suggest to you that what happened on November 8th. Trump’s victory was not a victory 
for Trump or his ideology. It was a gross political failure of the Democratic Party,” said 
Sanders. 
Sanders called Trump a “pathological liar” with no ideology, but he believes that voters 
chose Trump because his platform challenges the status quo, as opposed to Clinton’s, 
which embodied it. “There are people in this country who are hurting, and they are 
hurting terribly,” added Sanders. “And for years they looked to the Democratic Party, 
which at one time was the party of working people, and they looked and they looked and 
they looked and they got nothing in return. And out of desperation, they turned to Donald 
Trump.” 
“The Clintons’ lack of empathy to the plight of working and middle class Americans 
repelled voters. Furthermore, Hillary Clinton and the Democratic establishment ran her 
presidential campaign as though Clinton’s victory was imminent. “It’s her turn,” was a 
mantra that blinded the party from reality. In the wake of Clinton’s loss, the 
establishment has failed to accept responsibility and has resorted to casting blame on 
voters. The party needs to begin to turn their attention away from corporate and wealthy 
donors and toward the working, poor, and middle class voters that they repeatedly cast by 
the wayside,” said Sanders in a statement.  
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VII. Republicans Unveil New Bill to Replace Obamacare 
 
 
 
House Republicans introduced a newly crafted bill to repeal Obamacare's individual 
mandate that also aims to maintain coverage for people with pre-existing conditions and 
allow children to stay on their parents' plans until the age of 26. 
The new measure would offer individuals refundable tax credits to purchase health 
insurance and restructure the country's Medicaid program so that states receive a set 
amount of money from the federal government every year. 
House Speaker Paul Ryan said in a statement, "this bill is a plan to drive down costs, 
encourage competition, and give every American access to quality, affordable health 
insurance. It protects young adults, patients with pre-existing conditions, and provides a 
stable transition so that no one has the rug pulled out from under them."  
After the stunning health-care fiasco when GOP abruptly withdrew the American Health 
Care Act on March 24, Republican leaders have teamed up with independent healthcare 
research firms to flesh out the details of an alternative health care plan and gauge the 
feasibility of a new bill.  
White House spokesman Sean Spicer praised the bill's release. "Obamacare has proven to 
be a disaster with fewer options, inferior care, and skyrocketing costs that are crushing 
small business and families across America. Now, the American people are ready to turn 
the page," Spicer said in a statement.  
Republican leaders are committed to moving forward with major tenants of the 
legislation and are hoping that President Trump can bring wavering members on board 
and get the bill across the finish line. 
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VIII. Key Democrats Target President Trump on Ethics 
 
 
 
The top Democrat on the Senate Finance Committee will introduce a bill this week that 
would force President Trump to disclose his income, assets, and liabilities in a foreign 
country before he embarks on new trade negotiations. 
The measure from Oregon Sen. Ron Wyden marks the latest push by Democrats on 
Capitol Hill and independent watchdogs to pressure the Trump administration, as they 
clamor for investigations into a top White House aide and search for novel ways to force 
the new president to disclose more information about his vast business interests and the 
ethics questions that have dogged him since his Jan. 20 swearing-in. 
Sen. Elizabeth Warren and five other Democratic senators recently wrote to White House 
counsel Don McGahn, asking him to rein in possible ethics violations after top White 
House aide Kellyanne Conway touted Ivanka Trump’s clothing line during a television 
interview.  
Democrats face long odds of their efforts gaining much traction in a Republican-
controlled Congress, but they increasingly feel emboldened by the fury of Democratic 
activists who have taken their protests to the streets and into congressional town hall 
meetings in the first weeks of the Trump administration, political observers say. 
"The Democrats, driven by their supporters, are determined to inquire into all of these 
open questions," said Cal Jillson, a political scientist at Southern Methodist University.  
“There is a very broad sense among the people who are not die-hard supporters of Donald 
Trump that there are so many unanswered questions and so many ethical strings to be 
pulled, that the sweater will unravel." 
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IX. After Short-Lived Tenure, Uber President Quits Amid Company Turmoil 
 
 
 
After less than a year as president of Uber, Jeff Jones is leaving the embattled ride-hailing 
company, Uber confirms. 
"We want to thank Jeff for his six months at the company and wish him all the best," an 
Uber spokesperson says in a statement. 
Jones, previously Target's chief marketing officer, was brought on by Kalanick last fall to 
boost Uber's reputation. 
Though Uber has long held its reputation as an aggressive startup, the company has been 
battling current controversies, ranging from sexual harassment allegations to CEO Travis 
Kalanick's abrasive behavior. 
After a video surfaced earlier this year, showing Kalanick arguing with an Uber driver, 
the CEO admitted he needed leadership help, and announced his search for a new chief 
operating officer. 
While that hunt appeared to threaten Jones' role as second in command to Kalanick, in a 
statement to Recode, Jones simply says his leadership approach is "inconsistent" with 
what he saw happening at Uber. Recode first reported Jones' departure on Sunday. 
Meanwhile, Uber CEO Travis Kalanick issued a note to staff: "After we announced our 
intention to hire a COO, Jeff came to the tough decision that he doesn't see his future at 
Uber." 
"If you're going to leave, people do so within the first year because the pace isn't what 
they expected or what they're used to," said Neal Narayani, Uber's head of people 
analytics. 
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X. Rock 'n' Roll Pioneer Chuck Berry Dies at 90 
 
 
 
Every time you see a rocker strutting the stage, slinging their guitar around and cutting 
loose with killer riffs, Chuck Berry’s musical DNA is at work. 
Berry, who died Saturday at 90 according to the St. Charles County Missouri police 
department, created the rock star blueprint more than 50 years ago and generations later, 
there’s still nobody who can touch the original.  
From the time Berry first hit the scene with Maybellene in 1955, he defined the sound, 
the swagger, the style of a rock and roll star. He was the show. And to this day, guitarists 
pay homage banging out his wicked licks and imitating his signature duck walk.  
Berry was so energetic, charismatic and unique that he rendered moot the prevailing 
racial barriers of the 1950s that kept most African American musicians out of the 
mainstream. He had a knack for gauging what his audience liked and then giving it to 
them.  
His virile concoction of country hillbilly guitar licks and spirited R&B was the high-test 
that fueled the rock and roll engine. Even being locked up in 1962-1963 couldn’t keep his 
fire from spreading on both sides of the Atlantic. The Beatles, Rolling Stones, Beach 
Boys and others gained traction during that time by covering Berry songs. Even Elvis 
dipped into his catalog. More than 75 different artists have done Berry songs. Johnny B. 
Goode alone has seen at least two dozen versions. 
Berry and his music were built to last. Scandals couldn’t keep him down. Neither could 
passing fads or changing tastes. His salacious euphemisms and rebellious spirit still 
resonate. 
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XI. Fire Near Boulder, Colorado, may be Human-Caused 
 
 
 
Firefighters made progress Sunday in battling a small wildfire that forced people to flee 
hundreds of homes in the mountains just outside downtown Boulder, Colorado, and 
authorities said they believe the blaze may have been human-caused. 
Light winds pushed the flames in the wooded area a couple of miles west of Pearl Street, 
the shopping and dining hub in the heart of the university city. Crews partially contained 
the fire that had burned just over 60 acres, but officials worried that stronger gusts that 
could fan the flames might develop overnight. 
The Boulder Office of Emergency Management said 426 homes were evacuated before 
dawn and residents of an additional 836 were warned to get ready to leave if conditions 
worsened. The evacuation orders will remain in place overnight, said Boulder County 
Sheriff's Cmdr. Mike Wagner. 
There were no reports of injuries or damage to homes, emergency officials said. Several 
aircraft were dropping water and retardant on the flames, and a community center opened 
as an evacuation shelter. 
The fire started in the Sunshine Canyon area, which is dotted with a mixture of expensive 
homes and rustic mountain residences. 
Boulder County Sheriff's Commander Mike Wagner said the area is used by hikers and 
by transients for camping, leading authorities to believe the blaze was human-caused. 
Wagner said officials ruled out any lightning strikes or downed power lines.  
Wagner said fire crews will monitor the blaze overnight and focus on full containment 
and mop-up on Monday. 
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XII. More than 50 percent of California Still in a Drought 
 
 
 
Has this year’s record rain finally ended California’s epic drought? Not really. 
Despite all the rain and snow in California over the last couple of months, more than half 
the state is still considered to be abnormally dry or worse in terms of drought conditions, 
according to the U.S. Drought Monitor. 
A new map and graph system, which was calculated Tuesday and released Thursday, 
shows that nearly all of Northern California is no longer considered to be in the drought. 
Statewide, 43.94 percent of California is out of the drought, which is up 3.5 percent from 
Feb. 7 and up more than 30 percent since Nov. 15, according to the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration. 
The northern half of the state that gets more winter rain is drought-free, while much of 
the middle and southern portion is still in moderate to severe drought. Santa Barbara 
County, where a lake that supplies its water remains at 16 percent capacity despite rain 
elsewhere in the state, is still experiencing extreme drought. 
Overall, 31.86 percent of the state is considered to be abnormally dry, 16.78 percent of 
California is considered to be in a moderate drought and 7.41 percent of the state is still 
considered to be in a severe drought. 
Many areas of the state improved their drought statuses. More than 20 percent of 
California went from moderate drought on Feb. 7 to abnormally dry when the 
measurements were calculated Tuesday, according to the NOAA data. 
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